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Abstract 
This study is a sociological analysis of Romani nationalism in Britain. It 
explores the extent to which Britain’s Romanies support, and identify with, the 
notion of a “Roma Nation”. It is guided by questions regarding how Britain’s 
Romanies negotiate otherness, home and belonging within the context of 
increasing Roma migration to Britain.  It looks for instances of “groupness” or 
“collective identity” between previously disconnected Romani populations 
who have been brought together by migration. Fifty-two Romanies 
participated in this research. They belong to three waves of Romani diaspora: 
Romany Gypsies who arrived in Britain in the 15th century; Roma who arrived 
as refuges in the 1990s; and EU Roma migrants arriving post-2004. The 
primary aim of this study is to explore their experience of otherness, home 
and belonging and how their identifications with the Roma Nation are 
conditioned by their positions and experiences. The participants’ relationships 
to Britain are associated with both strong desires to belong and/or be 
recognised, and a bleak reality of exclusion and otherness. In their narratives 
there is no given homeland to which they all relate and with which they all 
identify. Roma maintain strong identifications with their countries of birth and 
Romany Gypsies assert a strong sense of British identity. The study shows 
that both Roma and Romany Gypsies have little interest in and limited 
knowledge of, an Indian homeland. The study also highlights the internal 
boundaries and contradictions that divide Britain’s Romani population. The 
analysis shows that they remain largely divided by country of origin, national 
identity, religion and lifestyle. The study concludes by considering the 
implications of these findings on the prospect of Romani nationalism in Britain.  
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Chapter 1 
How the Romanies Became White (and Black Again) 
Who am I and where do I belong? Throughout our lives we are all confronted 
with these questions. The answers shape our moral code, our norms and our 
values. They define our “roots”, determine and anchor our identities, and 
fashion our relation to society. Why, at times, do questions of identity and 
belonging become more significant and contentious? Why do questions of 
identity, origin and national belonging become central to some situations but 
not others? How do nomadic peoples make meaning of notions of origins, 
homeland and nationality? How are the socio-political relations between 
ethnic groups shaped in a society in which, on the one hand, identity is used 
to rally political opposition and resistance to the status quo, and on the other 
hand, nations, nationalities, ethnicities, and cultures are hierarchically 
positioned?  
It is evident that notions of identity, origins and belonging are not strictly 
“personal”. They are increasingly political in nature, often manipulated by 
racist, exclusionist and nationalist political ideologies and movements. The 
Romanies are often the intended targets of such ideologies. Their identities 
are denied or redefined, their origins are questioned, and through a process 
of “otherisation” they are excluded from the national community. At the same 
time, Romani actors seek to counteract the stigmatising processes of ethnic 
exclusionism with their own nationalist ideology. A small Romani nationalist 
movement has emerged at a transnational level, at the centre of which lies 
questions of Romani identity, origins and homeland. Romani nationalism is 
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arguably a form of diasporic politics. It requires us, however, to 
“deessentialise” and deconstruct understandings of the nation because of the 
ambiguity that a Romani homeland adds to the seemingly fixed nature of the 
nation state.  
The Romanies are a curious example of diaspora communities where origin 
and homeland have not, until recently, been of any political or personal 
significance. The consciousness of a Romani homeland - of a single origin, a 
land to return to - has never been central to the identity formation of the 
Romani people. Displacement, marginality and exclusion, however, are 
common experiences to the Romanies who are so often stigmatised and 
“othered”. Romani nationalism goes some way to provide answers to 
questions of identity and belonging for a group of people who are so often 
excluded from a sense of national belonging. It remains, however, a struggling 
and marginal movement. This study will explore diasporic Romani nationalism 
and the extent to which Britain’s Romani population support, and identify with, 
the notion of a “Roma nation”.  
Aims of the Research 
The Romani nationalist movement has been comprehensively researched in 
the Central and Eastern European context. Rather surprisingly, however, 
there has been little research exploring Romani nationalism in Britain. In many 
ways the Romani peoples of Britain are an interesting example.  Firstly, over 
the last decade there has been a substantial growth in Gypsy and Traveller 
NGOs (Cemlyn et al., 2009) engaged in various forms of activism. This has 
been a significant development as it is the first time that various stigmatised 
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“nomadic” populations have employed the concept of a seemingly united 
group identity, aiming to secure the interest of both domestic and international 
governments. This offers a unique case given that Britain’s Romany Gypsies 
have traditionally aligned themselves with similarly situated travelling 
communities in Britain (more specifically, the Irish Travellers) as opposed to 
other Romani populations across Europe. Secondly, within the framework of 
the EU enlargement process and the subsequent increase in Roma migration 
to Britain, this case provides us with an opportunity to explore how “Romani”, 
as a political identity, operates when applied to previously disconnected 
Romani communities who have been brought together by migration. By 
“Romani communities” I refer to two crudely defined subgroups of Romani 
peoples: (1) Britain’s native Romanies, who are known as “Romany Gypsies” 
and (2) European migrants of Romani ethnicity who are known as “Roma”.  
 
The overall purpose of this research is to explore identifications with, and 
support for, the notion of a “Roma nation” and/or diaspora in the British 
context. The research aims to understand experiences of otherness, home 
and belonging and how identifications with the “Roma Nation” are conditioned 
by such experience. Through an in-depth qualitative analysis, this research 
will explore instances of “groupness”, “we-ness” or “collective identity” 
amongst Britain’s Romani population, particularly in relation to questions of 
homeland, origins and national belonging.  
 
This research has an additional purpose. It aims to contribute to the discipline 
of Romani Studies. This research applies works on Romani identity, origins 
and nationhood to the British context, in order to contribute to an 
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understanding of Romani nationalism outside of a Central and Eastern 
European context. This will be achieved by stressing the differences, and 
similarities, between Roma migrants and Romany Gypsies and bringing them 
into the centre of the analysis. This is a qualitative focus group based study. 
The sociological intervention method is employed to gather individual and 
collective narratives. Fifty-two respondents from both Roma and Romany 
Gypsy backgrounds have participated and their lived experiences, knowledge 
and reflections are at the centre of this research.   
 
The following questions have steered my analysis:  
 
1. To what extent, and in what circumstances, do participants support, or 
actively adopt, a diasporic nationalist stance and/or identification with 
the “Roma Nation”? 
2. To what extent do the participants’ feel a sense of “belonging” to British 
society? How do their feelings of belonging differ and why? 
3. What do “origins” and “homeland” mean to the respondents? How do 
their narratives of origins and homeland differ and why? 
 
In the following, I will briefly introduce whiteness as an analytical concept. A 
short history of policy responses to the “Romani problem” and an overview of 
their exclusion from the race and ethnicity discourse will also be presented. 
Finally, I will give an outline of the remaining chapters.  
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Excluding the “Gypsy” from Race Discourse 
Romany Gypsies - or as they’re more commonly referred to, “the Gypsies” - 
are one of the oldest ethnic minorities in Britain. They were first referred to in 
British records at the beginning of the 15th Century. In spite of this, there is 
little, if any, accurate data on the size of the Romany Gypsy population. They 
have been lost within official statistics where they have been positioned under 
the umbrella term of “Gypsies and Travellers”- a category that encompasses 
a variety of peoples, not all of whom identify as Romany Gypsy. Nevertheless, 
whilst the percentage of those that identify as Romany Gypsy remains 
uncertain, there are an estimated 300,000 “Gypsies and Travellers” living in 
the UK (Richardson and Ryder, 2012:4). The absence of the Romany Gypsies 
from official channels of ethnic monitoring is telling. Unlike other large ethnic 
minorities in Britain, primarily from Africa, the Caribbean and South Asia, 
Romany Gypsies are not considered an ethnic group distinct from the white 
British populace, but as white “chavs” who choose to live in caravans. 
 
State definitions of the ethnic status of the Romany Gypsies are often blurred. 
On the one hand, they are recognised as an ethnic minority group and granted 
the full protection of the Equality Act 2010. On the other, the boundaries of 
“Gypsyness” were recently refashioned under the 2015 Planning Policy for 
Traveller Sites (PPTS) excluding any Gypsy and Traveller who is no longer 
nomadic, for whatever reason, from definitions of Gypsy ethnicity. There have 
been documented examples of MPs infringing the Equality Act, referring to 
Gypsies and Travellers in both an overtly and indirectly discriminatory manner, 
often without reprimand. What is clear is that, in spite of the Equality Act, the 
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state does not recognise that Romany Gypsies can be subjected to practices 
which are grounded in ethnic distinction and/or racist discrimination.  
 
There is a substantial body of research that indicates the Romany Gypsies 
are amongst the most socially excluded ethnic groups in Britain.  Of all “lower” 
socio-economic groups in the UK, they experience the poorest health and 
have a life expectancy which is ten years below the national average (Ellis 
and McWhirter, 2008). Romany Gypsy children have the lowest levels of 
educational attainment than any other ethnic group (DfE, 2012) and their 
participation in secondary education is significantly low. This is reflected in 
high rates of unemployment and poverty. Underpinning these inequalities is 
an incessant lack of culturally suitable accommodation or “Gypsy and 
Traveller sites’. Indeed, planning policy seldom advocates the development of 
local authority owned sites and instead encourages self-provision. When local 
authority sites are provided, they are often of poor quality, thus exacerbating 
ill-health. Such is the extent of their social exclusion that it cannot be explained 
by their socio-economic status alone and it has remained an unrelenting 
feature of the “Romany Gypsy experience”.  
 
Definitions of racism in the British context have been constructed upon a 
black/white dichotomy.  They thus omit Romany Gypsies from understandings 
of ethnic or racial discrimination, given that they are palpably “white”. This is 
replicated ‘within the liberal academic classes [in which] certain forms of 
racisms are legitimised and others are not’ (Bhopal and Myers, 2008, 209). 
Indeed, the scholarly recognition of the racialisation of the Romanies in Britain 
and of their experiences of discrimination are often overlooked.  The exclusion 
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of Romany Gypsies from understandings of racism and discrimination 
appears to be largely grounded in the notion that: (1) Romany Gypsies are 
white and therefore do not experience racism and discrimination; (2) Romany 
Gypsies equate a social class; and (3) Romany Gypsies are ethnically British. 
When the inequalities experienced by Romany Gypsies are recognised, this 
is usually done so within a “hierarchy of oppression” which posits that white 
minorities cannot experience racism at the same intensity as people of colour.  
Such assumptions are reinforced by the fact that Romany Gypsies have 
remained largely absent from the discourse of immigration and have been 
constructed in Britain (despite their stigmatised position) as part of the national 
community of white Britons. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to 
challenge these assumptions.  
The Invisibility of the “Gypsy” in Post-War Migration 
The fact that Romany Gypsies have been largely absent from immigration 
discourse has rendered them somewhat invisible as an ethnic minority. 
Romany Gypsies have been visible as an ethnic minority in Britain, both 
phenotypically and culturally, to varying degrees since the 15th Century. 
Boundaries and definitions of “ethnic minority” are changeable and vary over 
time/space. Likewise, the criterions for entry to, and membership of, the nation 
vary in different contexts. The very ideology of the nation functions to divide 
the world into an “us” and “them”. National boundaries have been maintained 
by “symbolic border guards” (Armstrong, 1982) that, throughout history, have 
called upon cultural, phenotypical and religious distinctions. This thesis argues 
that, owing to their absence from immigration discourse, the Romany Gypsies 
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of contemporary Britain have typically remained inside, although on the 
margins of, the parameters of Britishness. 
It is of note that both pre-war, and to an extent post-war, white migration to 
Britain has largely been overlooked. An analysis of migration has instead 
centred on migration from Africa, the Caribbean and South Asia. It is the arrival 
of the Windrush generation in 1948, rather than the arrival of Europeans, Irish 
or Romany Gypsies in the pre-war era, that is largely considered the crucial 
moment in the history of migration to Britain. It was with the advent of 
Windrush migration that phenotypical racial differences came to dominate the 
public discourse on migration. A letter sent to Prime Minister Atlee by eleven 
of his backbenchers, urged the government to take control of immigration from 
the colonies, arguing that: 
 
The British people fortunately enjoy a profound unity without 
uniformity in their way of life, and are blest by the absence of a 
colour racial problem. An influx of coloured people domiciled here 
is likely to impair the harmony, strength and cohesion of our public 
and social life and to create discord and unhappiness among all 
concerned (Carter, 2002, 118).  
 
Their concerns echoed the prevailing attitudes toward Commonwealth 
migration that positioned black migrants as the source of a ‘colour racial 
problem’ which was otherwise unknown to the British populace and which 
could be avoided by implementing immigration controls. It goes some way to 
explaining why white ethnic minorities are so often overlooked in many 
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academic, state and popular understandings of racism and discrimination. In 
post-war Britain, despite substantial white migration from Europe, the notion 
of the “immigrant” or “ethic/racial other” signified black or Asian groups. As a 
result, white ethnic minorities in Britain – though the recipients of 
discrimination, marginalisation and hostility – became largely invisible. What 
is more, the ethnic and cultural differences among the white population, as 
well as the history and significance of white migration to Britain, were 
overlooked (Webster, 2005).  
The equation of the “immigrant” and the “racial/ethnic other” with post-war 
black and Asian migration fashioned a characteristic binary of belonging which 
positioned Britons as white and “immigrants” as black. Within this binary 
Britain’s European immigrants and white ethnic minorities became 
increasingly invisible – a position which became further engrained after the 
introduction of the free movement of persons within the internal borders of the 
EU. This binary fashioned the notion of a British nation that was otherwise 
ethnically homogenous and one which had been so in the pre-war era. The 
pre-Windrush history of immigration was consequently whitewashed and 
racism was viewed as an issue that did not exist in Britain prior to post-war 
black and Asian migration (Webster, 2008). The “anti-racist” paradigm has 
rather unquestionably accepted the myth of white British homogeneity. There 
has been little interrogation of the discourses and practices of the state which 
have concealed the internal ethnic, regional and national differences which 
divide Britain.  
In much of the analysis of, and commentary on, post-war Commonwealth 
migration, the “newness” of racism is underlined (see, for example, Barker, 
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1981). Gilroy (1991. 60) states that in this “new racism”, ‘”race” is seen instead 
as a cultural issue”. Referring to this as “cultural racism”, Hall (1989, 1) 
explains that ‘differences in culture, in ways of life, in systems of belief in ethnic 
identity and tradition now matter more than anything which can be traced to 
specifically genetic or biological forms of racism’. “New racism” thus refers to 
cultural differences, such as language, religion, nationality, etc. as markers of 
racial difference. It is the belief that cultures are tied to national territories and, 
thus, the performance of culture outside its given territory will lead to hostility 
and tensions between newcomers and natives. As Modood (1997, 155) 
argues, ‘cultural racism builds on biological racism a further discourse which 
evokes cultural differences from an alleged British or “civilised” norm to vilify, 
marginalise or demand cultural assimilation…’ from racialised others.  
 
The theory of “new racism” is difficult to corroborate if the history of racist and 
discriminatory practices in Britain is explored. As Gilroy (1987, 45) notes, “new 
racism” ‘is primarily concerned with mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, it 
specifies who may legitimately belong to the national community and 
simultaneously advances reasons for the segregation or banishment of those 
whose “origin, sentiment, or citizenship” assigns them elsewhere’.  
Sociological studies of race and ethnicity have readily assumed “new” 
understandings of racism. Though the legislation employed to restrict 
undesirable immigration is new, it has been assumed such processes were 
not already in force in pre-war in Britain. The long history of anti-Semitism, 
anti-Gypsyism and anti-Irish sentiment in Britain illustrates that there is 
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nothing “new” about employing cultural difference as a means to which 
inferiorise and exclude groups from society.  
 
The exploration of anti-Gypsy racism and the ever changing constructions of 
the “Gypsy” are particularly pertinent to understandings of the contemporary 
Romani experience. Both the racially loaded nationalism that arose with 
Enlightenment science and the enduring historical construction of the “Gypsy” 
as the “Other”, have framed the experience of the Romanies in Britain. 
Historically, anti-Gypsy racism has encompassed elements of both 
“biological” and “cultural” racism. The Romanies have been constructed, 
therefore, as both innately inferior and as culturally deviant.   
Policy Responses to the “Gypsy Problem” 
An exploration of historic understandings of, and responses to, the Romany 
Gypsies uncovers that they embodied much of what was described as “new” 
about cultural racism. The attempted assimilation of the Romany Gypsies and 
other nomadic groups has a lengthy history. Policy responses have often been 
grounded in racialised understandings of the Romanies which accentuate 
their assumed moral deficit and the urgent need to civilise them (Vanderbeck, 
2003). Notions of immorality and a lack of self-control, dirt, aggression, 
deviance, idleness, poor intellect and racial purity have all been employed at 
various times to rationalise discriminatory responses toward the Romanies, 
with these ascribed characteristics fashioned in contrast to the norms and 
values of the wider, “respectable”, population. 
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State responses towards Romany Gypsies have often employed policies of 
spatial control and restriction of movement (Smith and Greenfields, 2013). 
They have been implemented under various guises throughout history with 
the 1530 Egyptians Act being one of the earliest examples. The Egyptians Act 
sought to rid England of all “Egyptians”, that is “Gypsies”, by barring any 
further immigration and demanding those already living in England to leave 
voluntarily within sixteen days or face the confiscation of their property, 
incarceration and deportation (Mayall, 1995, 20). The Act was revised in 1554 
to pardon those “Egyptians” who adopted a sedentary lifestyle and abstain 
from their ‘naughty, idle and ungodly life and company’ (Mayall, 1995, 21).  
For Mayall (1995, 22), this revision to state policy was significant; ‘the 
objective of complete removal, by deportation or death, was giving way to 
forced settlement and assimilation into the dominant, sedentary society and 
culture’.  The aim was, thus, to obliterate the traditions and culture which 
characterised Romany Gypsy identities.   
Another significant legislative change came in 1562 in which the Egyptians 
Act was amended to include “counterfeit Egyptians”. Formerly, Romany 
Gypsies had been defined by the state as immigrants or a foreign people. 
Despite policies of deportation, they remained a fixed presence in Britain with 
the “Egyptian” population increasing in size and intermixing with other 
indigenous nomadic groups. Under the Egyptians Act, indigenous itinerants 
living the “Egyptian way of life” and native born offspring of the Egyptians were 
exempt from existing controls. The Egyptians Act was thus modified to impart 
a level of flexibility over definitions of “Egyptian”. Under such revisions, the 
state could impose assimilationist policies against nomadic peoples whether 
they were “foreign” or not.  
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Efforts to assimilate Romany Gypsies intensified in the early 19th Century due 
to the impact of industrialisation (Mayall, 1988). The social changes instigated 
by industrialisation and the transition from a rural to an urban economy and 
society stripped commercial nomadism of much of its prior practicality and 
importance.  Though many itinerants were able to adapt to industrialised 
society, many others were faced with declining employment opportunities. 
Romany Gypsies, and other nomadic groups, were thus positioned as a 
“social problem”. By rejecting two of the key cornerstones of industrialised 
society – waged labour and a permanent residence – Romany Gypsies 
represented a challenge to modern society. As McVeigh notes, ‘the continued 
existence of nomads and vagrants was a key symbol of the unfinished project 
of modernity and evidence of the survival of unwanted elements from the pre-
modern’ (McVeigh, 1997, p.18). Consequently, Romany Gypsies, along with 
other nomadic “undesirables”, became subject to policies of assimilation and 
sedentarism (Mayall, 1988). 
 
The main objective of post-industrial policy, therefore, has been to make 
nomadism increasingly difficult to sustain. For McVeigh (1997), opposition to 
nomadism is grounded in the ideology of “sedentarism” which signifies a: 
 
system of ideas and practices which serve to normalise and 
reproduce sedentary modes of existence and pathologies and 
repress nomadic modes of existence…[sedentarism] includes the 
active and intentional incitement of fear and hatred of 
nomads….[and] also includes a host of other less tangible ideas, 
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actions and structures which construct being sedentary as the only 
possible mode of existence… (1997, 9).  
 
For McVeigh, post-industrial Britain embodies the success of sedentarist 
hegemony and the emergence of British multiculturalism has done little to 
challenge this. The dominant model of multiculturalism in Britain has been 
liberal multiculturalism. According to Anthias and Yuval Davis (1992, 158):  
 
Multiculturalism constructs society as composed of a hegemonic 
homogenous majority, and small unmeltable minorities with their 
own essentially different communities and cultures, which have to 
be understood, accepted, and basically left alone since their 
differences are incompatible with the hegemonic culture – in order 
for the society to have harmonious relations.  
 
Yet, Romany Gypsies have not been understood, accepted or “left alone”. 
Legislation continues to constrain Gypsy and Traveller identity. For example: 
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 removed the obligation upon 
local authorities to supply Gypsy and Traveller sites (Barclay, 2010); the Anti-
Social Behaviour Act 2003 gave police and local authorities greater powers to 
evict Gypsies and Travellers (Casiani, 2004); the Housing Act 2004 
reintroduced the obligation on local authorities to make adequate provision for 
Gypsies and Travellers, but was repealed by the Housing and Planning Act 
2016 (Central Bedfordshire Council, 2016); and changes to planning policy, 
introduced in 2015, prevent Gypsies and Travellers from settling on 
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permanent Gypsy and Traveller sites unless they can prove that they maintain 
a nomadic lifestyle (DCLG, 2015).  
 
Arguably, the emergence of multiculturalism has failed to challenge the 
assimilationist and integrationist policies in place against Romany Gypsies. 
The emergence of British multiculturalism occurred simultaneously with 
commonwealth immigration, thus, omitting, again, Romany Gypsies from 
definitions which heavily focus on non-white minorities and immigration. 
Indeed, ‘the whiteness of Gypsies (real or imaginary) impacts upon the 
position Gypsies are able to occupy within multicultural society’ (Bhopal and 
Myers, 2008, 195). That said, even in multicultural Britain, sedentarism 
prevails and is grounded in both racialised and classed understandings of 
Romany Gypsies. I will now briefly explain both.  
Racialising the Gypsy 
The nineteenth century was a seminal moment in scientific thinking about 
race. The notion of race was by no means a new invention. As the Egyptians 
Act demonstrates, racial differences certainly informed policy before the 
1800s. There was, however, a fundamental shift in scientific ideas about race 
throughout the nineteenth century. Referred to as the “Age of Reason”, it was 
a time of great socioeconomic, political and religious uncertainty, the basis for 
which is grounded in the Enlightenment and industrial revolution. The 
Enlightenment demanded a scientific understanding of the world, thus 
necessitating rational and objective scientific categorisations. Though such 
categorisation led to many of the advancements which made possible the 
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industrial revolution, it was uncritically applied to human populations. 
Intelligence, personality, beauty, and criminality became objects of scientific 
study, in which phenotypical characteristics were employed to fashion 
distinctions between “races” (Pahl, 2002). 
 
The Enlightenment was an acutely European project which transpired at a 
time when Europeans were eager to differentiate themselves from others 
whom they saw as inferior and less civilised than themselves. A hallmark of 
Enlightenment scholars was their unanimous agreement that Europeans 
were, by every measurement, superior to other races.  The notion of European 
supremacy hinged on its opposite - the unenlightened, the culturally 
backwards, the uncivilised, or the savage - which generally referred to those 
defined as non-European or non-white.  
 
During the 19th and 20th centuries, such reasoning was employed to position 
Europe’s Romanies. With the intention of scientifically explaining the 
Romanies supposed deviation from standards of Western civility, attempts 
were made to scientifically determine their non-European origins. Linguistic 
research made links between the Romani language and Hindustani (Matras, 
1995). The notion of an Indian homeland was thus introduced and utilised to 
explain the origin, identity and character of the Romani people.  The theory 
was popularised by German historian Heinrich Grellmann, giving scholarly 
legitimacy to the long held idea of a distinctive Gypsy race. Grellmann 
regarded the Romanies as an uncivilised and non-European people. He was 
a proponent of radical assimilationist policy, declaring it the only means by 
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which the Romanies could be civilised. His work gave scientific justification to 
the marginalisation of the “Indian speaking” nomadic peoples, who by now 
has been racialised as a lost Indian tribe. Their deviance was no longer 
explained in terms of their impiety but in terms of their genetics – a philosophy 
that not only lingered but which later informed Hitler’s “final solution” which 
saw half a million Romanies murdered in Nazi concentration camps (Acton, 
2004; Saul, 2007). 
In the British context, and following the English translation and publication of 
Grellman’s works, his theory of Romani origins instigated an interest in the 
Romany Gypsy community from which an expanding body of research 
developed. Indeed, following the popularity of Enlightenment ethnography and 
anthropology, Britain’s nomads became increasingly subject to the 
“orientalist” gaze. Orientalism – a way to conceptualise the dichotomy 
between the “civilised” West and “uncivilised” East - is a discourse in which 
the West’s understandings of the East are intricately compounded with 
Western supremacy.  For Said (1995), the “Occident” denotes the inherently 
held ideas of Western, European and white supremacy which are used to 
rationalise Western intervention and rule in the East. Orientalism often 
becomes a display of the West’s ‘projection onto and will to govern over’ (Said, 
1995, 95) another society, culture or minority, thus rendering minorities 
powerless to speak in a language of their own about a culture of their own. It 
is assumed that the “Orient” lacks the progressive values and knowledges of 
the West. The East is therefore essentialised, exoticised and inferiorised - a 
process facilitated by Western imperialism and the postcolonial preservation 
of hegemonic Western ideology.  
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Orientalism, when applied to the Romani experience, denotes the notions of 
incivility and exoticism that are central themes in Romani studies. By the late 
nineteenth century, fascination into Gypsy culture became the hallmark of the 
Romantic Movement. The literary and academic trend for romanticised 
Romany Gypsies positioned them as a ‘foreign and mysterious race that are 
at home living a natural, alfresco existence in the highways and byways of 
rural England’ (Holloway, 2005:355).  The Gypsy had been appropriated as a 
quaint and exotic figure for scholarly study - a representation which relied on 
the ‘generalisations about a fixed trans-European Gypsy “nature”’ that had 
been popularised by Grellmann (Burke, 2004:58).  
 
By the late 19th century, the scholarly studies of the Romany Gypsies had 
become, to a certain degree, ‘formalised and institutionalised in the shape of 
the Gypsy Lore Society’ (Mayall, 2010:58). The Gypsylorists propagated an 
image of Romany Gypsies as an exotic and enigmatic race from distant 
Eastern lands and aimed to protect and sustain the quaint world of the true 
Gypsy wanderers. This romantic depiction of Romany Gypsies, however, 
allowed the Gypsylorists to denounce the mass of Britain’s nomads as 
degenerate vagrants as, unlike the “genuine” Romanies, they were not 
presumed to have derived from a noble Romani bloodline (Mayall, 1988).  The 
Gypsylorist notion of the “true Gypsy” was an instrument exploited by policy 
makers, used as a means to condemn those they wished to subjugate (Acton, 
1974). They claimed that the “true Gypsies” were a highborn and endangered 
race and thus set forth legislation which would constrain the growing numbers 
of vagrants who imitated the Gypsy way of life (Mayall, 1988). Hence, the 
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notion of the “true Gypsy” became an effective political tool used ‘as an 
(unachievable) ideal against which to compare those they wished to repress’ 
(Holloway, 2005:362). 
 
For quite some time, Romani studies was wedged between a vague, and often 
amateur, combination of folkloristics and linguistics, which aimed to 
accentuate the distinctive customs and behaviours of the Romani people. It 
remained on the margins of the academic arena where it was positioned 
outside the ‘traditional spheres of academic respectability’ (Mayall, 2010:58). 
Contemporary Romani Studies, however, has begun to expand beyond the 
small and somewhat snubbed area of folkloristics and has emerged as a 
developing multidisciplinary field. Books about the Romanies have been 
published by an array of respected publishers and the field of Romani studies 
has become increasingly engaging for academics across disciplines (Mayall, 
2010). Their contribution to Romani Studies has somewhat shifted the focus 
away from the romantic notions of the Gypsylorists. Contemporary Romani 
studies is instead concerned with challenging the entrenched negative 
understandings of the Romanies which invalidate the Romani people’s right 
to equality and disregard the complexity of Romani culture (Tremlett, 2009). 
 
The orientalising legacy of enlightenment racialisation, however, has left a 
lingering mark on the works of Romani Studies scholars. Indeed, Romani 
studies has been continually criticised for its homogenisation of the Romani 
people (Tremlett, 2009).  Given the tendency for its scholars to unequivocally 
accept and propagate the theory of Indian origins, Romani Studies is often 
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considered instrumental in the construction and perpetuation of the “true 
Gypsy/ fake Gypsy” dichotomy (Willems, 1997). Scholars such as Willems 
(1997) have been critical of the way in which Romani Studies, in its absence 
of theory, has neglected the ways in which the process of racialisation has 
manipulated the social construction of Romani identity. He points to the earlier 
research of Okely (1983) which confronted the assumption that the narrative 
of Indian origins could be used to rationalise the contemporary realities of the 
Romani people. Indeed, Willems argued that “Gypsy” was a term imposed on 
a hugely diverse assortment of marginalised peoples. His critique has initiated 
a significant debate within Romani Studies. It confronted the tendency 
amongst Romani studies scholars to create a fallacious picture of the “true 
Gypsy” – a tendency which Willems believed brought about the ‘splendid 
isolation of Romani Studies from other academic areas’ (1997:305). 
‘Chavs Who Choose’ 
For Holloway (2005) the “true Gypsy/ fake Gypsy” dichotomy exists to this 
day, to the detriment of Britain’s Romany Gypsies. The “true Gypsy”, as set 
out by the Gypsylorists, has never been anything more than a romantic 
fantasy and exoticised myth, yet, society still relies on this fanciful figure to 
draw lines of ethnic distinction. In her research into the racialisation of “Gypsy-
Travellers”, Holloway observed the use of physiognomy as a means of 
differentiating between Gypsies and the wider population. Olive skin, dark hair 
and “traditional” clothing were all identified as signifiers of Gypsy ethnicity.  
Accordingly, just a small minority were considered “true Gypsies” whilst the 
remainder were branded ‘hangers on’ (p356). By amalgamating physiognomy 
with ethnic authenticity, argues Holloway, the white rural residents she 
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interviewed were employing the same “true Gypsy/fake Gypsy” discourse 
propagated by the Gypsylorists. The “true Gypsy” and ‘hanger on’ dichotomy 
operated as a mask; it allowed Holloway’s participants to voice their anxieties 
and prejudices about Gypsy communities without appearing overtly racist. 
‘Hangers-on’ were not considered a “race” but rather ‘white pretenders’ 
(p.364).   
This brings us to the conception of Romany Gypsies as “chavs who choose”. 
Comparable to the “trailer trash” of the United States, this understanding 
positions them as a degenerate white underclass that have chosen to live a 
nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle. In other words, Romany Gypsies are not 
a “naturally occurring” racial or ethnic group – they were not born Gypsies – 
but an element of the white working class who have chosen to be Gypsies. 
Significantly, the designation of “whiteness” bestowed upon Holloway’s (2005, 
364) ‘white pretenders’ did not bring with it any capital. The concept of 
whiteness has been defined as ‘a location of structural advantage, of race 
privilege…it is a “standpoint”, a place from which White people look at 
ourselves, at others, and at society...[it] refers to a set of cultural practices that 
are usually unmarked and unnamed’ (Frankenberg, 1993, 1). Whiteness 
implies ‘an idealised human being, a figure depicted in terms of its 
extraordinary qualities’ (Bonnett, 2002 330) indicative of the white middle 
class. Whiteness is ‘…a supremacist identity…it connotes lack of 
exceptionality, the homely virtues of quietness, tidiness, cleanness, and 
decency’ (Bonnett, 2002 330). This understanding of whiteness sits in contrast 
with perceptions of the Romanies as an uncivilised, dirty and lower class.  
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In whiteness studies, there has been a move toward defining whiteness and 
white identity not only in terms of its structural privilege, but in terms of a 
multiplicity of white identities with varying access to the capital of whiteness. 
Certainly, many scholars have explored the concept of whiteness as 
examining the varying “shades” of white; with some white groups (namely, the 
white working class) being denied the privileges of whiteness given their 
failure to achieve white respectability (Bonnett, 1998; Garner, 2007; Hartigan; 
1997; Haylett, 2001; Webster, 2008). Hughey (2010, 1289) presents a link 
between these two conceptions of whiteness with his notion of hegemonic 
whiteness which positions whiteness as: 
 
…a cultural process in which: (1) racist, reactionary and essentialist 
ideologies are used to demarcate interracial boundaries, and (2) 
performances of white racial identity that fail to meet those ideals 
are marginalised and stigmatised, thereby creating intra-racial 
distinctions within the category “white”. 
 
Hughey (2010, 1290) adds that while whiteness is a concept in flux, varying 
across different social contexts, many white identities, and processes of white 
identity formation, necessitate the positioning of ‘those marked as “white” as 
essentially different from and superior to those marked as “non-white”’ and the 
marginalisation of forms of whiteness and white identity ‘that fail to exemplify 
dominant ideals’. 
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In Holloway’s (2005, 364) study, participants did not recognise “fake Gypsies” 
as white equals but as white others from the ‘socially excluded urban 
population’. In this way, Gypsies, despite being white, do not necessarily 
‘benefit from or enjoy the privileges attached to whiteness’ (Bhopal, 2011, 
327).  In the study of whiteness, the white working class have played a central 
role.  The ambiguous positioning of the white working class within the symbolic 
boundaries of whiteness has underlined the instabilities of whiteness, 
revealing it as a set of values and practices rather than simply a skin colour. 
Whiteness appears to operate performatively and is not simply inherited or an 
unconditionally assigned trait (Rhodes, 2012, 486).  
 
Class is also central to McVeigh’s (1997) notion of sedentarism, given that 
nomadism confronts capitalist conceptions of land ownership and private 
property (Greenfields and Home, 2008). Gypsy uses of land sit in sharp 
contrast with the sedentary population’s relationship with land, hence 
fashioning a policy response focused on assimilation and settlement. Policies 
of settlement materialise in the form of spatial exclusion. Spatial exclusion has 
always been utilised as means to keep poor, white, marginalised groups apart 
from the wider, more prosperous population. ‘The spatial confinement of 
marginalised white-ethnicity to the habitus of the white council estate’ 
(Webster, 2008, 304) removes such groups not only from middle-class 
society, but increasingly from the more “civilised” ranks of the working class. 
The enforced decline of nomadism, and the confinement of the Romany 
Gypsies into permanent Gypsy and Traveller sites or into largely ‘poor quality, 
stigmatised areas of social housing where they reside with other marginalised 
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and disenfranchised sections of the population’ (Smith and Greenfields, 2013, 
14), is greatly influential to class based understandings of Romany Gypsies.  
 
For Hartigan (1999), the designation of whiteness is dependent on class 
identity. In his study of class and whiteness in Detroit, Hartigan presents the 
notion of shades of whiteness and argues that lower-class whites are 
excluded from the privileges and power of hegemonic whiteness. The white 
working class have become increasingly marginalised within contemporary 
public discourse and are often associated with backwardness and tawdry 
cultural practices (Hartigan, 1997; Haylett, 2001; Sayer; 2005; Webster; 
2008). Webster (2008, 302-303) argues that ‘the white working-class poor are 
blamed for a “decline” in the working class, pathological masculinities, 
backwardness, degeneracy, crime, over-fecundity, fecklessness and above 
all are seen as an anachronistic remnant of an industrial culture blocking a full 
move to modernisation and progress’. As Hartigan explains, such behaviours 
and characteristics are examples ‘of what whites cannot afford to be if the 
propriety of their implicit racial privileges are to be maintained’ (1997, 320).  
 
The positioning of the Romanies as “lower class” is significant given that the 
white working classes largely maintain a marginal status within conceptions of 
whiteness. The relationship between whiteness and class, however, is an 
ambivalent one. The notion of a homogeneous white group, or even a 
homogenous white working class, is problematic given the ways in which class 
intersects with such things as ethnicity, culture, religion gender and sexuality 
(Bonnett, 2000; Hartigan; 1997; Haylett; 2001). Such ambiguities are 
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perceptible in contemporary anxieties surrounding a growing “underclass” of 
“abject whites” (Haylett, 2001), “chavs” in the UK (Nayak, 2006; Webster, 
2008), and “white trash” in the USA (Hartigan, 1997). Nayak (2006) contends 
that “chavs” ‘like many minority ethnic groups before them… [are] associated 
with street crime, disease, drugs, over-breeding…and the seedy underbelly of 
the “black economy”’ (p.824). For Nayak, “discursively represented as a 
darkened underclass [chavs] appear as the new urban primitives…like black 
youth, [chavs] are represented as “gangstas”, “rouges”, “apes”, society’s 
“missing link” in the chain of human order’ (2006, 824). Similarly, concerning 
the USA, Hartigan (1997, 115) remarks: 
 
White trash is used to name those bodies that exceed the class and 
racial etiquettes required of Whites if they are to preserve the 
powers and privileges that accrue to them as members of the 
dominant racial order in this country. White trash is applied to 
Whites whose lifestyles, speech and behaviours too closely match 
the “marked” cultural forms associated with blackness or other 
symbolically informed forms of racial identity and difference. 
 
As Smith and Greenfields (2013, 14) rightly point out: ‘…it is no coincidence 
that the term “pikey”, which has long been a derogatory term for Gypsies and 
Travellers, has increasingly been applied to young white residents of social 
housing in recent years while “chav” (from the Romani word ‘”chavi” for child) 
has become a byword for “poor white trash” as the two groups have merged 
in the public consciousness into one criminally inclined, welfare dependent 
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and spatially segregated, incorrigible, “underclass”.’ The whiteness ascribed 
to “chav” and “pikey” allow these words to be used unopposed. Although 
designed to cause offense, these terms are not considered hateful within 
wilder cultural understandings (Bhopal and Myers, 2008).  
 
We have seen, therefore, a transformation in the positioning of the Romany 
Gypsies. Once citizens of a foreign state, they are now considered “British 
subjects”, albeit an underclass. Can this transformation be explained as an 
outcome of the gradual assimilation of the Romany Gypsies? Does it denote 
the diminution or erosion of racialised anti-Romani sentiment, and the 
acceptance of Romany Gypsies as British? Are the Romany Gypsies white 
again? The following section will explore a new dimension to the “Gypsy 
problem” brought to pass by EU freedom of movement. Here I will outline how 
the Gypsies became “black” again.  
New Europeans, New Prejudices 
Beyond Britain’s Romany Gypsy population lies another Romani population, 
commonly referred to as the “Roma”. This population is comprised of migrants 
from EU member states and has grown steadily throughout EU expansion.  
Research by the University of Salford uncovered that there are around 
200,000 Roma migrants living in the UK (Brown et al., 2013).   
 
Notions of incivility are a central theme in the Romani experience. Allegations 
of “cultural backwardness”, however, stem not only from their position as 
Romanies, but from their position as Eastern European migrants as well. To 
- 27 - 
understand the position occupied by Britain’s Roma migrants it is important to 
consider the precarious political context in which they arrived. As already 
discussed, the British approach to immigration control has, throughout history, 
been contingent on the identification of both racially desirable and racially 
undesirable migrants (Fox et al, 2012). Largely, it has been white Europeans 
who have been considered most desirable and the EU policy of freedom of 
movement has implicitly favoured white migration.  
 
In 2004, the UK welcomed migrants from the EU’s eight new member states. 
The government had expected arrivals to reach no more than 13,000 people 
per year; in view of this, they chose not to place restrictions on their new 
Eastern European arrivals. An unforeseen 500,000 migrants entered the UK 
in the two years which followed, triggering a significant public outcry.  
Restrictions were subsequently imposed on Bulgarian and Romanian 
migrants after their succession to the European Union in 2007 (Guskin and 
Wilson, 2007). These restrictions were not placed on Bulgarian and Romanian 
migrants because they were not white. Rather, the gap in the British labour 
market had already been filled. Whilst Fox et al. (2012) argue that these 
restrictions were not racially motivated, they did, however, create racialised 
effects. Romanians and Bulgarians ‘were symbolically denuded of their 
whiteness by an immigration policy that refused to recognise them as full 
Europeans with the associated rights (and colour) that such a status would 
have otherwise availed them’ (Fox et al., 2012, 6).  
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For Wolff (1994) the racialisation of Eastern Europeans predates EU 
enlargement. Just as Said (1978) maintained that the West has constructed 
the Orient, Wolff (1994) contends that they have also invented Eastern 
Europe. The notion of a divided Europe is a Western construction born from 
the Enlightenment. While the East was easily positioned as “inferior” to the 
West, Eastern Europe held an uncertain position. It was perceptibly European, 
yet, it was economically and socially underdeveloped compared to Western 
Europe. Eastern Europe was thus not considered fully European, nor was it 
as unequivocally uncivilised as the Orient. 
 
 In recognition of this, Todorova (2009:8) introduces the term ‘balkanism’ 
which she likens to Said’s concept of orientalism. Orientalism she notes ‘has 
had a tumultuous existence…’ and whilst it has been ‘…popularised by 
intellectuals who find that it describes adequately the relationship of the 
Balkans with the West’, this is not the case. Owing to the ‘historical and 
geographical concreteness’ (p11) of the Balkan regions and the way in which 
they have not been romanticised in the way in which the orient has, Todorova 
argues that balkanism is not simply a subtype of orientalism: ‘The Balkans, on 
the other hand, with their unimaginative concreteness, and almost total lack 
of wealth [are] totally devoid of the mystery of exoticism.’ (p14). This is 
significant, not only because a large majority of new Roma migrants have 
arrived from the Balkan regions, but because this assessment of the Balkan 
regions - as lacking progression and as appearing less appealing than the 
exoticness of the orient - encapsulates societal attitudes towards Roma 
migrants.  The language of the EU immigration debate has reflected this 
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positioning of Eastern Europe. Migrants are portrayed as arriving from 
impoverished, corrupt, volatile and culturally backward nations and this is has 
had a significant impact upon how Roma identity has been conceptualized.  
 
Fox et al. succinctly break down the three ways in which Romanian and 
Bulgarian migrants have been racialised. The first frame, the numbers frame, 
‘draws attention to and indeed amplifies the scope and scale of migration’ 
(p.7). Here, EU migrants are referred to as “floods”, “swamps”, “hordes” and 
“invasions” as a means to incite concern, anxiety and fears that jobs, welfare 
benefits, and public services are either at risk or vulnerable to abuse. Such 
narratives ‘depict the migrants as a nuisance at best, a menace at worst’ (p.8). 
The second frame, the crime frame, suggests a close, even inherent link 
between migration and criminality. Eastern European migrants have been 
linked to an array of organised criminal activities, such as cashpoint theft, child 
trafficking, pick-pocketing and prostitution. When such associations are 
unrelentingly repeated Eastern European migrants are constructed in the 
British imagination ‘not as upstanding workers trying to seek out a living but 
as dangerous criminals and social parasites preying on their well-meaning 
hosts’ (p.8). For Fox et al. (2012, 8), the racialisation process becomes most 
pronounced in the crime frame given that the supposed immorality of the 
migrants is deemed part of their innate character.  
 
Fox et al.’s (2012) third frame, the Roma frame, is of most use to an analysis 
of the positioning of Britain’s Roma. The numbers frame and the crime frame, 
as well as Todorova’s (2008) “Balkanisation”, are emphasized and validated 
- 30 - 
when employed in relation to the Roma. The Roma frame is grounded in and 
reproduces stereotypes of the Roma as exemplifying and embodying cultural 
backwardness ‘thus Romacising migrant “hordes” and their criminal 
tendencies, and in so doing insinuating and accentuating their supposed racial 
inferiority’ (Fox et al., 2012, 9). It is particularly successful as it makes use of 
the long history of both home-grown and wider European prejudice against 
the Romanies. That said, it utilises existing prejudices toward British Gypsy 
and Traveller communities, ‘acting as a local reference point to which 
understandings of newly arrived East European Roma can be meaningfully 
anchored” (Fox et al, 2012, 9). 
 
The amalgamation of Roma with British Gypsy and Traveller communities 
recycles familiar fears, suspicions and concerns as a means to understand 
and position otherwise unknown new arrivals (Fox et al., 2012). The notion of 
the “Roma migrant” has been applied somewhat indiscriminately to all Eastern 
Europeans, regardless of their ethnicity. Linking EU migration to the “immoral 
behaviours” and “cultural backwardness” associated with the Roma (often 
accompanied by references to the Roma’s alleged non-European origins) 
casts doubt upon their ability to integrate. This conception of the Roma is 
effective as an instrument for denying migrants both their “Europeanness”, 
and their whiteness, thus aggravating their marginalisation (Bonnett, 2000).  
Conclusion 
In a study of Romani diasporic nationalism, notions of “belonging” and 
“otherness” are central concepts. By nature of being an ethnic minority, 
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Romany Gypsies can be considered the “other”. They are among the most 
socially excluded peoples in Britain and regularly face discrimination in many 
guises. Yet, to the casual observer, they seemingly belong to Britain. 
Britishness, as defined in immigration discourse, denotes whiteness. 
Immigrants, on the other hand, signify blackness. Although Romany Gypsies 
are the descendants of 15th century migrants, their lingering presence in 
British society, compounded with their palpable whiteness, leaves them all but 
absent from understandings of racism and discrimination.  
 
Romany Gypsies have been cemented, therefore, into the boundaries of white 
Britishness where they have since remained, albeit on the margins. They 
arguably “belong” to Britain, yet their cultural deviance renders them a social 
problem or an underclass, against claims of white British cultural 
homogeneity. They have, thus, been subject to policies of assimilation and 
spatial control, indicating that whiteness is more than a skin colour but a set 
of practices and ideals that Romany Gypsies seemingly do not possess. They 
belong to British society but only partially and are, to an extent, similarly 
positioned to Roma migrants.  
 
The Roma, like their British counterparts, are considered culturally deviant. 
Deemed inherently criminal, they are accused of migrating to Britain en masse 
with intentions of taking advantage of the welfare state and public services.   
Largely migrating from Eastern Europe, their whiteness is called into question 
given their supposedly “backward” culture and socially and economically 
underdeveloped countries of origin. The implicit link between whiteness and 
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“Europeaness” cannot, therefore, be taken for granted. The Romanies have 
been whitened and darkened at various times throughout history by 
politicians, immigration policy and the media. Indeed, post-war Windrush 
migration whitened the Romanies while EU freedom of movement darkened 
them. Whiteness is not, therefore, fixed. Rather it is in a state of constant 
renegotiation in which it is defined in relation to the ongoing processes of 
racialisation.  
Where might the Romanies find a sense of belonging, comradery and “home”, 
if it’s not within British society?  This study asks whether it is within the so-
called “Roma Nation” propagated by Romani diasporic nationalism. The 
notion of a Romani homeland has been popular since the 19th century in which 
linguistic research first suggested an Indian origin. Though this has been used 
to justify the supposed racial inferiority of the Romani people, the notion of an 
Indian homeland has become cemented within, and popularised by, 
contemporary Romani Studies. This remainder of this thesis will explore in 
more detail, understandings of belonging, home(land) and diaspora; seeking 
to shed light on identifications with the Roma Nation.  
Chapter 2 concerns the politics of the Romani diaspora. It provides an 
overview of the Romani nationalist movement and the various claims made in 
the name of an essentialised Romani identity. It engages in debates about the 
paradoxes of identity movements which seek both to confront stigmatised 
identities while at the same time construct homogenised boundaries around 
cultural and ethnic identities. Chapter 3 presents the methodological and 
epistemological frameworks of the study and explains the research design, 
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my role and positioning throughout the research process and ethical 
considerations.  
In chapters 4 to 6 the participants’ experiences are discussed and analysed 
in line with the research questions. Chapter 4 looks at the participants’ 
experiences of, and responses to, being the “other” in British society. This 
chapter serves as an entrance to the following two chapters. It contextualises 
the participants’ responses and their articulations of belonging. Chapter 5 
explores the participants’ understandings of home(land). This is discussed in 
regards to the participants’ experiences of, and relationship to, their countries 
of origin, the notion of “Britishness” and the idea of Indian origins. Chapter 6 
discusses the participants’ understandings of the “Roma Nation”. Here the 
political dimension of their collective identifications is explored. Chapter 7, 
ending the thesis, presents a final discussion and conclusion to the study. It 
draws together the findings in relation to the research questions, offering an 
overview of the participants support and identifications with the Roma Nation. 
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Chapter 2 
Between Identity and Ideology: The Diasporic Politics of 
Romani Nationalism 
This chapter explores the politicisation of the Indian origins of the Romani 
people. It begins from the premise that the Romanies constitute a diaspora 
and will delve into the nationalist political discourse inspired by this conception 
of the Romanies. It begins by engaging with critiques of nationalism and 
diaspora that underline the essentialism inherent in territorially rooted 
constructions of Romani identity and will end by problematizing the identity 
politics from which a crude reification of the Romanies results.  
 
Before commencing this discussion it is necessary to define the Romani 
diaspora. Principally, I refer to the Romani people as a whole – the twelve 
million Roma/Romany Gypsies/Romanies who are thought to have left India 
in the 11th century. In the context of Britain, it refers to the first wave of Romani 
diaspora – the Romany Gypsies who arrived in Britain at the beginning of the 
15th century. There are, however, a further two waves of Romani diaspora to 
Britain: the Romani diaspora of the 1990s made up of refugees from Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Kosovo, and the post-2004 Romani diaspora 
characterised by Roma migrants from the EU. By waves of diaspora, I do not 
mean to imply that there were subsequent waves of diaspora from India. 
Rather, I mean a diaspora within a diaspora – that is, that Romanies who have 
for centuries been settled in nation states across Europe are again going 
through a process of dispersal from Eastern to Western Europe.   
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That said, what is a diaspora? How and why do diasporas materialise? These 
questions are not easily answered. Diaspora is a hotly contested concept and 
there is not a universally agreed definition within the literature on diaspora. 
Rather, diaspora studies has been characterised by debates regarding the 
extent to which diasporas are territorial – a descriptive tool in which a territorial 
homeland and the desire to return to a homeland are central features – or 
whether they are deterritorial – a socio-cultural process in which the formation 
of identities, primarily in response to mobility as opposed to territory, are the 
central focus.  
Territorial Diasporas 
In what was one of the first definitions of diaspora, Connor (1986, 16) 
describes it as ‘that segment of a people living outside the homeland’. Safran 
(1991), with aim to bring clarity to Connor’s broad description, offered a more 
precise definition containing six criteria that a group must fulfil to be 
considered a diaspora. First, the group or their ancestors must have been 
dispersed from their place of origin to two or more regions. Second, the group 
must preserve a collective memory or myth of their homeland. Third, they must 
have a collective sense of alienation suffered in their host society. Fourth, the 
group shares a longing to return to their homeland. Fifth, there is a collective 
commitment to maintaining or restoring the homeland. Sixth, the group holds 
a collective consciousness and solidarity. In short, a collective identity 
fashioned in relation to the homeland. Indeed, Safran (2003) argues that, 
unlike traditional immigrants, most of whom intend to assimilate into the 
culture of the host country, diasporas do not wish to detach themselves 
completely from their homelands. Rather, they choose to live between two 
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worlds, attempting to recreate elements of their homeland culture into the host 
country. 
Cohen (1996) builds on Safran’s definition. He describes diaspora as both 
involuntary – that is, a “traumatic” dispersal or “victim” diaspora, such as, the 
Jewish, African and Armenian diasporas – and voluntary diaspora which 
transpire through the search for work, the pursuit of trade or to further colonial 
ambitions. Cohen also emphasises the notion of a “return movement” which 
he argues requires the collective support of the diaspora in question. Safran 
and Cohen have often been criticised given the near impossibility of a 
diaspora fulfilling their rigid criteria at all times. Yet, in spite of this, Safran is 
critical of Cohen’s broader criteria. He argues that a minority group that has 
been dispersed from its homeland cannot be considered a diaspora if they: 1) 
lack the resolve to survive as a minority; 2) no longer speak the language of 
their homeland; 3) have no clear idea of their homelands past or location; 4) 
have no desire to return to their homeland; or 5) have few barriers to 
integration in their host country. 
Deterritorial Diasporas 
Safran (2004) and Cohen (2007), in their later works, begin to problematise 
the notion of homeland by acknowledging the weakening of rigid national 
attachments. They are reluctant, however, to set aside territorial definitions of 
diaspora all together. The severance of homeland from diaspora is argued 
more insistently in, what I am labelling, the socio-cultural approach in which 
diasporas are considered transnational “imagined communities”. From this 
approach, diasporas are seen as social and political constructions that are 
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thriving concurrently with the process of globalisation and increased mobility. 
Diasporas are not considered as naturally occurring bodies that simply 
materialise through territorial dispersal. Rather, they must be discursively 
constructed and mobilised. Diaspora is not, therefore, a mere descriptive term 
with rigid criteria but a proactive effort to establish and maintain a 
deterritorialised socio-cultural, political community.  
 
Appadurai (1996), for example, notably diagnosed the demise of the nation-
state via the process of globalisation. ‘We are in the process of moving to a 
global order in which the nation-state has become obsolete and other 
formations for allegiances and identity have taken its place’ he argued, 
concluding that ‘there will be a spread of national forms unconnected to 
territorial states’ (1996, 189). We are experiencing then a ‘decoupling of nation 
from state’ in which ‘globalisation is undermining the project of modernity in 
the specific sense of the dis-embedding of the political project of the state 
[state formation] and the cultural project of nationhood [ethno-national identity 
building]’ (Delanty and O’Mahony, 2002).  
 
Critiques of classical definitions of diaspora have often, therefore, disputed 
the centrality of homeland. Avtar Brah (1996), for example, argues that 
diasporic identity is not characterised by the desire for a homeland, but rather 
by ‘homing desire’ – the need to belong to an identity rooted in historical 
origins, rather than a longing for a homeland and physical territory. For Brah 
‘home is a mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination… it is a place of 
no return’ (Brah, 1996, 192). She continues, ‘not all diasporas inscribe homing 
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desire through a wish to return to a place of “origin”. For some, cultural 
identification with the [place of origin] might be by far the most important 
element’ (1996, 193).  
 
In a similar vein, Anthias (1998) criticises classical definitions of diaspora for 
their ‘absolutist notions of “origin” and “belonging”’. She indicts diaspora 
studies of overlooking issues of gender and class, as well as intra/interethnic 
conflict and cooperation: 
 
…the lack of attention given to transethnic solidarities, such as 
those against racism, of class, of gender, of social movements, is 
deeply worrying…for a discourse of antiracism and social 
mobilisation of a transethnic (as opposed to transnational) 
character, cannot be easily accommodated, within the discourse of 
diaspora, where it retains dependence on “homeland” and “origin”, 
however configured (Anthias, 1998, 577).  
 
By the same token, Soysal (2000) argues that classical definitions of diaspora 
‘privilege the nation state model’, thus ignoring contemporary ‘practices of 
citizenship, which are multi-connected, multi-referential and postnational’ 
(2000, 13). This is similar to Hall’s understanding of diaspora which refers not 
‘…to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to 
some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return…’ but to 
identities ‘…which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves 
anew, through transformation and difference…’ (Hall, 1990, 235). Hall argues 
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that we cannot define diaspora identities with any precision or universalism - 
as ‘one experience, one identity’ - without recognising the differences and 
discontinuities which shape their uniqueness (Hall, 1996, 236). Groups are 
divided along lines of class, sexuality, gender, country of residence and other 
contextual factors and, in view of that, each individual navigates their 
relationship with society differently. Diasporic identity can be described, 
therefore, as: 
…a matter of “becoming” as well as “being”… cultural identities 
come from somewhere, have histories. But like everything which is 
historical, they undergo constant transformation… subject to the 
“play” of history, culture, and power… it is always constructed 
through memory, fantasy and myth (1990, 225-226).  
 
Hall questions, therefore, the plausibility of “return”, arguing that the original 
homelands, from which diasporas are dispersed, have too been transformed 
over time. In reference to the African diaspora he notes, ‘the original “Africa” 
is no longer there. It too has been transformed… it cannot in any simple sense 
be merely recovered… we can’t literally go home again’ (Hall, 1990, 223). That 
said, immigrants and ethnic minorities can define themselves as belonging to 
a wider transnational community that exist beyond a territorial state or 
homeland. This requires a shift in the way in which minorities are framed and 
involves the incorporation of the “transnational” or “global” into the “national”. 
Diasporas are more, therefore, than minority groups living within a nation 
state. They are part of a global, transnational community.  
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In light of such critiques, Cohen (2007) reviewed his understanding of the 
homeland/diaspora relationship. In so doing he identified three types of 
home/homeland which he refers to as ‘solid’, ‘ductile’ and ‘liquid’. A solid 
homeland refers to the traditional conception of diaspora in which there is a 
documented dispersal from a concrete homeland. A ductile homeland is one 
which is looked to as a source of identification and affiliation but not as a home 
to be returned to or restored. Lastly, Cohen describes liquid homelands as 
‘deterritoralised diaspora’ that have ‘lost their conventional territorial reference 
points, to have become in effect mobile and multi-located cultures with virtual 
or uncertain homes’. In so doing, he acknowledges the strategic processes of 
construction which result in the formation of diasporic identities. A diasporic 
identity is, therefore, a channel through which to assert political identity, which 
can be employed by minority groups as a source of agency and 
empowerment.  
Framing Collective Identity 
In an attempt to understand the nature of diasporas, I turn to social movement 
literature which underlines the strategic construction of collective identity 
through processes of framing. A collective action frame can be described as 
a collection of beliefs, values and meanings accredited to individual and 
collective experiences, social situations and events. They assist movements 
in constructing shared understandings, objectives and identities which incite, 
inspire and legitimate collective action. In their framing activities, movement 
leaders both utilize and refashion existing cultural symbols and meanings – 
as well as constructing new meanings and symbols – and transform them into 
“collective action frames”, through which movement activists make sense of 
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their political environment (Tarrow, 1992).The formation of social movements 
is, therefore, a ‘product of people seizing and making opportunities’ (Tarrow, 
1994: 81). In this way, diasporas are constructed by ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs who strategically deploy identity frames with the aim of 
constructing a shared collective identity or “imagined community”. Diasporic 
politics therefore utilises identity as a means to unite disparate peoples into a 
coherent, and transnational, identity based community.   
 
Diasporas can be defined, therefore, by a shared collective identity. Put 
differently, they are groups defined by a shared identity marker, such as, 
ethnic, national or religious identity. The popularity of the term “collective 
identity” has provoked an abundance of definitions. Melucci (1988, 342) 
defines it as: 
 
...an interactive and shared definition produced by several 
individuals and concerned with the orientations of action and the 
fields of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes 
place… the process of identity construction, adaption, and 
maintenance always has two aspects: the internal complexity of an 
actor (the plurality of orientations which characterises him), and the 
actor’s relationship with the environment (other actors, 
opportunities and constraints).  
 
Others define collective identity as ‘a shorthand designation announcing a 
status – a set of attitudes, commitment and rules for behaviour – that those 
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who assume the identity can be expected to subscribe to subscribe to’ 
(Friedman and McAdam, 1992, 157); a ‘shared definition’ that derives from 
‘common interests, experiences and solidarity…’ (Taylor and Whittier, 1995; 
172); ’perceptions of group distinctiveness, boundaries, and interests, for 
something closer to a community than a category’ (Jasper, 1997, 86); and ‘the 
mesh between the individual and cultural systems’ (Gamson, 1992; 55). In a 
nutshell, collective identity is the feeling of “we-ness”. It is ‘an individual’s 
cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, 
category, practice or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, 
which may be imagined rather than experienced directly’ (Polletta and Jasper, 
2001, 285).  
 
Constructing a collective identity involves active ongoing negotiations of who 
we are and who we are not. For Taylor and Whittier (1992), there are three 
important elements of collective identity construction: boundaries, 
consciousness and negotiation. They define boundaries as ‘the social, 
psychological and physical structures that establish differences between a 
challenging group and dominant groups’, and explain consciousness as ‘the 
interpretative frameworks that emerge from a group’s struggle to define and 
realise members’ common interest in opposition to the dominant order’ (Taylor 
and Whittier, 1992, 510-512). Negotiation is understood as the ways in which 
the group resists and/or redefines stereotyped and stigmatised 
understandings and categorisations. Through these processes, a collective 
identity develops and fashions a sense of “who we are” in order to fight for 
political and social change (Taylor and Whittier, 1992).  
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Identity frames, thus, ‘promote a heightened awareness of a group’s 
commonalities and frame interaction between members of the in-group and 
out-group (Taylor and Whittier, 1992, 111). Yet, often a set of competing 
collective identities develop which unsettles the notion of “us” and “them”. The 
“us”, argues Gamson (1997, 80), is defined ‘not just against an external them 
but also against thems inside, as particular subgroups battle to gain or retain 
legitimate us standing’. The construction and maintenance of collective 
identity transpires, therefore, not only vis-à-vis outsiders but also against 
those who assert insider status.  
Nationalism as an Apparatus of Groupness 
How then do we explain the variability of feelings of “we-ness”? Why at times 
are feelings of “solidarity”, “unity” and “belonging” felt more or less strongly 
than others? Under what circumstances, or in which contexts, does collective 
identity become more pronounced? Brubaker introduces the notion of 
“groupness”, encouraging scholars to consider collective identity as 
changeable and impermanent rather than fixed and continually felt. In doing 
so, we can explore, and perhaps explain, ‘phases of extraordinary cohesion 
and moments of intensely felt collective solidarity, without implicitly treating 
high levels of groupness as constant, enduring or definitionally present’. For 
Brubaker, we should consider groupness as an “event”. In this way, 
“groupness” or “collective identity” may or may not materialise regardless of 
the efforts, of what Brubaker terms, ethnopolitical entrepreneurs. This prompts 
scholars to explore and explain unsuccessful attempts at ethnopolitical 
mobilisation.  It must not be assumed, therefore, that the existence of a group 
or category, such as the Romanies, automatically results in collective identity, 
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solidarity or “groupness”. Though Brubaker recognises that groups often do 
act based on crude categorisations (as will be discussed later in the chapter, 
when used strategically, it can be beneficial for them to do so), it is wrong to 
assume that groups are internally homogenous. That said, while it has been 
argued that the Romanies do not share a collective identity, it is unlikely that 
any group share an inherent sense of “we-ness” and/or solidarity. This is not 
to claim that groups cannot mobilise based on crude categorisations, but that 
“groupness” many not always materialise. That said, though it is recognised 
that the Romanies do not constitute a homogenous, bounded group, it is often 
convenient to refer to them in generalising terms. As Brubaker argues, 
however, ‘these designations have a purely aggregative meaning. They refer 
not to solidarity or bounded groups but to sets of category members… who, if 
asked their ethnicity or ethnic nationality, would identify themselves as 
[Romani]’. Thus, while “Romani” clearly signifies something, it tells us little 
about the extent of their groupness.  
 
One of the most prevalent political ideologies invoked to fashion a sense of 
“groupness” is nationalism.  Nationalism has been particularly effective 
strategy of mobilisation given its particularistic and romanticised use of the 
homeland. A territorial component of national identity is of great importance 
given that it allows boundaries between the “national community” and “others” 
“outsiders” and “enemies” to be spatially fixed and observable as opposed to 
just conceptually constructed. What is more, territory, which is emotionally 
referred to as the homeland, presents a tangible link to the history of the 
nation. Scholars of nationalism often emphasis, therefore, the importance of 
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shared roots and origins (Smith, 1986), and shared histories and traditions 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).  
 
Nations, thus, are constructed on the basis of foundational myths of origins, 
traditions and histories. In the process of constructing nations, certain 
narratives of origins, traditions and history are selectively preserved and/or 
forgotten, thus, redrawing the boundaries of the nation. Nationalist 
entrepreneurs, favour particular myths, traditions, histories and cultural 
symbols over others in an attempt to fashion a common source of identification 
based on a ‘legacy of memories’ which engenders a ‘desire to live together, 
[and] the will to continue to value the undivided heritage one has received’ 
(Renan, 1990, 11). As Renan (1990: 19) notes, ‘to have common glories in 
the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great 
deeds together, to wish to perform still more – these are the essential 
conditions for being a people’.  
 
The incitement of symbols, history and traditions is an effective tool for 
encouraging groupness given that they establish boundaries that delineate 
who is, and who is not, a member of the group. As Brubaker argues, however, 
nations are social constructions and not historic realities (2002) and are 
dependent on the choice of symbols and political goals of nationalist 
entrepreneurs. Scholars of nationalism such as Hobsbawm and Ranger 
(1983) and Anderson (1991) have pointed to the constructed and “imagined” 
nature of the nation, observing the elements of artefacts and invention that 
play a central role in the formation of nations. Because nations are social 
constructs, nationalist entrepreneurs have to “invent traditions” to construct 
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the common heritage considered essential to the development of a sense of 
groupness (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).  
 
This had often made it difficult for nationalism to fulfil the vision of national 
community as a homogeneous entity. Nationalist leaders often enforce 
uniformity (over ethnic, religious, linguistic, racial etc. diversity) via the 
standardisation of language and law and the provision of standardised public 
education.  Modern nation states surfaced as the only vehicle through which 
to create homogenous culture by expunging local and regional practices, 
languages and knowledge, by way of the formation and administration of 
public education and communication systems (Gellner, 1983). Nation states 
introduce and disseminate programs through which they aim to “regulate” the 
population, to manipulate and mould citizens/subjects and their identities 
(Foucault, 1980) and to realise uniformity.  
 
While the depiction of national identities as fixed, unified, and homogenous 
prevails, in reality most nations are culturally, ethnically and religiously 
diverse. As a result, unification efforts have employed processes of 
homogenisation and/or the forcible suppression of cultural difference. As Hall 
(1996: 616) notes, ‘most modern nations consist of disparate cultures which 
were only unified by a lengthy process of violent conquest…these violent 
beginnings which stand at the origins of modern nations have first to be 
"forgotten" before allegiance to a more unified, homogeneous national identity 
could begin to be forged’. National identities are, therefore, unstable, unfixed, 
relational, and most significantly, contested. Nations can be seen as 
historically situated and produced, as unfinished projects, and as contested 
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terrains. Indeed, projects of nationalism are always in process, regardless of 
the naturalising and normalising discourses that conceal their politics 
(Pettman, 1996: 48).  
A Nation Without A State 
The task of Romani political entrepreneurs engaged in diasporic politics is to 
construct a collective Romani identity that can be used to build a transnational 
Romani community. This necessitates the construction of an identity that is 
particularistic – it is constructed upon ethnicity, roots and origins and functions 
as a boundary mechanism. As will now be discussed, the formation of a 
Romani diasporic identity is, to some extent, a political end in itself. Romani 
political entrepreneurs have adopted the term diaspora not as a means by 
which to describe the Romani population, but as a political aim in itself. They 
endeavour to instil and inspire a diasporic consciousness, or sense of 
groupness, via the employment of nationalistic rhetoric which allows for 
identifications, alliances and political action to transpire on a global, as well as 
national and local, stage.  
The roots of Romani nationalism can be traced back to 1971, when Romani 
activists converged in London for the first World Romani Congress. It was 
during this event that the “Gypsies” chose to self-designate as the “Roma”. 
This was the launch of a politically constructed narrative which aimed to 
conceptualise, or reconceptualise, the Romani people from the “Gypsies”, as 
a social problem, to the “Roma”, as a distinct ethnic group of Indian origins 
and a transnational political constituency. The congress was one the first 
examples of self-organised international Romani activism, and arguably the 
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birthplace of a Romani nationalist movement. It signified the beginnings of a 
politicised diasporic consciousness underpinned by historical and cultural 
similarities which connect the deeply fragmented Romani people. It was at this 
congress that Romani nationalism was institutionalised in the shape of the 
International Romani Union (IRU).  
  
The “reunification’ of the Romani diaspora has since become a priority for the 
Romani political class and central to this has been: (1) the notion of a Romani 
homeland in India; and (2) a nationalist/diaspora discourse which positions 
the Romanies as a “nation without a state” (Marushiakova and Popov, 2004).  
The politically constructed “Roma Nation” defines the Romanies as both a 
diaspora and a non-territorial nation. By defining the Romanies according to 
such discourses, Romani activists and intellectuals are implying that Romani 
populations across Europe possess a common history and, specifically, a 
common origin. The IRU does not, however, make any claim to statehood. 
Rather, activists are searching for their place in the modern world without 
being bound to a specific, and already established, nation. As stated in the 
Declaration of a Roma Nation (IRU, 2001: no pagination):  
 
Individuals belonging to the Roma Nation call for a 
representation of their Nation, which does not want to become 
a state. We ask for being recognised as a Nation, for the sake 
of Roma and non-Roma individuals, who share the need to 
deal with the nowadays new challenges. We, a Nation of 
which over half a million persons were exterminated in a 
forgotten Holocaust, a Nation of individuals too often 
- 49 - 
discriminated, marginalised, victim of intolerance and 
persecutions, we have a dream, and we are engaged in 
fulfilling it. We are a nation, we share the same tradition, same 
culture, the same origin, the same language; we are a Nation. 
We have never looked for creating a Roma state… 
 
The Roma Nation is a greatly contested narrative given the deep 
fragmentation of the Romani diaspora. By consequence of their interaction 
with various other European populations, the Romanies have developed 
varying lifestyles, customs and relationships with their countries of residence 
and speak varying dialects of the Romani language (Hancock, 1998; 
Marushiakova and Popov, 2004). Marushiakova and Popov (2004: 88) 
therefore ask just ‘how realistic is it to use the concept of community (let alone 
nation)’ to describe a group of people who are divided by such clear cut 
distinctions. Accordingly, the IRU (no date) have stated that ‘their participation 
process needs to draw on common roots and common perspectives beyond 
citizenship, group affiliation, or country of residence’ (no pagination). The 
reunification of the Romanies as ‘a nation without a state’ (Marushiakova and 
Popov, 2004) is only plausible, therefore, by employing something that can 
exceed the nation states that fragment the Romanies linguistically, culturally 
and geographically.  
 
Many Romani activists have, thus, employed the symbols of nationhood. 
During the first World Romani Congress, for example, a national flag and 
anthem were adopted (Hancock, 2007). What is more, 8th April was declared 
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International Romani Day (sometimes referred to as Roma Nation Day) during 
the fourth World Romani Congress in 1990. It has been references to an 
Indian homeland and common tongue however that have become the most 
significant elements of the Roma Nation, and by extension the project of 
reunification. For Hancock (1997) the recognition of an Indian homeland is 
crucial as it unites the Romanies as a diasporic people, distinct from other 
Europeans. The only ‘alternative is to create a fictitious history and to have, 
again, [their] identity in the hand of non-Romani policy-makers and scholars’ 
(1997, no pagination).  The Romani nationalist movement has, thus, 
established itself as a channel through which to unite disparate Romani 
populations into a single historical-political imaginary.  
Diasporising the Roma Nation 
 
Brubaker contends that, despite the contested nature of diaspora, there are 
‘three core elements that remain widely understood to be constitutive of 
diaspora’ (2005, 5). These are dispersal (whether forced or voluntarily); 
homeland orientation (whether a real or imagined homeland); and boundary 
maintenance (in which collective identity is mobilised and maintained). In what 
follows, the ways in which Romani nationalists have attempted to meet these 
criteria will be discussed.  
 
Dispersal 
As previously discussed, dispersal from a homeland is a commonly accepted 
measure of diaspora. As examined in Chapter 1, it is thought that the 
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Romanies originated in India. Ian Hancock (1998), an esteemed Romani 
scholar, explains that the Romanies were originally soldiers in Northern India. 
Around the start of the 11th Century, argues Hancock, India was invaded by 
the Muslim general Mahmud of Ghazni who was making attempts to establish 
Islamic rule in the predominantly Hindu India. Hancock suggests that troops, 
who we now know as the Romanies, had been assembled by the Indian rulers 
to protect Northern India from invasion. When their efforts were unsuccessful, 
however, they fled through the mountains and into Persia. As the conflict 
continued, the troops journeyed further and further West until they reached 
Central and Western Europe during the course of the Middle Ages.  
 
Hancock’s account of Romani history depicts a victim diaspora who were 
forced to flee to Europe where they were once more driven into a maligned 
and marginalised position. He highlights that the Romanies have been 
historically and repeatedly expelled or oppressed, thus, propagating the 
narrative of a subjugated Romani people, driven to flee every region on their 
migration westward. In this way, they are comparable to the Jewish diaspora 
of Safran’s classical definition.  
 
Homeland Orientation 
Brubaker’s second criterion – homeland orientation – is closely linked with the 
notion of dispersion. For diasporic groups dispersed from their place of origin, 
the homeland– or the idea of a homeland – is an elemental source of solidarity, 
community and identity (Brubaker, 2005). A homeland orientation involves 
collective efforts and commitments to the maintenance and restoration of the 
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homeland and a myth of return. It is ‘a culture and collective identity that 
preserves the homeland’s language, or religious, social and cultural practise 
either intact or as time passes as mixed, bicultural forms’ (Toloyan, 649).  
 
Attempts to restore the Romani homeland have been made throughout 
history. During the early 20th century, the Kweik dynasty (self-proclaimed 
“Gypsy Kings” of Poland) advocated the creation of an independent Romani 
state, Romanstan. In 1934 a delegation was sent to the League of Nations to 
solicit land in Southern Africa in order to establish a Romani state. At the same 
time the Kweik dynasty travelled to India to specify the location of the Romani 
homeland and future state. In 1936 a delegation was sent to Mussolini to 
petition for land in Abyssinia where the Romanies could create their own state 
and in 1959 the “World Gypsy Community” asked for land in Somalia. In the 
1970s, they even issued passports for the future Romani state (Marushiakova 
and Popov, 78).  
 
Since the 1990s, however, the IRU has adopted the language of 
transnationalism, describing the Romanies as a trans(border)-national 
minority or a nation without a state. While the Indian origins of the Romani 
diaspora have remained central to Romani political identity, the IRU do not 
actively pursue the establishment of a Romani state. The IRU instead aims to 
preserve the homeland culture through actively lobbying for standardisation 
of the Romani language, cultural preservation and the rejection of 
assimilation. 
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Research suggests that the homeland narrative, has in many respects failed 
to resonate beyond a ‘relatively restricted circle of the so-called “international 
Roma” activist’ (Marushiakova and Popov, 2004:91). According to Stewart 
(1997) the employment of an ethno-political narrative is yet to be embraced 
by the wider Romani population: ‘for them, identity is constructed and 
constantly remade in the present in relations with significant others, not 
something inherited from the past’ (p.28). While the linguistic study of Romani 
language has established a link between the Romanies and India, an Indian 
homeland has never been central to the oral history of the Romani people. As 
Hancock (1997, no pagination) illuminates, the narrative of Indian origins has 
been lost since the arrival of the early Romani populations. It remains largely 
unfamiliar to a considerable majority of Romanies, ‘many of whom have 
internalised instead the notion of an origin in Egypt’.  
 
While connections to India may have been factually proven, the Romanies do 
not possess a collective memory of their Indian origin, nor has the account of 
their Indian heritage been passed down through oral tradition (Fonseca, 
2011). Its reappearance on the Romani nationalistic schema is a clear 
illustration of what Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) refers to as “invented 
tradition”. It exploits ‘not what has actually been preserved in popular memory, 
but what has been selected, written, pictured, popularised and institutionalised 
by those whose function it is to do so’ in an attempt to legitimise nationalist 
action and strengthen cohesion (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983:13). It could 
be argued, therefore, that the narrative adopted by the nationalist movement 
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fails to strengthen, or create, a united transnational Romani identity. The 
recovery of a homeland is simply a new invention. 
 
Writing in 1991, Safran (1991, 86-67) argues: 
The Gypsies are a truly dispersed and homeless people… [but] 
their homelessness is characteristic of their nomadic culture and 
the result of their refusal to be sedentarised. Moreover, diaspora 
consciousness is an intellectualisation of an existential condition: 
the Gypsies have had social and economic grievances… but they 
have not been asking themselves questions about “the Gypsy 
problem”… the Gypsies have had no myth of return because they 
have had no precise notion of their place of origin, no geographical 
focus, and no history of national sovereignty. The absence of such 
a myth might be a consequence of… the absence of a Gypsy 
intellectual elite… 
At the time of writing, Safran was correct in his hypothesising; there were no 
visible Romani intellectual elite (though one arguably slips into orientalist 
musings by denying the existence of a pre-21st century intellectual Romani 
voice). Over the past three decades a Romani academic circle has emerged, 
thus, demonstrating that what was once, perhaps, “true” is no longer. Romani 
intellectuals have rejected the orientalising works of the Gypsylorists (see 
chapter 1) that positions the Romanies as inferior, and have instead fashioned 
an account of their origins which (1) gives precedence to the Indian origins of 
the Romani people and, (2) chronologically documents their persecution and 
suffering. The intention is to aid the growth of a shared historical 
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consciousness. Whether or not they have been successful in their aims is 
contentious – the Romanies are still disproportionally excluded from education 
and by default the works of Romani intellectuals – yet, the very existence of a 
Romani academic circle unsettles Safran’s claims.  
 
Boundary Maintenance 
Brubaker’s third criterion – boundary maintenance – involves the maintenance 
of a distinct collective identity, or sense of groupness, that connects members 
of a diaspora to the transnational community and engenders internal solidarity. 
Indeed ‘boundaries can be maintained by deliberate resistance to assimilation 
through self-enforced endogamy or other forms of self-segregation or as an 
unintended consequence of social exclusion’ (Armstrong, 1976, 394-5, 
emphasis added). Boundary maintenance is, thus, a constant negotiation of 
who belongs and who does not.  
 
Remarking on assimilation, Bauman (2001: 93) says ‘the purpose of the 
assimilatory pressures was to strip “others” of their “otherness”, to make them 
indistinguishable from the rest of the nation’s body…”. For Bhopal and Myers 
(2008, 110) the alternative is to be excluded: 
 
It is suggestive of being cast out and ghettoised, but it also 
suggests that the minority group have a certain strength in the face 
of hostile set of circumstances which allows them to maintain an 
identity and not become subsumed within an assimilatory process. 
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Under such circumstances, notions of community might become 
stronger and more resilient as groups are forced to make a choice 
between defending what they value or surrendering everything.  
 
It is through acknowledging this potential for resistance that the boundary 
maintenance of Romani culture and identity can be understood. The fact that 
the scholarly study of the Romani people is still a viable and emerging field of 
research demonstrates that the Romani people have, and continue to, resist 
assimilation. This implies that Romani communities do not feel obliged to 
‘mimic ideals of community held within the western nation state and, by not 
doing so, [retain] a type of community that belongs wholeheartedly to a Gypsy 
nationhood’ (Bhopal and Myers, 2008, 114). Crudely understood, it can be 
argued that via a process of self-exclusion the Romanies have excluded 
themselves from wider society. Yet, this interpretation conveniently overlooks 
a long history of oppression endured by the Romani people. Alternatively, self-
exclusion can be understood as a process through which Romani cultures and 
ways of life can be protected from, and outside of, the nation state (Bhopal 
and Myers, 2008, 15).  
 
In Castells’ (1997) greatly sited work The Power of Identity, he distinguishes 
new social movements by the type of identity that they produce: resistance or 
project identity. To the first type of identity belongs social movements which 
are distinguished by their resistance to dominant society and the ideals 
embodied therein. Such movements are steered by ‘actors who are in 
positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatised by the logic of domination, 
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thus building trenches or resistance and survival on the basis of principles 
different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society’ 
(Castells, 1997: 8). Such movements pertain to those whom believe that 
dominant institutions offer them little advantage. For them, it is either cultural 
eradication - that is assimilation - or accepting the structural disadvantage 
imposed upon them. The only alternative is resistance to domination and 
oppression by widening the gap between the stigmatised group and wider 
society. Castells refers to this strategy as ‘the exclusion of the excluders by 
the excluded’ (Castells, 1997: 9). Such groups position themselves as exterior 
to dominant culture and society, preserving something they regard as valuable 
– the basis of their identity – which exists only within their own community. 
They do not call for integration but separation.  
 
Eid (2007) refers to this strategy as ‘reactive ethnicity’, which he describes as 
a defensive ethnic consciousness which emerges in response to ethnic based 
discrimination, oppression and exclusion: 
 
…groups that have been stigmatised often have the power to turn 
negative stigma into a badge of pride. But they can hardly define 
themselves without reference to the ready-made categories 
bestowed upon them by the majority group. They rather engage in 
counter discourses of resistance by making use of the very same 
essentialising categories which the majority group defines them 
(Eid, 2007: 32).  
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Eid argues that groups that have been stigmatised have the capacity to 
transform negative stereotypes and attitudes into a badge of pride or honour. 
His theory is helpful in the analysis of Romani identities as ‘resistance 
identities’. It can be argued that Romani communities in the UK, which attempt 
to resist the assimilationist pressures of the non-Romani societies by building 
trenches of resistance and survival and withdrawing from the wider society, 
can be seen as an example of resistance identity and reactive ethnicity. 
A Territorial or Deterritorial Diaspora? 
For Toninato (2009), definitions of diaspora will always be problematic when 
applied to the Romanies. She states, ‘the problem of analytical interpretations 
of diaspora is that they are written from the perspective of sedentary societies 
an encounter difficulties in grasping the deterritorialised an spatially 
unbounded culture of Roma/Gypsies who are “at home” anywhere…yet 
nowhere, since wherever they go they are constantly reminded of their 
difference and their inability to ‘fit in’ and to be identified with a well-defined 
national territory’ (2009, 3).  
 
Nomadism connotes rootlessness, yet, through a focus on the return to and/or 
(re)establishment of a territorial homeland, diaspora becomes politicised to 
mobilise a nationalist cause. One of the fundamental criticisms of classical 
definitions of diaspora is that they too easily slip into the language of ethnic 
essentialism. Indeed, both Safran and Cohen reproduce the notions of fixed 
and homogenous ethnic groups and the territorial basis of ethnic identity. 
Somewhat ironically, such definitions depreciate the centrality of dispersal and 
mobility to diaspora and instead fix diaspora to ideas of nation and territory 
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which legitimises the notion of homeland as the source of ethnic identity. By 
focussing on the desire to return to, or re-establish, the homeland, diaspora 
becomes embroiled in the rigid framework of the nation state. Diaspora is 
considered a condition to be corrected with the return to and/or 
(re)establishment of the homeland/nation.  
 
In the case of the Romanies, “place” and “territory” are greatly problematized 
concepts. The Romanies are a geographically dispersed population - a 
diaspora of some sort, yet they are also commonly characterised as a 
“nomadic’ people” – mobile, rootless, communities wandering from one place 
to another without permanent abode (Gilbert, 2014). In stark contrast to the 
borders and boundaries of the traditional nation state, nomadism functions as 
the dispersal of individuals and groups across an unrestricted and 
indeterminate territory. 
 
 The Romanies may, therefore, be described as a “deterritorialised” people, 
with their diasporic politics more closely mirroring cultural theorisations of 
diaspora. By defining the Romanies as an essentially deterritorialised people 
one is not necessarily implying that they are without attachments to territory. 
Rather, it is to denote that their relationship with, and understanding of, 
territory differs to that of other diaspora groups.  The Romanies do have 
territories which they are often unwilling to leave unless ejected, as they so 
often are under the strain of competing claims to ownership, or the legality of 
settlement, but these territories do not amount to a homeland, nor can they be 
exploited to authenticate their existence as an ethno-national people.  
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Why, then, does the Romani nationalist movement define itself according to 
the tenets of classical definitions of diaspora when cultural theorisations of 
both diaspora and the nation state suggest the loosening of identities from 
territory? Firstly, despite the process of globalization, and the 
deterritorialisation of culture, the world remains dominated by nation-states. 
The nation-state continues to be the most powerful actor in global politics and, 
despite the rise in non-state actors and supranational unions that undermine 
the sovereignty of the nation state, the nation state continues to be influential 
at the global level. There is political power attached to territory and territorial 
boundaries determine the limits of state sovereignty. The nation state has a 
monopoly over resources which are used to further its political and economic 
interests, thus, without territory, stateless nations are rendered powerless. 
Within the nation state model of global politics, therefore, the recognition of a 
homeland – a territory – affords the Romani nationalist movement ‘legitimacy 
and a measure of security’ (Hancock, 1997, no pagination).  
 
Secondly, I argue, perhaps somewhat controversially, that a deterritorialised 
conception of the Romanies is yet another example of the romanticisation of 
these once nomadic peoples. As is discussed later in this thesis, nomadism, 
in the physical sense, is no longer a defining characteristic of the Romani 
people. Describing the Romanies as a deterritorialised people, with little 
attachment to land or the nation states in which they live, not only reinforces 
their otherness and exteriority to the state, but ignores the contemporary 
socio-political contexts and realities in which the Romani people are currently 
living, and have been living, for many years. The Romany Gypsies of Britain, 
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for example, have been settled in the nation states that make up the United 
Kingdom for hundreds of years. Their nomadism unfolded within the 
boundaries of the nation state. It had no transnational element once they 
reached the shores of the United Kingdom in the 14th century. By suggesting 
that still, after seven hundred years, the Romanies have not formed 
attachments to the nation states in which they reside, is to comply with the 
orientalist logic that renders them as non-European others and drives feelings 
of non-belonging.   
The Contemporary Politics of Diaspora 
This leads us to the question of how to characterise contemporary forms of 
diaspora politics which employ a frame of Romani identity as means by which 
to mobilise a transnational constituency. Across Western Europe, and indeed 
elsewhere, the category of “Roma” is arguably becoming increasingly salient 
and politicised. It is employed by political entrepreneurs as a boundary marker 
and as a method of establishing a transnational Romani identity – the Roma 
Nation – in a way that undermines other national identities (such as, British, 
Bulgarian, Romanian, etc.).  The Romanies are not a new addition to Europe’s 
socio-political stage. As discussed above, there has been large numbers of 
Romanies living in Europe since the Middle Ages. What is new, however, if 
the emergence of “Roma” as a salient political identity or categorisation that 
is utilised by the Romanies and national, international and supranational 
institutions as a discourse that shapes both strategies of ethnopolitical 
mobilisation, and strategies of so-called integration.  
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The employment of “Roma” as a political identity allows Romani political 
entrepreneurs to make stronger symbolic links between Romani peoples 
across Europe.  The contemporary geopolitical context, since the introduction 
of EU freedom of movement, has aided and accelerated the politicisation of 
the Romanies as a diaspora and has been deployed as a means by which to 
unite disparate constituencies from across an array of nation states. The 
“Roma Nation” can transcend other categories of identification, such as 
national and religious identities. This is not to suggest that there is universal 
agreement over the use of the terms Roma/Romani/Roma Nation by political 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, one of the most interesting conflicts is that “Roma” is 
being employed as a rigid boundary marker while at the same time there is 
debate regarding the extent to which the Romanies should be viewed as part 
of a wider constituency of nomadic peoples and/or antiracist movement. In the 
UK, these conflicts are apparent in the very different types of political activities 
directed by organisations using “Romani/Roma/Gypsy” identity frames to 
mobilise political constituencies.  
 
To demonstrate this one can briefly look at two very different examples of 
organisations in the UK – The Traveller Movement and 8 April Movement. In 
the case of The Traveller Movement, its aim is to ‘involve the Gypsy, Traveller 
and Roma community with decision making processes at a national policy 
level’. It attempts to construct a British “Gypsy, Traveller and Roma” identity, 
thus collectively representing the interests of a broad and changeable 
nomadic constituency. Like The Traveller Movement, the vast majority of 
organisations in the UK aim to represent the entire spectrum of nomadic 
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communities in the UK. What is important, however, is that the category of 
“Gypsies, Roma, and Travellers” is being deployed as a political identity and 
means of claims-making on a national level. The 8 April Movement also 
promotes the notion of a united Gypsy, Traveller and Roma community in the 
UK. With its focus on “Roma Nation Day”, however, it relies on essentialist 
symbols and language to construct a Romani community not only within the 
context of Britain, but in the context of Europe. As it states in one of its 
publications, ‘Our status has been defined as that of a nation without territory; 
a nation of l0 million in Europe alone, a figure that will double by 2050. The 8 
April Movement believes the building of an electoral mandate is the next 
essential step towards realization of a greater level of individual empowerment 
and of collective self-determination’. It is an explicitly political organisation with 
its ultimate aim being Romani self-determination and the recognition of the 
Roma Nation on an international stage.  
 
Both The Traveller Movement and 8 April Movement utilise the category of 
Gypsy, Traveller and Roma as means of constructing a political constituency 
that transcends ethnic, national and religious divides. That said, they both 
present examples of how Romani identity is increasingly being used in the UK 
as a politicised identity. Both organisations employ identity frames for very 
different political aims, with 8 April Movement being far more diasporic than 
the Traveller Movement in its efforts to focus on the transnational community, 
or the Roma Nation, as an imagined community that presents a viable 
alternative to that of the nation state.  
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The extent to which these organisations have been able to successfully 
convince their “constituency” of their aims and conception of Romani and/or 
Gypsy and Traveller identity is unknown. Neither is it known whether such 
movements are necessarily welcomed by the communities in question. 
Strategies that will possibly be convincing for governments and international 
audiences may be regarded as counterproductive and unconvincing at a micro 
level. Romani activists and organisations, for example, are often inclined to 
present the Romanies as victims of discrimination, hostility, inadequate 
schooling, unsatisfactory housing, poor health, unemployment and so on. This 
is of course true, however it maintains the understanding of the Romanies as 
perpetual victims of state sponsored negligence. Or, in the words of Popov 
(quoted in Alexandrova, 2004: no pagination), it ‘serves to increase the 
negative stereotypes of the Gypsies, which in the long run [acts as an] 
obstacle to the solutions of their problems’.  
 
Evidently, Popov has observed what worryingly appears to be a double 
quandary: Romani activists can successfully have their voices heard by 
participating in identity politics and emphasising Romani identity as the central 
focus of political action, but in doing so they are in danger of reifying, 
politicising and imaginably even deepening the gap between minority and 
majority identities. This problem is by no means a new one, and is most 
definitely not unique to the Romanies. Since the publication of Goffman’s work 
on stigma, scholars have come to recognise the challenges confronting any 
would-be minority activist: ‘in drawing attention to the situation of his own kind 
he is in some respects consolidating a public image of his differentness as a 
real thing and of his fellow-stigmatised as constituting a real group. On the 
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other hand, if he seeks some kind of separateness, not assimilation, he may 
find that he is necessarily presenting his militant efforts in the language and 
style of his enemies’ (Goffman, 1986: 114). As Scott (1999: 3) has neatly 
explained, ‘Claims for equality involve the acceptance and rejection of the 
group identity attributed by discrimination. Or, to put it another way: the terms 
of exclusion on which discrimination is premised are at once refused and 
reproduced in demands for inclusion’. Activists call for equality and, thus, 
demonstrate against those who view marginalised groups as innately 
different. Yet they simultaneously, for political purposes, must reiterate the 
differences between marginalised groups and the cultural or ethnic majority.  
 
Can this predicament be resolved? Is there another way? Is it practical and 
desirable, for example, to anticipate a diaspora politics that omits every 
reference to cultural and ethnic identity? With this in mind, it is necessary to 
explore the discussions that underlie the critique of identity politics.  
Identity Politics 
Influenced by a Foucauldian interpretation of identity, Judith Butler contests 
not only the employment of identity as a political claim but the epistemological 
and ontological assumptions that lie behind it. Identity, argues Butler (1999), 
is deeply imbricated with power. Indeed, she proposes that identity is an 
explicit formation of power as while power may seem to control pre-existing 
subjects by constraining them to legal, cultural and institutional norms, these 
subjects, by reason of this subordination, are not simply “given”. Rather, they 
are fashioned and defined according to these norms. As opposed to the 
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traditional interpretation of pre-existing political subjects parleying with the 
state, Butler offers a performative account of subjectivity – one that 
understands it as embodied through the iterative enactments of state 
structures. Put differently, political actors do not merely interact with power but 
are created by power by accepting the terms of recognition that power offers. 
In acknowledging these terms, subjects are given recognition as right-holding 
citizens entitled to make claims on state resources. In this respect, identity is 
not merely “who I am” (and what, in turn, influences and positions political 
goals and objectives). Rather, identity is the effect of power and, therefore, to 
make claims on behalf of identity is to make claims on behalf of power.  
 
Butler’s interpretation of the relationship between identity and power raises a 
significant question. To be precise, what happens when identity becomes the 
main method of political participation and the only channel through which 
groups are given recognition and afforded rights? As this chapter has 
discussed, the notion of the Romani diaspora, specifically as executed by the 
International Romani Union, relies heavily on the construction of an 
essentialised and territorially rooted Romani identity and the desire for such 
an identity to be recognised in the international political arena. Attached to 
such a claim, however, are two fundamental dangers. First, the political 
performativity of identity, as a channel to secure power, inadvertently partakes 
in the process of discrimination it aims to redress. This is far more than the 
typical criticism that Romani nationalism, and indeed Romani Studies, 
entrenches existing group divisions. Rather, Butler (2004) argues not only that 
identity politics preserves a history of division, but that so far as identity is the 
channel through which one becomes a political actor, then identification can 
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be understood as a means by which power discerns between those 
sanctioned to make claims and those who are not. As Butler’s work explains, 
for example, it is not solely that a feminist movement premised on the 
identification of a united, shared and intelligible classification of “woman” 
preserves the male-female division even as it claims to dismantle it. More 
importantly, this classification fashions exclusionary gender norms (e.g. white, 
heterosexual, middle class) that impede other experiences of femininity (e.g. 
BME, lesbian, working class) and sexuality (e.g. transgender) (Butler, 2004). 
In other words, given that identity is a product of the logic of power, it 
unavoidably upholds power’s propensity to exclude. 
 
This speaks to the “true Gypsy/fake Gypsy” dichotomy of the early 
anthropological studies of the Romanies (see chapter 1), which have 
ultimately shaped the Romani nationalist narrative. The notion of a “Roma 
nation” is one which has been constructed and championed by the Romani 
“elite”. It has been argued that it highlights more than anything, the poor 
political communication amongst the Romani population, whom for which the 
aim to be recognised as a nation, is by no means universally shared. Indeed, 
Romani politics are arguably “elite” politics, dominated by a handful of Romani 
intelligentsia (Willems and Lucassen, 2000; Barany, 2002). For Kovats (2003), 
Romani politics can only be sustained at an elite level, detached from 
democratic control by the Romani people.  
 
Roma nationalism does not represent the emancipation of a 
suppressed people in the tradition of anti-colonial struggles, but the 
promotion of an authoritarian nationalist tradition in which a political 
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community is constructed through the manipulation of vulnerable 
people, to secure the interests of an unaccountable elite. (Kovats, 
2003: 4).  
 
These arguments allude to Butler’s caution of the exclusionary nature of 
identity movements.  The pursuits of the IRU are an attempt to directly 
challenge the diversification of the Romani population. Romani nationalism 
infers that sub-ethnic divisions are the result of aggressive external factors, 
such as assimilationist policy, as opposed to naturally occurring internal ones 
(Hancock, 2007). It is for that reason that great efforts have been made by the 
IRU to determine and universalise a standardised Romani language (Acton 
and Klímová, 2001) given that the promotion of a common language is vital to 
the nation building process (Kymlicka, 1997:28). Whether we define Romani 
as a collection of strongly related tongues or as a distinct language containing 
various dialects, what is certain is that there has never been a standardised 
or homogenous, Romani language nor has there been a homogeneous 
Romani culture or identity. The employment of both the diaspora and 
nationalist frame therefore raises questions about what counts as Romani 
identity and culture, what kinds of Romani identity and culture should be 
supported and who should decide such matters. There is a danger, therefore, 
that a pursuit of the resurrection of “authentic” Romani identity and culture 
might be enacted at the expense of movement inclusivity and the 
heterogeneity of the Romani diaspora. What may be crucial to explore in this 
research, therefore, is whether a nationalist/diaspora frame restricts Romani 
identity to only those duly certified by a political elite.  
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These dangers appear to be somewhat unavoidable given that the 
politicisation of Romani identity will always involve negotiations and 
renegotiations of what is, and what is not, Romani identity. Nevertheless, for 
Butler (1997) – and this is the second hazard of identity politics – in jeopardy 
is not merely the subordination of others, but, more importantly, the 
subordination of ourselves. The political performance of identity does not only 
impede or exclude others from acquiring access to the political arena, it make 
us accomplices to our own subjection by virtue of our own reliance on the 
structures of power. Indeed, Butler argues that one readily responds to the 
dictates of power given that power’s interpellation guarantees identity (Butler, 
1997). Put differently, power does not simply constitute political actors by 
acknowledging them as such; it creates and utilises the need for recognition, 
as an assurance of survival, so that subjects begin to long for their own 
subjection.  
 
Called by an injurious name, I come into social being, and because 
I have a certain inevitable attachment to my existence, because a 
certain narcissism takes hold of any term that confers existence, I 
am led to embrace the terms that injure me because they constitute 
me socially. The self-colonising trajectory of certain forms of 
identity politics are symptomatic of this paradoxical embrace of the 
injurious term (Butler, 1997: 104).  
 
In her critique, Butler’s objective is not to postulate a fatalist impression of the 
subject as merely an upshot of power. Rather, Butler’s argument attracts 
attention to the form of politics that such a longing for identity can induce. 
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Brown conceptualises this as the ‘politics of ressentiment’ (Brown, 1995: 27). 
Such politics transpire when the only feasible admission to the political sphere 
is via the necessity of being acknowledged as historically subjugated and, 
thus, in need of reparation or protection. This confines individuals and groups 
into positions of victimhood, imploring them to be invested in their own 
marginality. Identity based claims, argues Brown, ultimately employ moralistic 
forms of reproach, reducing politics to the logic of retribution. ‘Politicised 
identity’, Brown argues, ‘thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by 
entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain into politics; it can 
hold out no future – for itself or others – that triumphs pain’ (Brown, 1995: 74). 
Thus, by making subordination the focus of political claims, identity-based 
politics fix ‘the identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions and 
codifies as well the meanings their action against all other possibilities of 
interdeterminacy, ambiguity, and struggle for resignification and repositioning’ 
(Brown, 1995: 27). 
 
As this chapter has explored, the issue of heterogeneity brings an element of 
uncertainty to the notion of a Romani diasporic consciousness. Romani 
nationalism seeks to (re)discover a “we” amongst a dispersed population, yet 
the notion of a homeland has not been successful in achieving this. As a 
movement strategy, the documentation of oppression has played a leading 
role. Indeed, outlining the history of the Romanies as a persecuted people has 
become somewhat of an important function within the production of group 
consciousness and cohesion. The “victim” narrative, which places the 
Romanies as a perpetually subjugated population, is a significant aspect of 
group mobilisation. It presents a strong case for standing united against the 
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societies and institutions implicit in their persecution, and is the basis from 
which to submit a range of demands - from financial reparations, to official 
acknowledgement of the Romanies as an ethnic minority or nation.  
 
The historical documentation of persecution plays a crucial role for several 
reasons. Firstly, the persistent stigmatisation of the Romanies, due to their 
supposed ethno-cultural characteristics, has led to the classification of the 
Romanies as a single, united group. Secondly, the atrocities experienced by 
the Romanies have become a symbol of a shared, and on-going, oppression 
that has presented them with a foundation for solidarity. It has been argued, 
therefore, that the historical and on-going persecution of the Romani people 
brings together typically disparate Romani populations into a single group and, 
to some extent, allows for them to recognise that they have more in common 
than they may have considered (Kapralski, 1997): 
 
The centuries-long persecution of the Gypsies by states and 
societies in a variety of historical contexts is Romani history. Given 
the chronological proximity of Porajmos1, it is especially important 
to make Roma cognizant of the indiscriminate slaughter of their 
forefathers during World War II, because this understanding can 
create a sense of belonging, a feeling of shared suffering. (Barany, 
2002:205). 
 
                                            
1 Romani word for Holocaust.  
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Though victimhood can be exploited as an effective means to obtain 
resources from the state, ‘through the manipulation of guilt and social 
responsibility’, there is a risk that the group in question may internalise their 
victimhood as an ‘unchanging reality of life’ (PER Report, 1992, no 
pagination).  In this vein, Brown sees a need for ‘loosening identities’ 
attachments to their current constitutive injuries’ (Brown, 1995: 134). By taking 
this line of argument, she does not completely dismiss the claim to identity but 
endeavours to reconfigure the risks concerned with such a claim. This, she 
contends, may be accomplished if one shifts away from the understanding of 
identity as an assertion of whom one is and towards one that comprises of 
“what I want for us”. Here “want” is not to be misinterpreted as a manifestation 
of self-interest, but should be observed as an indication of collective goals 
(Brown, 1995). Brown defines this repositioning as a shift from identity as an 
ontological claim to identity as an explicitly political one (Brown, 1995: 76). 
Such a reimagining provides the capacity to undermine what identity 
supposedly is and transform identity politics into a practice through which 
issues can be discussed and challenged both within the group and in its 
interactions with power. Thus, ‘the replacement – even the admixture – of the 
language of “being” with “wanting” would seek to exploit politically a recovery 
of the more expansive moments in the genealogy of identity formation, a 
recovery prior to its own foreclosures against its wants, prior to a point at which 
its sovereign subjectivity is established through such foreclosures and through 
eternal repetition of is pain’ (Brown, 1995: 76). 
 
Brown’s bid to reconceptualise identity claims as negotiations of ‘collective 
good’ as opposed to conclusive affirmations of shared identity, moves the 
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debate somewhat towards amending the more destructive tendencies of 
identity politics. What is particularly valuable is her understanding of identity 
based claims as declarations that initiate rather than foreclose discussion. 
Nonetheless, Brown’s critique still presents a challenge for Romani 
nationalism given the distinction she makes between identity as an ontological 
claim and identity as a political one. Indeed, is it realistic to draw such a 
distinction, particularly in cases like the Romanies in which political goals are 
precisely to secure whom one is (and likewise, “who we are”)? 
In Defence of Identity Politics 
The formation of a Romani diasporic consciousness will always invoke 
ontological claims. Nevertheless, this does not imply that it should support the 
reestablishment of an essentialist subject. It simply calls for the 
acknowledgement of the fact that individuals are prone to act upon dominant 
processes of categorisation. Indeed, movement leaders cannot produce 
identities from nowhere; they have to begin with existing group identities, and 
these typically mirror the dominant forms of exclusion in society. How should 
Romani nationalists thus negotiate the ontological and political aspects of 
diasporic consciousness? Some theorists have indicated that “strategic 
essentialism” might be an effective approach (Spivak, 1987). 
 
First introduced in her 1985 essay, Spivak points out the conflict and 
disputations intrinsic to the ontological and historical accounts of identity and 
its political worth. Though she accepts the value of such an account, Spivak 
argues that a shift away from identity politics is not a viable means of 
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resistance accessible to the formally colonised world2 and to those still 
struggling under the current coloniality of power3 (Spivak, 1985).  What such 
a shift neglects is the ways in which non-representation also operates as a 
form of power, particularly given that modern Western states were somewhat 
consolidated via hegemonic projects of imperialism. In other words, 
considering the constitutive affiliation between the notion of the modern 
political subject and its colonial “other”, it should not be too readily supposed 
that subjugated individuals can act outside of the subject positions dictated 
and acknowledged by power (Spivak, 1988). In this regard, strategic 
essentialism should not be considered as the acceptance of identity as fixed, 
but as a mobilising categorisation.  
 
Spivak’s proposal offers new ways of thinking about the issue of how the 
Romani diaspora may preserve a notion of territorial identity without resorting 
to an essentialist stance. First, it highlights the conditions of coloniality that 
frequently typify the longing and struggle for collective self-determination. 
According to Spivak, the stigmatised subject, by virtue of their historic position 
within a regime of imperial power whose governing systems and knowledge 
                                            
2 Spivak is writing here in the postcolonial context. The Romanies are not 
easily situated as postcolonial subjects given the absence of an obvious or 
universally agreed homeland. They are a dispersed people whose presence 
is not limited to any specific nation state or territory. By definition, therefore, 
they cannot be considered postcolonial in the literal sense, as a people without 
territory are exempt from colonisation.  
3 That is, the continuance of colonial and Eurocentric structures, mentalities 
and social relations of inequality and domination after the defeat of 
colonialism, that are racialised (that is, understood as inherent or essential to 
the groups involved), and are founded on, and serve to justify, colonial 
domination.  
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production remain to hold epistemic and institutional leverage, find themselves 
in a position in which they “cannot not want to inhabit these very same 
techniques and knowledge’ (Spivak, 1993: 44). This is arguably an important 
counterargument to Brown’s suggestion to see identity as a political, as 
opposed to an ontological, claim. Spivak’s interpretation of identity as 
“something one cannot not use’ (Spivak, 1993: 5) calls attention not only to 
the ways in which one’s ontological and historical circumstances influence the 
capacity to make political claims, but how the historical and lived experiences 
of identity reveal the degree to which one is able to consider their identity as 
political at all. Thus, whilst Brown’s reworking of identity claims relies on the 
murky distinction of ontological and political aspects of identity, Spivak’s 
strategic essentialism underlines their relationality. The political saliency of 
identity is, therefore, dependent on its “security”, which is in turn dependent 
on one’s relation to power. Does this, as Brown and Butler argue, make the 
Romanies willing participants in the exclusionary logic of power? Spivak 
argues that such complicity is, on occasion, regrettably essential to our 
survival. Strategic essentialism therefore makes evident the political, 
ontological and historical aspects of identity and the ways in which they 
interconnect and determine one another. 
 
Secondly, strategic essentialism enables the assertion of identity within a 
poststructuralist critique. Spivak’s argument is interesting given her affirmation 
that the reconstruction of identity is compatible with, and in effect instigated 
by, the goals and principles of deconstruction. ‘A strategy’, Spivak 
emphasises, ‘is not a theory’ (Spivak, 1993: 4). Rather, it is ‘a persistent 
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(de)constructive critique of the theoretical’ (Spivak, 1993: 3). In that regard, 
the implementation of identity is, in effect, the constant questioning of what 
identity means within any given context. What Romani nationalists and 
intellectuals may obtain from this is a case for how affirmations of group 
interests and objectives can be made without a conclusive explanation of what 
identity is. As opposed to a claim that identity is given, claims to group rights 
can instead be understood as on-going negotiations of what group identity 
involves.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified two understandings of diaspora: territorial and 
deterritorial. In territorial definitions, diaspora refers to marginalised, dispersed 
peoples who share: a collective memory of their homeland; the will to maintain 
the culture of their homeland; and the desire to return to their homeland. 
Deterritorial definitions, on the other hand, recognise that, through the process 
of globalisation, the performance of culture is no longer tied to the territory of 
the nation state. Though diasporic identities are still rooted in historical origins, 
they have been dramatically transformed post-dispersal and are, thus, no 
longer accompanied by a longing to return to the homeland but a need to 
maintain cultural identification with the homeland.  Definitions of diaspora, 
thus, place emphasis on either homeland (territorial) or homing desire 
(deterritorial).  
Romani diasporic nationalism has been, at various times since the 20th 
century, both territorial and deterritorial in nature. Throughout the 20th Century, 
Romani nationalist made various claims for territory in order to establish a 
- 77 - 
territorial Roma nation. Contemporary Romani nationalism, in the form of the 
International Romani Union, has referred instead to a non-territorial Roma 
nation of Indian origins. Here, the desire to return to and/or establish a Romani 
state has been replaced with the desire to inspire a diasporic consciousness 
which will reunify the greatly dispersed and dissimilar Romani peoples into a 
single collective identity rooted in the politics of origins and home(land). 
Nationalistic symbols have, thus, been employed to invoke groupness, 
including: a national Romani flag and anthem; the standardisation of Romani 
language, and the documentation and dissemination of Romani history and 
persecution.  
 
Romani nationalists have been criticised for its attempts to homogenise the 
Romani peoples. Ultimately it falls into the trap of identity politics in which 
group differences are overlooked in an effort to present the group as a strong, 
unformed and united political constituency sharing a robust collective identity. 
Romani political entrepreneurs are, thus, given the power to define “authentic” 
Romani identity and make political claims in the name of this identity. They 
have relied greatly on the politics of “victimhood” – cementing Romani identity 
into a long history of discrimination and marginalisation, in order to make 
claims for rights and recognition. In doing so, they fix Romani identity to an 
unchanging reality of victimhood.  
 
Critiques of Romani nationalism have stressed the essentialising rhetoric 
employed to validate group identity, yet, these critiques arguably do little but 
demobilise the attempts of Romani activists and organisations to make claims 
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and demands in the name of the Romanies. Spivak, on the other hand, 
recognises the struggle for marginalised groups to act outside of externally 
imposed essentialised categorisations, and suggests “strategic essentialism” 
can be beneficial. Rather than speak of Romani nationalism as an ill-fated and 
misinformed ideology caught in the regressive clutches of identity politics, it 
may be more fruitful to consider it a strategic stance or project. Exploring the 
“Roma Nation” with this in mind, we can study to what extent, and in what 
circumstances, the Romanies actively support the employment of such a 
strategy. This change of focus from disproving Romani diasporic claims and 
towards the dynamics of groupness, shifts attention away from whether 
Romani diasporic nationalism is “right” or “wrong”, and towards how the 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Attempts by non-Gypsies to define the features of Romani culture and 
ethnicity have often been based on stereotypical, prejudiced and destructive 
conceptions of the Romani people. Indeed, the Romanies often find 
themselves excluded from the process of the construction and negotiation of 
ethnic boundaries. Non-Gypsies are poorly situated to understand Romani 
culture and ethnicity, both in the form of its historic foundations and the way it 
has transformed and adapted to contemporary society. It is for this reason that 
the politicisation of Romani identity has become so central to Romani 
nationalism, with ethnopolitical entrepreneurs eager to gain control over the 
(re)construction and negotiation of Romani identity. It is of great importance 
to this research, therefore, to consider the ways in which social research can 
replicate the disempowerment of Romani people by perpetuating archaic, 
fictitious and negative notions of Romani identity. This chapter will thus 
explore the exclusion of Romani people from the process of research, drawing 
on postcolonial and feminist critiques of the academy. It will advocate the 
greater involvement of Romani people in research about their lives, and 
outline how this was attempted in this research project through the 
employment of a participatory approach.   
 
The research is informed by a focus group based research method called 
sociological intervention which was introduced by Alain Touraine and later 
reworked by Alberto Melucci. This chapter will provide a discussion of the 
processes involved in sociological intervention and will outlines my attempt to 
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employ Touraine and Melucci’s methods to explore Romani diasporic politics, 
whilst maintaining a commitment to participatory ideals.  
Others, Outsiders and Plastic Gypsies 
Voice can be defined as inclusion and participation in social, 
political and economic processes, meaning making, autonomy and 
expression. We can think of ‘voice poverty’ as the denial of the right 
of people to influence the decisions that affect their lives, and the 
right to participate in that decision making (Tacchi, 2008:12). 
 
Voice poverty is a term usually reserved to describe the exclusion of people 
with experience of poverty from the discursive construction of poverty.  When 
applied to this study it denotes the exclusion of Romani communities from the 
academic discourse on Romani, Gypsy and Traveller communities and the 
consequent impact this has had on the nature of both debates and policy 
responses. With the vast majority of Romani communities largely detached 
from mainstream education, they remain underrepresented within the 
academy. “Knowledge” of the Romanies is, thus, produced, interpreted and 
disseminated by non-Romani academics. Their interests, concerns and 
priorities have, therefore, been eclipsed by the curiosities of academics, which 
has, in turn, exacerbated voice poverty.  
 
The impact this has upon research is debateable and is, perhaps, dependent 
on one’s epistemological stance on the nature of knowledge. Should the 
absence of “marginalised” communities, from the academy, be a matter of 
concern for academics? Arguably, the qualitative researcher, by nature, seeks 
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to represent the “voices” of informants. They describe, interpret, and fashion 
an understanding of a phenomena, presenting knowledge of a community in 
their own words; but is this enough? Academics are unavoidably implicated in 
the processes of speaking for and representing others. These processes of 
representation are inescapably tied to the production of knowledge and power 
and have, therefore, both ethical and political implications. That said, the 
practice of representation presents a particularl issue for scholars researching 
“marginalised” groups. Indeed, for researchers concerned with the process of 
transforming power relations, both within and beyond the boundaries of social 
research, the research process is complicated by the contradictory and 
intricate difficulties of representing the subjectivities and identities of “others”. 
With this in mind, a discussion on how representational processes are 
connected to epistemological debates within the social sciences is necessary.  
 
Central to debates on representation is the construction of the “other” and the 
resulting relationship of power in which the West imagines a lack of agency 
on part of the “subordinated”. This research draws upon Said’s (1978) theory 
of Orientalism, in which: 
 
Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as a corporate 
institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making 
statements about it, authorising views on it, describing it, teaching 
it, settling it, ruling over it – in short, Orientalism as a Western style 
for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over it (p3).  
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Said discusses Orientalism as the production of western understandings of 
the East, and exposes the assumptions behind this construction of the “other” 
as being compounded with ideas of western supremacy. He warns of the 
historical, political and philosophical implications for research; historically, 
marginalised peoples have been silenced (or have chosen to be silent, hence 
exercising the agency the West assumes they are lacking), whilst academics 
have produced and disseminated knowledge on them, on the basis of brief 
encounters. 
 
The acknowledgment that speaking for, or representing others, is problematic 
has developed from two related points. First, that a ‘speaker’s location’ (i.e. 
social location or social identity) is epistemologically significant and second, 
that particular privileged locations are ‘discursively dangerous’ (Alcoff, 1991, 
7). In Alcoff’s opinion, both speaking for and speaking about others presents 
a problem, primarily because these both participate in the process of 
representing others (Alcoff, 1991). That said, any research which entails 
‘subject construction’ (Spivak, 1988, 306) is embroiled with the process of 
representation and, therefore, cannot be separated from the issue of power 
inequality.  
 
Ultimately, for Alcoff, the question ‘of speaking for others bears crucially on 
the possibility of political effectivity’ (Alcoff, 1991, 11). Political effectivity 
should facilitate the empowerment of oppressed and marginalised peoples. 
Nevertheless, Alcoff’s claim rather crudely jumps from highlighting the 
problem of speaking for others to somewhat arguing that it may be ethical to 
speak for others as long as it is “empowering”. This assumes that scholars 
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have direct knowledge of who “oppressed people” are; what is in their interest; 
and how they can be empowered. Alcoff’s argument is thus at risk of 
employing essentialised categories of identity (such as the “Gypsy”), in which 
oppression is assumed inevitable.  
 
Alcoff’s argument exemplifies Spivak’s concern with regard to how scholars 
construct the interests of “oppressed” peoples with apparent ease (Spivak, 
1999). This is not to say that Alcoff herself is guilty of this, but rather that the 
employment of political effectivity to empower oppressed people needs to be 
subjected to the same level of scrutiny as claims of representation as they are 
unescapably linked. Spivak effectively unmasks the problematic ways 
oppressed peoples are constructed by highlighting the contradictory ways in 
which academics claim to deconstruct the subject whilst also claiming to know 
and speak for “others”. In considering “others”, Spivak contends that 
academics too readily position themselves as representatives of the voices of 
oppressed groups. Accordingly, Spivak argues that scholars must pay close 
attention to how their research is bound up in the processes of representation. 
She advises us to ‘suspend the mood of self-congratulation as saviours of 
marginality’ (Spivak, 1992, 204). In other words, researchers must not 
presume to know, or have direct access to knowledge of “others”. Rather, 
Spivak argues that full and comprehensive knowledge of “others” is in fact an 
impossibility (Spivak, 1999, 283). That said, ethical ways of representing 
“others” need to be grounded in recognising and employing responsibly within 
this impossibility, not attempting to bypass it. 
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It is critical therefore for researchers to reflect on their positionality, given that 
this can impact upon and manipulate the process of representation (Reinharz 
and Chase, 2002). Arguably, power inequalities will always be present due to 
differences in race, ethnicity, class, gender or age etc. Reflections on 
positionality, however, should surpass the mere weighing up of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the “insider” and “outsider” researcher. 
Since notions of identity are at the centre of this research, the initial stages of 
selecting a suitable methodology were grounded in the ontological questions 
such as “what is identity and how is it constructed?” and “how do we 
experience identity?” In this research I employ the participants’ narrated 
experiences as a source of knowledge, but recognise, like Spivak, that their 
narratives do not provide a full and comprehensive knowledge of the Romani 
experience. I borrow from feminist standpoint theory (Harding, 1991; 
Hartstock, 1983) which underlines the “situatedness” of knowledge 
production. From this perspective, knowing is always partial and relative and 
is contingent on contextual factors such as history, race and ethnicity, 
nationality, religion and social class.  
 
The way a researcher is positioned – their gender, class, ethnicity, nationality, 
culture, etc. – also influences knowledge production and has an effect on all 
aspects of research methodology (Mullings, 1999). A researcher’s 
positionality influences the choice of research area, motivations for selecting 
such a research area, the methods of conducting research and the knowledge 
that the researcher aims to produce (Hartstock, 1997; Haraway, 1991; 
Harding, 1991). The issue this raises, however, is not whether the researcher 
influences the research process, nor how this can be avoided, but rather how 
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to direct ‘this methodological [issue]…into a commitment to reflexivity’ 
(Malterud, 2001: 484). It is important, therefore, that I reflect on my own 
identity and situate myself accordingly.  
 
I will also seek to understand and appreciate my positionality from the 
perspectives of the research participants. Brought to mind is Smith’s (1999: 1-
3) caution that: 
 
scientific research is implicated in the worst excess of 
colonialism…Research is not an innocent or distant academic 
exercise but an activity that has something at stake and that occurs 
in a set of political and social conditions, and questions about 
researcher’s subjectivities, posturing and interpretation arise. 
 
From the standpoint of ethnic minorities, immigrants or colonised peoples, 
research is arguably linked to ethnocentrism, colonialism, and white western 
hegemony. The centrality of research to the greatest extremes of racial, 
ethnic, or western supremacy goes a long way to explain the incessant 
mistrust of the academy. Indeed, the roots of mistrust are situated in the ways 
in which knowledge about marginalised peoples has been gathered, classified 
and represented through the eyes of the West. The ways in which the outsider 
researcher is perceived by participants are, thus, historically loaded with 
‘socio-political divides of black/white, east/west, colonial/imperial, 
developed/developing, and others’ (Shah, 2004, 565).  
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Research is increasingly indicating the deepening levels of mistrust felt 
towards “white” or “outsider” researchers (Shah, 2004). Consequently, ethnic 
minorities are often referred to as “hard to reach” – a label which positions 
them as “vulnerable” or even unwilling to cooperate. “Hard to reach” is, of 
course, a contested term and is arguably racially loaded. Gypsies, Roma and 
Travellers are frequently referred to as “hard to reach” despite the extensive 
body of research on these groups that already exists. Myers (2015, 213) 
argues that “hard to reach” reflects a ‘universal ambivalence towards Gypsies’ 
which indicates ‘something closer to feelings of distaste about Gypsies, or of 
uneasiness in dealing with them, rather than specific hurdles that are difficult 
to surmount…’ The term reflects, therefore, the inherent ethnocentrism of 
outsider research. Too often marginalised “others” are branded “hard to 
reach”, yet seldom do academics acknowledge that their own ethnocentrism, 
prejudice, and often sense of entitlement, makes their presence hard to want.   
 
Pertinent to the approach of this research, are the words of Roy Wells who at 
the time of speaking, in 1975, was the President of the National Gypsy 
Council:  
 
Your clever academics befriend us for a few months, they come 
down to our site, eats our food and drinks our tea. Some of them 
even lives amongst us. Then they disappear to their nice homes 
and university libraries. Next thing we know they’re giving lectures 
on us, writing books about us…what do they know about our 
struggles? How can they know our pain? We live it all the time. Our 
persecution lasts a life-time, not just a few months. Give us the 
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tools to say it right and we’ll tell you like it is. You know what we 
call them on our site? Plastic Gypsies. (Quoted in Bhopal and 
Myers, 2008, 36).  
 
And the powerful words of bell hooks: 
 
No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than 
you can speak about yourself.  No need to hear your voice.  Only 
tell me about your pain.  I want to know your story.  And then I will 
tell it back to you in a new way.  Tell it back to you in such a way 
that it has become mine, my own.  Re-writing you, I write myself 
anew.  I am still author, authority.  I am still the colonizer, the 
speaking subject, and you are now at the centre of my talk. (hooks, 
1990: 151). 
 
Their words act as a powerful reminder of the ethical responsibilities that 
researchers must acknowledge: the matter of the participant’s control over the 
research, and the need for a relational dimension, which is too often absent 
from research. It is imperative for researchers to recognise the potential 
imbalance of “loss and gain”. More often than not, it is the researcher who has 
the most to gain from academic study - peer reviewed research is central to 
academic recognition and career advancement. As a non-Romani, 
postgraduate, I will profit substantially more from this research than the 
communities I will be studying. It is unlikely that the research will have any 
immediate or far reaching benefits for Romani communities, yet it is likely to 
significantly aid my professional advancement.  I could be easily positioned, 
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therefore, as Wells’ ‘plastic Gypsy’ – the academic who departs as abruptly 
as she arrives, disseminating knowledge of the “other” from the safety of the 
ivory tower. I accept and acknowledge my privileged position within the 
research relationship, however, like Merton (1972), I recognise that the 
insider/outsider dichotomy is often overly simplistic. Our identities are complex 
and not easily placed within a single affiliation.  Rather, we have a set of 
identities meaning we are all at time both insiders and outsiders.  
 
My interest in Romani communities did not emerge from an academic 
engagement with literature and documentaries nor was it informed by my 
undergraduate studies. Rather, it emerged through my day to day interactions 
with these communities.  As a result of a shared socioeconomic status, the 
Romanies and the working class are often “confined” to specific, and often 
stigmatised, geographical areas (Liégeois, 1994). I grew up in several areas 
of low socio-economic status, in which there were sizeable Gypsy and 
Traveller populations. On account of this, a considerable fraction of my friends 
are from the Romani community. This by no means positions me as an 
“insider”; however, I approach this research not as a “neutral” outsider but as 
one acquainted with the Romani community on a personal, rather than 
professional level. 
Confronting the Orientalist Legacy of Social Research 
Although some writers make it sound as though there is a separate 
“participatory” research method, this is misleading. The idea of 
participation is more an overall guiding philosophy of how to 
proceed than a selection of specific methods. So when people talk 
- 89 - 
about participatory research…on the whole they are not discussing 
a self-contained set of methodologies, but a situation whereby the 
methods being used have included an element of strong 
involvement and consultation on the part of the subjects of the 
research [emphasis added] (Pratt and Loizos, 1992).  
 
Where possible, this research aims to embody the principles of participatory 
research – an approach which is guided by the values that move the social 
sciences away from the orientalist and colonial legacy of social research. 
There is an increasing presence of participatory studies within the field of 
Romani studies (see Greenfields and Ryder, 2012). This is a welcomed 
development that will, perhaps, help to lessen the justifiable mistrust that 
Romani communities have had towards social research.   
 
The roots of participatory research lay in the notion that research should 
‘contribute something of value to the community in which the research is being 
conducted’ (Kirby et al, 2005, 32). It is an approach greatly influenced by the 
works of Paulo Freire (2000) who argued for the development of counter-
hegemonic approaches to the production of knowledge in order to confront 
the authority of powerful majority interests. The participatory researcher 
argues, therefore, against the reproduction of unequal power relations in 
research (Durose et al, 2012). Participatory research is a ‘more open and 
democratic process of knowledge production’ (Brock, 2002, 8). It aims to 
reduce the gap between the researcher and the researched and, therefore, 
advocates the coproduction of knowledge. 
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Participatory research directly confronts “voice poverty”. It embodies the belief 
that marginalised communities have a fundamental right to contribute to the 
analysis of their situations and the right to a voice (Lister and Beresford, 2000; 
Bennett and Roberts, 2004). This is particularly important for communities, 
such as the Romanies, who have historically been victims of the imbalance of 
power in social research. The perspectives and ideas of the communities 
themselves are, thus, seen as crucial to achieving a more inclusive and in 
depth understanding of the issues under study (Bennett and Roberts, 2004). 
This research considers it a right for Romani communities to take part in the 
debates and discourse of Romani Studies, and acknowledges their expertise 
in doing so. The authority of Romani communities is respected and their 
knowledge is deemed legitimate. Consequently, this research is committed to 
presenting greater control to Romani communities over the research process 
and the ways in which the data is interpreted, disseminated and used.  
 
For Park (1999), participatory research should always be instigated by issues 
identified within a community and the need to seek solutions, as opposed to 
the researcher’s own curiosities. As Park points out, the ‘communities involved 
in participatory research more often than not suffer from problems ranging 
from material deprivations, to deteriorating social relations, to political 
disenfranchisement’, however, these conditions alone do not instigate 
research. Rather, participatory research is typically carried out as a result of a 
catalyst which instigates discussions and debates within the community. The 
aims and focus of this research can be considered as an extension, “follow 
on”, or in-depth response to the findings of an earlier participatory project Our 
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Lives, Our Fight, Our Third Sector. This participatory study, which I conducted 
collaboratively with six individuals from Gypsy, Roma and Traveller 
communities, explored the ‘service provision of Gypsy and Traveller 
organisations from the perspective of service users’ (Webb et al, 2013:1). The 
research identified: 
 
• A lack of cohesion between British Romany Gypsies and Roma migrant 
communities, signifying the complexity of Romani identity.  
• The limited presence of community members in the leadership of 
‘Gypsy and Traveller’ NGOs and activism. 
 
These findings can be considered the “catalyst” for this research and form the 
basis for determining its focus. 
 
This process alone does not make the study participatory. Indeed, a greater 
element of community involvement and consultation, at all stages of the 
research, is central to participatory approaches (Park, 1999). This becomes 
problematic, however, within the context of doctoral research where there is 
an arguable conflict of interests between the objectives of doctoral 
programmes and the principles of participatory research. The foremost 
purpose of doctoral research is to attain an academic award and, thus, there 
are rules and criteria to follow which greatly restrict opportunities for 
collaboration. I recognise and acknowledge that this research has a limited 
capacity to implement participatory principles. Reasonable restrictions must 
be placed on the involvement of Romani communities, as in the absence of 
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such restrictions they would irrefutably need to be acknowledged as co-
authors. This research can, therefore, be described as adopting elements of 
participatory research.  
 
Following the success of the previous participatory project, this research was 
guided by an advisory panel. Advisory panels are increasingly becoming a 
favoured approach to research with Gypsies and Traveller. In an attempt to 
undo previous bad practice, Greenfields and Home (2010) assembled an 
advisory panel in their research, considering it “important to ensure that 
respondents considered themselves as stakeholders in the research and 
could identify specific ways in which the wide-ranging study would prove of 
benefit to the travelling population” (p.121). This was an initiative also adopted 
in research by Ryder and Greenfields (2010), in which Gypsies and Travellers 
sat on the project steering group.  
 
The advisory panel drew its membership from the Romani community. Three 
members of the original advisory panel, established during my MA research, 
resumed their roles. Keen to engage with an array of stakeholders, and given 
that all three members were from the Romany Gypsy community, the 
remaining three members were recruited from the Roma community using 
connections I had established during my previous research.  The advisory 
panel played an important role in the research, acting as advisors and 
“sounding boards” during the development of research questions and 
methodologies. They can be described as “critics” of interim reports and 
ongoing data analysis, and they identified issues that had been either 
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overlooked or overstated, or aspects of the research that were of little benefit 
to the communities as a whole (see Appendix 5). The panel will also be 
encouraged to contribute to a co-authored research report, separate to the 
doctoral thesis, which will present research findings in an accessible format to 
be disseminated to Romani communities and organisations.  
 
To some extent, they can be thought of as “informal” peer reviewers. 
Participatory researchers consider those with direct experience of the 
phenomena under study as holding particular expertise (Bennett and Roberts, 
2004). They are arguably well placed to assess the credibility and legitimacy 
of research about their lives and experiences. As Walker (2010) rightly points 
out, academic procedures can act as a shelter from the need to engage with 
communities under study. Peer review acts as a form of epistemological 
protectionism which upholds the academy’s monopoly over defining and 
legitimating knowledge: 
 
 But how far is academic peer review epistemological 
protectionism? It is a mode by which universities assert their 
monopoly of rights to defining what counts as knowledge. If 
[community members] were allowed to count as peers for the 
purposes of review, knowledge could be co-produced in a 
strong sense. But the ranks of peers are closed to all but 
“fellows” – cognoscenti, initiates in the discipline. (p205). 
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Indeed, the participatory researcher cannot simply bypass the processes of 
the academy in which they are, by definition, positioned. They can, however, 
bring accountability to research by directly involving community members in 
the decision making and “quality assurance” processes of knowledge 
production. 
Focus Groups as Collective Testimony 
As key readings suggest (see, Krueger, 1994; Morgan, 1997; Barbour and 
Kitzinger, 1999; Bloor et al., 2000; Macnaghten and Myers, 2004; Della Porta, 
2014) focus groups have become one of the foremost methods of qualitative 
exploration in social sciences. They have been used in a wide range of 
qualitative research settings (Lloyd-Evans, 2006) and have, thus, been 
defined in various ways. While some researchers, such as Hughes and 
DuMont (1993, 776) characterise focus groups as ‘in-depth interviews 
employing relatively homogeneous groups to provide information about topic 
specified by the researcher’, others define them as ‘group discussions 
exploring a specific sort of issues’ (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999, 4). In this 
research, however, focus groups are defined as ‘loosely structured 
conversation conducted with a group of interviewees that, through a focused 
debate upon certain topics, aims at investigating collective opinions’ (Della 
Porta, 2014, 290). 
 
A focus group is generally understood to involve a group of six to twelve 
participants who are guided by a researcher to attain knowledge and 
information about a specific topic (Blee and Taylor, 2002). They can be ‘formal 
or informal, preorganised or occurring in natural settings, guided to a greater 
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or lesser degree by the anthropologist/facilitator, and more or less open 
ended’ (Schensul and LeCompte, 2012, 195). Unlike in-depth interviews, 
focus groups do not require participants to respond individually to a variety of 
questions devised by the researcher. Rather, they are invited to discuss, 
challenge and confront each other collectively on the issues that the research 
is exploring (Della Porta, 2014). Focus groups offer, therefore, a valuable tool 
for researching group behaviours, interactions and norms.  
 
Indeed, what is unique to focus groups is the ‘explicit use of group interaction 
to generate data’ (Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999, 4). Morgan (1988) regards the 
hallmark of a focus group as ‘the explicit use of the group interaction to 
produce data and insight that would be less accessible without the interaction 
found in a group’ (Morgan, 1988, 12).  This is one of the main strengths of 
focus group methodology as it makes it possible for research participants to 
develop ideas collectively, presenting their own priorities, concerns and 
perspectives, ‘to create theory grounded in the actual experience and 
language of [the participants]’ (Du Bois, 1983). As Della Porta (2014) points 
out, the aim of the focus group is to explore the ways in which issues are 
collectively framed and to ‘discover the meaning behind the positions of a 
certain group, and the collective process through which this collective 
meaning is formed’.  They provide an insight into how participants think, 
reason and reflect with the specific advantage of mirroring the natural course 
of conversation and interaction (Morgan, 1997). 
 
Schensul and LeCompte (2012, 107) argue that this is particularly valuable for 
social movement research as, opposed to one-to-one interviewing, they 
- 96 - 
permit the researcher to observe interactions, which can illustrate the ways in 
which participants ‘collectively frame issues and construct group solidarity’.  
Blee and Taylor (2002, 109) agree, arguing that ‘in contrast to individual 
interviews, they allow the researchers to observe the group interactions that 
underlie the construction of collective identity, collective action frames, and 
the emotional dynamic involved in the creation of oppositional values’ (Blee 
and Taylor, 2002, 109). 
 
With the research questions in mind, the election of focus groups seems an 
obvious and advantageous choice of methodology for a study concerned with 
“groupness”. From a participatory perspective, one could argue that focus 
groups are participant-powered; the participants are able to guide the 
interaction as opposed to it being led by an interviewer. The interviewer is as 
much a participant as researcher, thereby encouraging collaboration. It is 
imperative, however, that focus groups are employed in a way that will be 
effective in obtaining rich data. It is wise, therefore, to explore the ways in 
which focus groups have been previously employed in social movement 
research. I will thus look to Alain Touraine’s sociological intervention, and the 
revisions to this method proposed by Alberto Melucci.  
What is Sociological Intervention? 
The capacity to study action as it occurs is, according to Touraine, 
fundamental to understanding social movements. It was for this reason that 
Touraine developed the method of sociological intervention, arguing 
that existing methods, such as questionnaires, impart only a ‘static picture of 
social facts’ (Munday, 2006: 92). Sociological intervention seeks to identify the 
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‘will to act and [the struggle] to be recognised as an actor’ (Touraine, 1995, 
207). In other words, it is the study of what Touraine (1995) refers to as 
“subjectivation” – the process by which one becomes aware of their capacity 
for empowerment, revolt and social action. 
  
In The Voice and the Eye (1981), Touraine provides a detailed outline of the 
intervention method. The basic premise of a sociological intervention is a 
series of focus group style sessions with a group of social movement actors. 
Touraine takes the group through a series of intervention stages on a journey 
of, what he refers to as, the “self-analysis” of the movement. This involves the 
group defining itself in its own terms; the group engaging in discussion with 
movement supporters and critics, before finally reaching a stage of self-
analysis and reflexivity in which the group and the researcher come together 
to elect an understanding and meaning of the movement  (North, 1998; 
Munday, 2006).  
 
In many ways sociological intervention is similar to the focus group method. 
There is, however, an important point of departure. Unlike focus groups in 
which consensus is the norm, conflict plays a central role in the intervention 
method. Researchers often seek to identify the difference in the group and, 
therefore, staged interactions with actors from and outside the movement are 
employed to prompt and encourage disagreement and debate (Brincker and 
Gundelach, 2005). What is more, both methods entail very different 
processes. While focus groups meet on only one or two occasions and are 
often used in conjunction with other methods, the intervention method requires 
prolonged engagement with a group and is the only method employed. In 
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Touraine’s original imagining, the process of sociological intervention could 
take several years. In more recent studies, however, the process usually lasts 
around six months and entails around six to eight meetings (Brincker and 
Gundelach, 2005; Munday, 2006). 
 
Sociological intervention remains a largely unfamiliar and uncharted method. 
In fact, notwithstanding The Voice and the Eye in which the technique and 
theoretical framework are set out, there is very little literature concerning 
sociological intervention. This is, perhaps, due to the debates, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter, which arose at the time of the first intervention 
studies. Nevertheless, while the method may no longer be at the forefront of 
methodological debates, sociological intervention has proven flexible, 
adapting to a wide range of research interests and usages. Though primarily 
developed to explore the meaning of collective struggles, sociological 
intervention has been used to analyse other forms of action and social actors, 
as well as issues entirely unrelated to social movements and collective action 
(McDonald, 2002; Cousin and Rui, 2011).  
 
The method was most notably adapted by Alberto Melucci. Though critical of 
Touraine, Melucci recognised the potential and value of Touraine’s 
sociological intervention, adapting the method for his own research. Melucci 
agrees with Touraine that the study of groups is critical to the effective analysis 
of social movements (Munday, 2006). Indeed, the study of groups enables the 
researcher to collect rich data on the processes through which collective 
identity is constructed and maintained (Melucci, 1989; North, 1998). In many 
ways Melucci’s approach is similar to Touraine’s method, closely resembling 
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the first two stages of Touraine’s intervention. Melucci’s adaptation was 
careful to avoid any efforts to attain total consensus between the researcher 
and participant’s vis-à-vis movement meaning (North, 1998).  
 
Sociological intervention has seen a relatively low uptake and remains a 
mostly unexplored methodological approach (McDonald, 2002; Cousin and 
Rui, 2011). McDonald (2002) makes a convincing case for the advantages of 
employing sociological intervention in research.  For McDonald, the method is 
pertinent to questions surrounding narrative, experience, reflexivity and 
agency that are ever more central to debates in contemporary sociology and 
participatory research. As he explains: 
 
Participants in a sociological intervention do not discuss a topic; 
they construct a story of their experience…the research participant 
does not simply tell a story or construct a narrative in relationship 
to a researcher – he or she struggles to construct a narrative in 
relation to other social actors (McDonald, 2002, 257).  
 
What makes sociological intervention so central to this research, and indeed 
any research exploring groupness or employing a participatory approach, is 
its entanglement with the struggle for recognition (see Fraser, 1997). As 
McDonald (2002, 257) continues, ‘research participants may find that their 
narrative is dismissed, turned around, or broken apart as they strive to be 
heard by their interlocutor’. The political struggle for recognition, which has 
characterised the Romani Nationalist movement and underlines the argument 
for greater collaboration between researchers and research “subjects”, is 
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replicated in the interactions between participants and interlocutors in a way 
that mimics not only relationships of power, but the struggle to transform these 
relationships. McDonald argues that by ‘placing narrative within relationships, 
the interpretive process of research participants becomes framed within a 
struggle for recognition’ (2002, 258). Sociological intervention thus positions 
narrative within a struggle for agency. Here is where the greatest strength of 
sociological intervention lies; as opposed to conventional methodological 
approaches which are focused on telling stories to researchers, the 
sociological intervention engages participants in a struggle to give a narrative 
of themselves to other social actors.   
Research Design 
A sociological intervention is composed of a series of focus group discussions 
with participants who represent various key actors of the social movement or 
experience being researched (North, 1998; McDonald, 2002). An intervention 
typically requires at least two research groups of between eight to twelve 
participants (McDonald, 2002). Touraine (1981) argues that sociological 
intervention should involve more than one group in order to determine whether 
they will all arrive at the same conclusions about the issues or experience 
under research.  Interventions were conducted with five groups of participants. 
The first group, consisting of twelve participants based in West Yorkshire, met 
five times. The second group, consisting of nine participants based in South 
Yorkshire, met three times. The final three groups based in West Central 
Lowlands, Midlothian, and Derbyshire met once for a focus group that was 
structured around the stages of the intervention method. Regrettably, 
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sustained involvement with these groups was not feasible due to cost and time 
restraints.  
 
Participants enter the intervention process with a shared struggle or 
experience. They have, perhaps, been involved with the social movement to 
an appreciable degree. Participants are not, however, part of the same social 
movement group or organisation, nor are they the leaders or representatives 
of particular organisations within the social movement (North, 1998; 
McDonald, 2002). The latter, Touraine (1981) argues, are prone to speaking 
on behalf of their particular organisations - simply reiterating the organisational 
goals and ideology without engaging in the reflexive and self-analytical 
processes of the intervention. This research is not a study of the Romani 
Nationalist movement and its activists. Rather, its focus lies in the extent to 
which Romani nationalism has successfully or unsuccessfully been able to 
invoke groupness amongst “ordinary” Romanies. The participants need not, 
therefore, be involved in activism. They instead came to the focus groups with 
a shared experience of being Romani in Britain.  
 
The intervention group should, as far as possible, include actors from the full 
spectrum of organisations and ideologies that make up the social movement. 
Intervention groups do not, therefore, exist naturally. As McDonald (2002, 
251) explains, they ‘…do not exist naturally, are not located within existing 
structures or networks, and don’t have a history of working together, and the 
research process does not bind them to implementing decisions’. The 
intervention group is not, therefore, intended to represent the population, but 
to reflect issues and tensions that were uncovered in preliminary fieldwork 
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(McDonald, 2002). Touraine (1981) argues that this makes easier the 
exploration of the group’s experience in regards to the social relationships that 
shape it.   
 
The research can be considered a continuation of my earlier MA project - ‘Our 
Lives, Our Fight, Our Third Sector’. One of the key findings of this research 
was a noticeable lack of cohesion between Romany Gypsies and Roma 
migrants. It was important, therefore, for the focus groups to reflect this 
division. A purposive sampling frame – in which individuals from pre-specified 
groups are purposely sought out and sampled – was therefore employed to 
capture a sense of the diversity within these communities. Given the 
enormous variety of sub-groups that fall under the category of “Romani”, this 
was applied in its crudest sense. The focus group sample was thus comprised 
of twenty six Romany Gypsies and twenty six Roma migrants (see, table 1). It 
is important to also highlight that the sample of Roma migrants came to 
represent three main waves of immigration: migration from the Eastern Bloc 
during the 1980s; asylum-seekers and refugees arriving in the mid-1990s from 
Kosovo and the Czech Republic; and “economic migrants” from Eastern 
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Table 1: Sample 
 Location Size Romany 
Gypsies 






























Derbyshire 8 4 4 19 - 
48 
3 5 
Interviews UK wide 7 3 4 29 - 
74 
2 5 
  52 26 26 18-74 19 33 
 
 
The recruitment of participants entailed entering the Romani communities at 
the centre of this research. Though my primary purpose was to recruit 
participants for my study, it was also the beginning, or continuation, of a 
process of rapport building with Romani communities, activists and leaders, 
and the research participants themselves. Building rapport refers to the 
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process of establishing a relationship of mutual trust with Romani 
communities. This undoubtedly starts with the way in which one enters the 
community. For example, when using a participatory approach one is likely to 
enter at a community level and begin building rapport with community 
members directly, while a researcher that employs gatekeepers is more likely 
to begin this process with community leaders and organisations. This is 
significant in regards to researcher positionality, that is, the way in which 
participants and the community in general view the researcher. This can 
potentially have bearing on the establishment of rapport with participants and 
what they may or may not chose to share with the researcher.    
 
It is vital then to reflect on my own entrance to Romani communities. I have 
both personal and professional connections with the communities in West 
Yorkshire and Midlothian.  I have regularly socialised with members of the 
community based in these areas and was thus able to utilise my own personal 
networks to gain access to these communities. What is more, I have 
previously conducted research in both these areas. It is important to note, that 
my previous participatory research was based in same West Yorkshire 
neighbourhood. Initially, therefore, participants for the West Yorkshire and 
Midlothian focus groups were recruited from my existing personal networks. 
Of the twelve participants in the West Yorkshire intervention group, six were 
recruited from my personal networks – one of whom participated in my MA 
research. Similarly, I recruited four of the Midlothian focus group participants 
from my personal networks – two of whom were participants in my 
undergraduate research.  
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The use of personal acquaintances had both its benefits and drawbacks. 
Given that I had already built rapport with these participants, the focus group 
discussions were somewhat effortless to initiate which, in turn, encouraged 
the remaining participants to get involved more quickly. The participants felt 
confident in posing questions about the research and challenging any 
assumptions I may have made. Indeed, at various points during the focus 
groups, they provided critical feedback. For example: 
 
Tony and Nathan joked that I was being “politically correct” by 
avoiding the word Gypsy. They suggested I should refer to them as 
Gypsies, or Romany Gypsies, as opposed to Romani or Romanies. 
Simeon agreed, explaining that many Roma will refer to themselves 
as Gypsy too. He deemed “Roma” the “politically correct” term. 
(Interview Notes).  
 
Given that I have known these participants for many years, they were 
knowledgeable of my research interests and were arguably “invested” in my 
success. I was, of course, aware of the ethical concerns that this raises. Their 
readiness to participate may have been driven by a sense of obligation, as 
opposed to a readiness to be a subject of my research. I did not want to coerce 
them into participating and made it transparent that they were not obligated to 
participate and that they may withdraw from the research at any time without 
damaging our friendship in any way. I believe that their willingness to 
participate was largely motivated by a desire to support me (their friend) in my 
chosen career.  
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I was also mindful that by using my personal networks I may impair my 
objectivity, for example, by selecting participants that I believed would provide 
the answers that complimented my own ideology or outlook on the issues 
under discussion. I believe that I largely avoided this given that I have rarely 
discussed Romani nationalism in a social setting. I was conscious, however, 
that, owing to our already established rapport, I did not always engage as well 
with the remaining participants. Though my intention throughout the research 
has been to uphold a critical and objective view of all the participants’ 
narratives, I must acknowledge that elements of my fieldwork may have been 
affected by my close affiliations with some participants, and as I have noted, I 
admittedly spent more time conversing with the participants known to me and 
found it easier to have discussions with them.  
 
I, thus, made certain that, in order sharpen my objectivity, I also conducted 
research with participants entirely unknown to me. I used snowball sampling 
to widen the recruitment process. Snowball sampling is a method of 
participant recruitment which involves asking participants whether they know 
of anyone else in the community who meets the criteria of the study.  The 
number of participants thus increases with each new participant recruited. The 
advantage of such an approach is that potential participants are typically 
referred to the study by a familiar and trusted person who can “vouch” for the 
research process and ease any concerns. It is important, however, to consider 
the ethical implications of the snowball method. To solicit the contact details 
of potential participants without their permission can be considered an 
invasion of the right to privacy. With that in mind, initial contact with potential 
participants was always made by the referring participant. I made contact with 
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potential participants only once permission to share their contact details had 
been established.   
 
The snowball method relies heavily on social networks. A limitation of this 
method, therefore, is that recruited participants are likely to from the same 
social network. I recognise this as a weakness of my sample, however, in an 
attempt to counter this, I used two different starting points for snowball 
recruitment in the West Yorkshire focus group. The first stream of snowballing 
began with a member of the Romany Gypsy community, while the second 
began with a member of the Roma community, the aim of which was to widen 
the range of participants by utilising two different social networks.  
 
The recruitment of participants for the West Central Lowlands, Derbyshire and 
South Yorkshire focus groups was a somewhat trickier process. The 
neighbourhoods were unfamiliar to me and I did not have the same advantage 
of already established personal and professional networks. I entered the 
community as a stranger and was required to take a different approach to 
recruitment. I made contact with a local organisations that worked closely with 
the Romani communities in these areas, outlining my research and requesting 
their help in recruiting participants. The organisations acted, therefore, as 
gatekeepers. Using gatekeepers to assist with participant recruitment is a 
common approach in social research. The term gatekeeper refers to people 
or organisations who occupy a prominent and recognised role in the 
community and ‘typically have knowledge about the characteristics of 
community members and are sufficiently influential to encourage community 
members to participate in a study’ (Hennick et al, 2010, 92).  
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The benefits of employing gatekeepers are twofold: first, a gatekeeper can 
offer important information and characteristics about the community that can 
assist in the recruitment process. Secondly, a gatekeeper essentially 
becomes an advocate of the research within the community. They often hold 
a substantial influence over whether community members participate in the 
study or not, which can either impede or assist the studies success. Indeed, 
the process of rapport building and recruitment becomes much easier when 
the study is endorsed by a trusted gatekeeper. There is, however, a significant 
drawback of employing gatekeepers given that they have control over the 
selection of participants. This is a potential weakness of my own sample as 
the gatekeepers selected participants that were all proficient in English, thus 
excluding Roma with a weaker grasp of the language.  
Sociological Intervention in Practice 
In Touraine’s (1981) sociological intervention, the first stage of the research 
process is best described as an exploration into the collective existence of the 
group in question. Melucci refers to this as the ‘who we are’ phase (1989, 
245), or in other words, it can be described as an exploration of collective 
identity. According to McDonald (2002), this usually involves one focus group 
which last approximately two hours (see appendix 2 for a more detailed 
breakdown of the fieldwork). Such discussions are thought to shed light on 
group identity and solidarity and act as an opportunity to go beyond the 
traditional harmonising and homogenising representations of the group’s 
identity, allowing for a multiplicity of voices, histories and understandings of 
identity to be heard. After reviewing previous literature I identified three key 
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aspects of the Romani experience that informed the development of the topic 
guide for stage one of the intervention. These were: belonging, home(land), 
and otherness (see appendix three for a more detailed guide). The purpose 
of these discussions was to uncover the similarities and differences between 
experiences of “being Romani” in Britain, and account for moments of 
“groupness”.  
 
The decision to conduct focus groups with a mixed sample of Romany 
Gypsies and Roma migrants was arguably somewhat ambitious and in 
hindsight I would have conducted the first stage of the intervention with each 
of these groups separately. In my eagerness to find (or, as it may be, not find) 
groupness between these two groups, I was not prepared for the reality that 
they have very different experiences of being Romani, which required different 
topic guides. We discussed, for example, the Roma participants’ pre and post 
migratory experiences, thus, limiting the input of Romany Gypsies. Similarly, 
during discussions on nomadism, there were few opportunities for 
participation from the Roma, given that they did not have experience of the 
Romany Gypsy “travelling” lifestyle. As a result, I was not able to discuss these 
experiences in as much detail as I would have liked to. It did, however, 
highlight the multitude of experiences that greatly contradict the prevailing 
homogenising discourse. The participants were able to ask each other 
questions, compare their experiences and, in doing so, reveal the difficulties 
in defining ‘who we are’.  
 
The second stage of a sociological intervention involves the introduction of 
what Touraine refers to as “interlocutors”. These are the opponents and allies 
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of the social movement whom are asked to join the research group in a 
discussion about its claims (North, 1998). Interactions with interlocutors can 
both confront and reinforce notions of collective identity and unity. According 
to McDonald (2002), these interactions often call into question the identity 
described by the group during the first stage of the intervention. In so doing 
‘they present the research group with new questions, challenging the group to 
rethink critical dimensions of its action, identity or experience’ (McDonald, 
2002, 254). In Melucci’s adaption, this is known as the ‘who you are’ stage. 
As opposed to using interlocutors, the group ‘compares itself with video pre-
recorded definitions proposed by three types of outsiders: “spokespersons”, 
i.e., people who speak on behalf of the movement; “observers”, i.e., people 
such as journalists who are close the movement but not involved directly;’ 
(Melucci, 1989, 246-247) and finally the movements opponents.  
 
I used this stage of the intervention to introduce the ideology of Romani 
nationalism and the scholarly research of Romani origins that is integral to the 
notion of a Romani homeland in India. An obvious interlocutor would have 
been Romani activists advocating a Roma Nation and their opponents. 
Locating a “Romani Nationalist”, however, proved difficult. The one 
organisation that explicitly referred to the “Roma Nation” was led by non-
Romani allies. What is more, the intervention groups were widely spread 
geographically and it would have been both costly and time-consuming to 
invite interlocutors to each focus group. I, thus, followed Melucci’s 
recommendation and performed the role of surrogate interlocutor, presenting 
alternative conceptions of Romani identity to the group.  
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Following Melucci’s three types of interlocutors, I presented to the group: 
“spokespersons” -in which I read statements from the International Romani 
Union and smaller organisations, such as the Roma Nation Movement and 
the European Roma Movement, played videos from International Romani 
Day/ Roma Nation Day events, and presented a Romani flag; “observers” – in 
which I summarised scholarly research on Indian origins, played a video that 
illustrated the origins, migratory roots and history of the Romani people, and 
read extracts from journalistic articles on the collective suffering of the Romani 
people across Europe; and “opponents” – in which I summarised scholarly 
critiques of nationalism, and read mission statements from UK based Gypsy 
and Traveller organisations which advocate unity between Roma, Gypsies 
and Travellers. The groups then discussed these sources, the extent to which 
they agreed or disagreed with then, and what issues, conflicts, or opportunities 
these conceptions of Romani identity presented.  
 
These discussions produced an abundance of data. Participants were 
enthusiastic, reflecting on and engaging with the debates, uncertainties and 
conflicts which are often provoked by Romani nationalism.  The issue of 
participant retention, however, proved problematic for intervention group 2, in 
that beyond the second meeting it ceased to be an intervention group, and 
became instead a “nationalist” group. The participants who attended were 
more politically motivated and saw this stage of the intervention as an 
opportunity to “convert” rather than “converse”. Owing to this, other 
participants chose not to attend future sessions and their narratives and 
opinions were regrettably not reflected.  
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To some extent, I was frustrated with this situation and felt the group had been 
colonised by nationalist voices. I was excited, however, to have unwittingly 
located this stream of nationalistic thought which went largely against the 
prevailing narrative. Nevertheless, I was concerned that I was getting only one 
side of the debate and the data from these focus groups arguably did not 
represent the entirety of experiences. I experienced similar problems in other 
focus groups in which louder, more confident members of the group 
dominated the discussions at times despite my efforts to include everyone. I 
suffered similar issues of retention in Intervention Group 1 with one participant 
explaining she felt somewhat intimidated by “rowdier” members of the group. 
I recognised that these silenced voices needed to be heard and, breaking with 
sociological intervention tradition, I did some short follow up interviews, which 
I will discuss later in the chapter.  
 
In the second stage of the intervention my role as researcher changed. In the 
initial stage my role was that of a focus group facilitator, joining the discussion 
only briefly to prompt or question the participants. In the second stage, 
however, I became an active participant in the research. Ultimately, I was 
playing the role of interlocutor - introducing counter narratives and acting as 
“devil’s advocate” to ensure that the participants’ discussed a range of views. 
In this way, the focus groups became more structured and I exercised more 
control and influence over the direction of the discussion. The discussions, 
therefore, very much followed my own agenda which arguably indicates a shift 
in power relations. Nonetheless, this stage of the intervention provided the 
opportunity to present to the participants academic research, journalistic 
reports, and political claims, that are too often inaccessible and that are 
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produced almost exclusively by outsiders and/or more “powerful” insiders. Too 
often research concludes the Romanies are apathetic on matters regarding 
homeland and origins without first presenting knowledge in an accessible 
format. By playing the role of interlocutor, I was able to go some way to resolve 
this.  
 
The final stage of Touraine’s sociological intervention can be described as a 
dialogue between the researcher and participants, in which the researcher 
presents the group with various interpretations of the data collected, 
prompting the participants to engage in a process of self-analysis (McDonald, 
1999). Melucci refers to this as the how phase, the researcher feeds back to 
the group ‘the terms it has used to define itself’ (p246). Participants are then 
asked to select the terms which most effectively represent the positive and 
negative characteristics of the group and its action, and each participant is 
encouraged to give their final thoughts on the group in their own words  
 
The identity constructed by the group in stage one of the intervention is likely 
to have transformed throughout the intervention. Interactions with 
interlocutors often confront constructions of identity thus raising new questions 
and often highlighting tensions within the group. It is now the role of the 
researcher to present their own analysis of the issues researched, 
encouraging them to focus on the questions and dilemmas raised throughout 
the research. The researcher will often replay audio recordings of the 
discussions or provide extracts of the transcripts. It is the objective of the 
researcher to facilitate a process of reflexivity with the intention of encouraging 
the group to produce an account or narrative of the research process, and to 
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accept, reject or modify the researcher’s analysis. The third stage of the 
intervention, thus, assists the group to move beyond simply reliving its 
experience, towards analysing its experience (Touraine, 1981; McDonald, 
2002). 
 
I returned to the intervention groups, after supplementing them with 
interviews, when I was writing up the analysis of the data. Touraine and 
Melucci both stress the importance of the researcher and the participants 
developing a shared analysis. It is arguable, however, how successfully I was 
able to achieve this. Due to time constraints I was unable to return to the 
groups in West Central Lowlands, Midlothian and Derbyshire. I had asked in 
the focus groups, however, if any of the participants were willing to speak to 
me at a later date, via telephone or email, should I need to clarify and/or 
expand on any of the data. I was able to contact a small number of participants 
from each group to discuss my findings and ask for their input. This was 
somewhat problematic in that the majority of the participants did not respond 
and arguably it was the most “educated” and “political” participants who did 
offer feedback on the analysis. In a similar vein, when I returned to South 
Yorkshire and West Yorkshire to present my findings, the sessions were 
poorly attended.  
 
The participants were presented with a summary of my findings. In order to 
test the veracity of my analysis I asked the participants a series of questions: 
What are your overall thoughts on the findings? To what extent do these 
findings accurately/inaccurately reflect your experiences? How 
accurately/inaccurately have I interpreted your responses? Is there any data 
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that should be included/excluded?  The participants’ feedback and 
suggestions were then incorporated into my analysis.  
 
Overall, I found it was difficult to engage participants in the task of data 
analysis. Largely, the participants agreed with the entirety of my findings but I 
was unconvinced that I had produced a “perfect” analysis. I believe the 
participants were somewhat overwhelmed by the task at hand and/or overly 
convinced of my academic “authority” or “expertise” and, thus, hesitant to offer 
feedback. When participants did offer feedback it was often accompanied with 
phrases such as, “I know I’m not an expert” or “I’m not that clever”, in spite of 
my assurances that there were no right or wrong answers. Other participants 
were more explicit about their disagreement, for instance, some believed I had 
portrayed Romani nationalists as “villains” and misinterpreted their narratives.  
This was discomforting, particularly as I recognised that I had allowed, to 
some extent, my own opinions of nationalism and identity politics to 
manipulate my analysis. At the same time, I recognised these participants had 
their own objectives which were did not necessarily correlate with the 
objectives of the research. We engaged, therefore, in a negotiation in which 
we were able to agree on an analysis that took into consideration their critique 
without completely overriding my own analysis.  
The Interviews 
In the early stages of this research, it was my intention to gather the narratives 
of Romani activists in a bid to reveal the workings, and critiques of, Romani 
nationalism at an organisational level. As this research progressed, 
specifically at the fieldwork stage, I became increasingly more interested in 
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the individual experiences of otherness, home, and belonging. It necessitated 
the study of these processes “from below”, by means of the respondents’ lived 
experiences and their identifications with nationalist ideology. By this point, 
however, I had already identified and interviewed leading Romani activists 
across Britain and their narratives remained incredibly relevant and beneficial 
to the research. Breaking from Touraine’s intervention guidelines, my focus 
groups were supplemented by semi-structured interviews. Interviews were 
conducted with three Romany Gypsy and four Roma activists. Short follow up 
interviews were also conducted with three participants from intervention group 
two.  
 
In the place of a predetermined list of questions, as is the case in traditional 
structured interviewing, a semi-structured interview employs an interview 
guide that includes a set of questions, issues and topics, but the interviewer, 
and the respondent, have the freedom to interject additional questions, 
comments and answers throughout the interview process (Blee and Taylor, 
2002). Bernard (2011) suggests that semi-structured interviewing is an 
appropriate approach when it is unlikely the researcher will have more than 
one opportunity to interview the participant. He argues that semi-structured 
interviewing is of particular use when ‘dealing with…elite members of a 
community – people who are accustomed to efficient use of their time’ 
(Bernard, 2011:158). By utilising semi-structured interviews, relatively in-
depth data can be collected in a shorter period of time. This is beneficial to 
both the researcher with limited access, and the interviewee who can choose 
the extent of their participation. 
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Blee and Taylor (2002) outline a number of benefits for applying in-depth 
interviewing to the study of social movements. First, it provides an insight into 
the ‘motivations and perspectives of a broader and more diverse group of 
social movement participants than would be represented in most documentary 
sources’ (Blee and Taylor, p94). Moreover, it allows the researcher to grasp 
the way activists understand their participation and their social word, thus 
giving access ‘to such nuanced understandings of social movement outcomes 
as the construction of collective and individual identities’ (95). Finally, it is a 
method that ‘brings human agency to the centre of movement analysis’ (96), 
while allowing the researcher to examine the ways in which the messages of 
social movements are received by actual and potential constituents.  
 
Negotiating access to activists was more difficult than I had expected. Again 
employing purposive sampling, I aimed to interview activists from both the 
Romany Gypsy community and Roma communities. Initially, I contacted well 
known activists, who worked with and for prominent Gypsy and Traveller 
based organisations, via email. Unfortunately, I did not receive any responses 
and found myself without access. Upon discussing this setback with the 
advisory panel, I was afforded a wealth of information about various activists 
in the community who had previously been unknown to me. The advisory 
panel acted, therefore, as gatekeepers and were able to negotiate me access 
to two activists. From there, I again employed the snowball method and was 
able to interview a further five activists. Four of these interviews were 
conducted via telephone, and three conducted face to face. Follow up 
interviews with participants from intervention group two were conducted by 
telephone.  
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Ethical Considerations 
The research posed ethical as well as methodological challenges. My 
approach to research ethics was informed by the guidelines produced by the 
British Sociological Association, the Economic and Social Research Council, 
and the University of Leeds. I will focus my discussion of ethics on five key 
areas: informed consent; privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality; avoiding 
harm; building and maintaining rapport; and managing expectations.   
Informed Consent 
It is critical in social research, to make certain that the participants understand 
the purpose and aims of the research, its likely outcomes, and how the 
findings will be used (De Vaus, 2002). The BSA (2002) emphasise that 
‘research should be based on the freely given informed consent of those 
studied’, thus, the researcher has a responsibility to present comprehensive 
information about the research, its aims, and its purpose. The literacy rate 
among Romani communities is considerably lower than that of the wider 
population and it was, thus, imperative that information about the research 
was accessible to potential participants. The issue of literacy was 
compounded by the language barriers faced by Roma migrants participating 
in the research. It was for this reason that detailed information about the 
research was provided in both verbal and written form. A translator was 
offered to all participants whose first language was not English, however, none 
of the participants requested one.  
 
Participants were first approached via telephone or email, through which I 
provided a detailed outline of the research and explained what their 
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participation would entail. A detailed information sheet, which included a copy 
of the Research Ethics Committee confirmation of ethical approval and the 
contact details of my supervisors, was then forwarded by email or post. The 
participants were given the opportunity to ask questions and time to consider 
whether they would participate in the research. Consent forms were signed 
before each focus group and interview (see Appendix 4), with participants of 
telephone interviews given consent verbally which was recorded before the 
interview commenced. This included gaining their consent for the focus group 
or interview to be recorded.  
Privacy, Anonymity and Confidentiality 
Whilst conducting this research, I was guided by the principle that all social 
research should maintain strict confidentiality and ‘the identities and research 
records of those participating in research should be kept confidential…’ (BSA, 
2002). I assured participants that all research data would be treated as 
confidential and would be anonymised prior to publication. The BSA 
recommends that ‘appropriate measures should be taken to store research 
data in a secure manner’. All audio recordings of focus groups and interviews 
were, thus, deleted after transcription, and transcripts and field notes were 
stored on the University of Leeds M-Drive.  
 
For the most part, I was the only person to view the data. The only exceptions 
to this were when I discussed anonymised transcripts with the advisory panel. 
The advisory panel were made aware of the confidential nature of the data 
and were asked to sign confidentiality agreements (see appendix 4).  
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In addition to the secure storage of data, my main approach to upholding 
confidentiality was to anonymise research participants. As Spradley (1980) 
points out, it is hugely crucial to ensure that participants are not easily 
identifiable in any publications of the research findings, therefore, all 
participants’ names were replaced with pseudonyms. Initially, I believed that 
the use of pseudonyms would be a sufficient measure to protect the 
participants’ identities, however, an unanticipated ethical dilemma arose when 
recruitment patterns situated my research in five geographical areas:  West 
Yorkshire, the West Central Lowlands, South Yorkshire, Derbyshire and 
Midlothian. The dilemma in this case was whether or not to name the exact 
cities and towns in which the fieldwork took place or to anonymise them. The 
point of debate here, of course, is to what extent naming the city or town in 
which they reside (or have association with) might threaten the anonymity of 
the participants. I came to the decision that despite the large size of the areas 
in question, their anonymity would still be at risk given the small size, and 
close knit nature, of the Romani population in these areas.  
 
In a similar vein, it was important to also protect the anonymity of any 
individuals or organisations mentioned by the participants, given that they had 
not consented to take part in the research. There is, of course, a tension 
between providing contextual information within the analysis and protecting 
the anonymity of the participants. The exclusion of personal and contextual 
information to a certain degree compromises my analysis. For example, some 
participants has spoken in great detail about an ongoing disagreement 
between various Romani activists which had taken place on Facebook. The 
disagreement in question was enormously relevant to my research, however, 
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given that it referred to specific Facebook posts, it would have been difficult to 
guarantee anonymity had I included the data in my research. Nevertheless, 
the same disputes materialised within my fieldwork and I was thus able to 
replicate these discussions and avoid making reference to this particular 
online dispute.  
 
In spite of the measures outlined above, there are limits to the anonymity that 
I had promised the participants. As Sensing (2011, 36) points out, ‘in a group 
setting, the researcher and those connected to the project may pledge 
confidentiality; while they cannot make that promise for others, they should 
encourage discretion.’ Indeed, when using focus groups there is always a risk 
that participants may disclose confidential information to others. That said, 
following Sensing’s advice, I emphasised ‘at the beginning and ending of the 
session that everyone should respect each other’s privacy and anonymity’ in 
the hope that outside the focus group setting they would ‘not reveal the 
identities of other participants or indicate who made specific comments during 
the discussion’ (p36).  
 
Upholding confidentiality also required careful consideration of the content of 
the data. Kirsch (2005) argues the researcher should remain cautious, 
warning that ‘undivided attention, sincere interest, and warmth shown by 
skilful interviewers’ may lead to participants revealing ‘intimate details about 
their lives that they may later regret having shared’ (p2164). She continues 
‘participants may forget – or repress – the knowledge that what they are 
sharing is being recorded and will be analysed and published in some form or 
another’ (p2165). For this reason, all participants were offered a copy of the 
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transcript of their interview or focus group so that may review what had been 
said and have the opportunity to request that certain information was not used 
in the data analysis. Mindful of the literacy and language barriers I have 
already discussed, participants were also given the opportunity to go through 
the transcript with myself.  
Harm 
Protecting the participants from harm was a priority at all stages of the 
research. Throughout my data collection I was cautious that the focus groups 
and interviews had the potential to cause distress given that they were likely 
to touch upon experiences of racism and discrimination. Such topics were 
therefore approached sensitively, and discussed only when it was absolutely 
necessary and pertinent to the research. Kirsch (2005) explains, it is not 
always possible to predict how participants will react, and sometimes even the 
most seemingly harmless questions can bring about painful memories or 
reflections. For the most part, the participants did not appear significantly 
distressed; however, there were some instances where my questions 
unintentionally triggered somewhat painful memories. For example: 
 
Shannon spoke of the barriers impeding Romani children’s access 
to education and her determination to confront them, yet, she also 
spoke of her own children’s experience of education. Shannon 
sounded upset when she explained that her daughter, who had 
been bullied, developed post-traumatic stress disorder. It was not 
my intention for the interview to be painful or intrusive and it made 
me feel quite sad for her and her daughter.  (Interview notes).  
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Potential for harm and distress is not only limited to the fieldwork process itself. 
Rather, there is potential for participants to experience distress as a result of 
what is written about them in the completed research manuscript. This can 
result from both my own interpretations of the data and the comments and 
observations made by other participants. While writing this research I have 
had to strike a balance between the need to present an in-depth, authentic 
and critical account of the groups at the centre of the research, and the need 
to avoid unnecessary harm to participants. It was, thus, also important to 
consider how the research may impact on the existing and ongoing 
relationships between participants. I sought to avoid creating tension between 
participants, as well as tension with the wider Romani, Gypsy and Traveller 
community, by trying to collect, represent and understand a wide range of 
opinions and perspectives and drawing attention to both the similarities and 
differences between them.  
 
In regards to the dissemination of this research, I have also had to take into 
account the potential impact of the research on the wider Romani movement. 
Though I aim for the research to be a useful resource for the Romani people, 
there is also potential for it to justify certain practices, such as either including 
or excluding Traveller communities from Romani activism.  With that in mind, 
I have aimed to write about such issues in a fair and responsible manner and 
representing a range of attitudes and perspectives.  
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Rapport and Reciprocity 
Efforts were made to build and maintain rapport with participants. Rapport can 
be described as a relationship built on mutual trust, respect and empathy 
which, in turn, fosters a shared understanding (Springwood and King, 2001). 
Rapport can be established in various ways, for example, I accepted social 
invitations from the participants in order to cultivate relationships outside of 
the research space. Rapport necessitates openness on the part of the 
researcher regarding his or her own beliefs – a task made far easier when the 
researcher and participants hold similar values and outlooks. The majority of 
research on social movements has been conducted by researchers who are 
sympathetic to, or actively involved, in the movement under study (Munday, 
2006). As I have already mentioned, I approach this research not as the 
neutral researcher but as one acquainted with the Romani community on a 
personal level. Nonetheless, I remain an “outsider” to the Romani community, 
with a different, and sometimes conflicting, worldview. While I maintained 
openness and honesty in my views and responses to questions, I also 
maintained a measure of professionalism in order to remain somewhat 
conciliatory. These more personal exchanges have continued with 
participants, since the completion of the fieldwork, by way of discussions on 
social media. Furthermore, I have made a promise of reciprocity to the 
participants, including issuing copies of the research upon its completion and, 
when requested, providing advice regarding issues such as housing and 
education. My intention is to produce a co-authored research report upon 
completion of this thesis in order to present the results to the Romani 
communities who played such a critical role in the research. Practicing 
reciprocity thus becomes a method of further developing long-term rapport.  
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Managing Expectations 
As well as gaining informed consent, there is the additional matter of 
managing the participants’ expectations of the research. Research has the 
potential to inform policy and enhance knowledge; however, it is it crucial to 
keep in mind that not all research will bring a direct change or improvement to 
the lives of the participants or to the communities to which they belong. It is 
important for the researcher to be open and realistic about their expectations 
of the research. This is especially important when conducting research with 
socially excluded groups as if there is a misguided belief that the research will 
bring about an improvement to their lives and if this improvement does not 
materialise, it is likely that it will incite disillusionment with research.  
 
This research is a relatively small scale project and for that reason it is 
important to make clear the restrictions this brings to its potential impact. It is 
written for a predominantly academic audience and, in its original form, it 
unlikely to be disseminated beyond a fairly restricted academic circle. 
Nonetheless, an accessible co-authored research report will be disseminated 
to Romani communities and organisations. The research does, therefore, 
have the potential to assist Romani communities in their efforts to mobilise 
politically.  
Analysis 
The principle method of analysis employed in this study is one which often 
used in qualitative social research - thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). This method was used in conjunction with a comparable analytical 
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approach - cross-sectional analysis - as set out by Jennifer Mason (2002) and 
the thematic framework approach of Ritchie et al. (2003).  
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) acknowledge that the method of thematic analysis is 
not necessarily unique. Rather, it is a process that is common in many 
analytical approaches to qualitative research. Indeed, the process of thematic 
analysis as defined in this research bears a strong similarity to other analytical 
approaches, such as phenomenological analysis. Nevertheless, Braun and 
Clarke (2006, 16-23) contend that a thematic analysis is comprised of the 
following stages: 
 
• ‘Familiarising yourself with the data’, transcribing the data, immersion 
in the data via repeated reading, taking notes of initial ideas, meanings 
and patterns through a process of ‘active’ reading.  
• ‘Generating initial codes’: coding interesting and relevant features of 
the data methodically across the entire data set, organising data related 
to each code. Themes may be ‘data-driven’ or ‘theory driven’ – in the 
former themes will emerge from the data while in the latter the 
researcher will approach the data with specific questions in mind.  
• ‘Searching for themes’: organising codes into potential themes, 
grouping together different codes to form overarching themes, drawing 
together all the data relevant to each theme.  
• ‘Reviewing themes’: refining the themes, excluding themes without 
enough data to support them, collapsing similar themes into a single 
theme, ensuring themes are representative of both the coded extracts 
and the data set as a whole. 
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• ‘Defining and naming themes’: ongoing refinement of themes, analysis 
of the collated data extracts for each theme, organising themes into a 
coherent and consistent account of the data which tells an overall story 
or narrative.  
• ‘Producing the report’: the final analysis and write-up of the research.  
 
The initial three phases of thematic analysis can be referred to as the data 
management phase (Spencer at al., 2003). The purpose of coding is to 
systematise the selection of data extracts for the purpose of cross-sectional 
analysis (Mason, 2002). For instance, the codes were arranged under a 
hierarchy of headings and subheadings which echoed the structure of the 
issues discussed in the focus groups and interviews (e.g. origins, migration, 
Britishness). Though this process was largely theory-driven, data-driven 
codes were allowed to emerge from the data. As the process of coding 
transcripts developed, additional codes were added, some codes merged 
together, and others were refined, resulting in around fifty codes. Their 
position on the hierarchy shifted as codes began to emerge as more or less 
pertinent.  
 
The final two stages of analysis – reviewing and defining themes – can be 
referred to as ‘descriptive accounts’ (Ritchie et al., 2003). This necessitated a 
careful exploration of the transcript extracts assigned to each code, making 
comparisons between different cases, and identifying common themes, 
connections and conflicts. Themes and links were initially illustrated by 
diagrams and later expanded upon in writing. This developed into a process 
of looking for descriptive accounts of the themes which were emerging from 
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the data. There are two types of descriptive accounts at an analytical level: 
those grounded in the explicit explanations given by the participants 
themselves; and those emerging from implicit explanations which are 
suggested by the analyst (Richie et al., 2003). Braun and Clark (2006) refer 
to these approaches as semantic and latent analyses, respectively. Different 
types of evidentiary support were used for explicit and implicit accounts. In the 
explicit accounts, evidentiary support overtly emerged from the reasoning 
within the participants’ own accounts. In the implicit accounts, I employed a 
number of strategies put forward by Ritchie et al. (2003, 224-225): uncovering 
underlying logic in what participants had said; using common sense 
assumptions, such as patterns commonly known to exist, to explain patterns 
within the data; drawing on the findings from other empirical studies; and 
relating findings to the broader context of the theoretical framework. Attempts 
have thus been made to link the findings of the research to relevant theories 
and empirical studies already discussed in earlier chapters.  
Concluding Remarks and Reflections 
Sociological intervention is an effective tool for an exploration of collective 
identity construction. The contributions of Touraine and Melucci were 
employed to deconstruct the construction of collective identity by Romani 
communities and activists; to explain the strategic employment of collective 
identity; and to examine the conflicts and convergences that an identity based 
movement initiates. In adopting a primarily focus group based approach to 
exploring collective identity, sociological intervention was a valuable starting 
point. Moving through a process of exploring who the participants thought they 
were; the extent to which the agreed and disagreed with the constructions of 
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collective identity proposed by opponents and allies; and the extent to which 
they had developed a coherent and shared understanding of collective 
Romani identity, paralleled the research questions and provided an effective 
structure on which to build an analysis of politicised constructions of collective 
Romani identity.  
 
It is pertinent to considered, however, whether 1) sociological intervention is 
compatible with a participatory approach, and 2) whether I did enough to foster 
a collaborative research environment. I was concerned that my commitment 
to participatory research started and ended with the inclusion of the advisory 
panel. To some extent, sociological intervention is merely a glorified series of 
focus groups, and beyond the reasoning that focus group discussions are 
participant led, I questioned whether I was doing anything different to a 
researcher not engaged in the politics of participation. There is a danger that 
this research could be considered participatory in name only. However, 
sociological intervention does propose some interesting points of departure 
from traditional research methods.  
 
Firstly, in the second stage of the intervention the groups were presented with 
the opportunity to explore and discuss the documents, articles and academic 
texts that are so often written about them, yet remain so inaccessible to their 
communities. Secondly, sociological intervention places great emphasis on 
collaborative analysis of data. This was not a typical example of conducting 
research in which one simply enters the field, collects data, and returns to the 
confines of the ivory tower to bury oneself in analysis. Rather, sociological 
intervention encourages a prolonged engagement with the participants that 
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continues long after the completion of data collection, and which fosters 
debate, discussion and collaboration at the analytical level.  
 
It is for this reason that I remain confident in sociological intervention as a 
method for exploring collective identity and implementing a participatory 
approach and I am somewhat surprised that it has not been used more 
extensively in social research. I employed an approach that has never been 
used in the context of Romani identity and activism and as a result encouraged 
much needed and frank debates and discussions between various fragmented 
Romani communities who, up until that point, had had little if any opportunity 
to discuss the issues and tensions that they had encountered. I would not go 
as far to claim, as Touraine did, that the process somehow radically takes the 
development of the Romani movement further, however, the discussions 
indicated directions in which development might be fruitful. The co-authored 
research report should, therefore, contribute someone of value to Romani 
communities. 
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 Chapter 4 
Belonging 
It is not possible to explore a Romani diaspora without first exploring the 
participants various positioning’s within society. The participants’ experience 
of, and response to, being the “other” in British society are important points of 
reference for feelings of belonging and the materialisation of “groupness”. The 
focus of this chapter lies on the participants experiences of “being Romani” 
and/or “migrant” in Britain. This chapter can also be regarded somewhat as a 
context chapter, seen through the participants’ eyes. It serves an as entrance 
to and a background for the following chapters, and contextualises the 
participants feelings of belonging. The chapter will first focus on the 
experiences of Romany Gypsies. 
Encountering Otherness 
Max (M: 20: Romany Gypsy): People are suspicious of Gypsies. 
Like, when you go down to the shop and the shop assistants are 
looking at you suspiciously…they just decide that because you’re 
a Gypsy, you’ll chor4 something. I mean it gets to you, it bothers 
me. They don’t know me, they know nothing about me. The way 
they look at you, it cuts deep.  
 
                                            
4 Steal.  
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The stigmatisation of “Gypsyness” has left a profound mark on the identities 
of Britain’s Romany Gypsies. As discussed in Chapter One, the Gypsies of 
Britain have, throughout history, been simultaneously exoticised and 
dehumanised. As we can see in the works of the Gypsylorists, Gypsies are 
romanticised as a quaint and mysterious people compelled by their 
wanderlust, while at the same time reviled as animalistic, criminal, deceitful, 
idle, and parasitical. It is the latter conceptualisation of Britain’s Gypsies that 
most acutely characterises the everyday lives of the participants. Like Max, 
they are often subject to surveillance by reason of their supposed criminality. 
Nathan (M: 26: Romany Gypsy) explained that shops and pubs often close 
during Gypsy fairs - ‘they’d rather lose a week’s takings than let us in. They 
think we’ll cause trouble’ – while many of the other participants revealed they 
had been refused entry to pubs, clubs and shops simply for being “Gypsy”. 
Overt discrimination on public transport is common. As Naomi (F: 18: Romany 
Gypsy) explained, bus drivers had purposely missed the stop adjacent to her 
site and fellow passengers have avoided sitting next to her. Chloe (F: 22: 
Romany Gypsy) was asked by a fellow passenger on the train why she and 
her friends ‘dressed like slappers’.  
 
Romany Gypsies are a phenotypically white minority, yet, as the participants’ 
experiences illustrate, they remain an identifiable other. It is important, 
therefore, to ask – how do Romany Gypsies become visible as a “white other”? 
For what reason are Chloe and Naomi identifiable as “Gypsies” on public 
transport? Why are Max and Nathan singled out for surveillance in shops and 
bars? When white groups exhibit lifestyles and behaviours that too closely 
resemble the marked cultural forms of blackness, they are often stripped of 
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their whiteness (Hartigan, 1997). As Hughey (2010) explains performances of 
white racial identity that fail to meet white ideals are marginalised and 
stigmatised. For Melody (F: 30: Romany Gypsy) clothing is a signifier of 
“Gypsyness”:  ‘if I go down shops in the stereotypical Gypsy clothes I’m 
followed round by security. If I go dressed like a gorjer5 I get left to it’. As 
discussed in chapter one, Holloway (2005) observed the use of clothing as a 
means of differentiating between “Gypsy-Travellers” and the wider population. 
Access to whiteness is not, therefore, dependent on only looking white, but 
dressing white. Whiteness is performed and commodified through clothing. By 
presenting herself as ‘a gorjer’ she constructs a costume of whiteness which 
enables her to “pass” more successfully. By wearing the “right” clothing, she 
can access the privileges of whiteness she is routinely denied when wearing 
“Gypsy clothes”.  
 
Location also acts as a signifier of otherness. The Gypsy and Traveller site 
and Gypsy fair are racially marked spaces. They are an example of the spatial 
segregation of Gypsy and Traveller populations and a means by which to 
contain and control “Gypsyness”. Racialised spaces serve to make racialised 
others visible. When public transport failed to stop outside Naomi’s Gypsy and 
Traveller site, or when businesses closed their doors to Nathan during Gypsy 
fairs, it was precisely because their otherness was signified by their 
occupation of a racialised space. The socio-economic demographic of areas 
in which the participants lived were decisive to the visibility of their otherness 
                                            
5 Non-Gypsy 
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and resultant discrimination. In areas typically marked as white, the spaces 
occupied by Romany Gypsies become more visible. The participants noted 
they experienced the most discrimination in white rural areas: 
 
Peggy (F: 47: Romany Gypsy): It’s really been in more rural places, 
you know, where people are richer, snobbier, that I’ve seen the 
most racism. I mean of course it happens elsewhere, but it’s more 
intense, it’s more organised in the rich areas.  
 
The presence of Romany Gypsies in white rural areas is deemed disruptive. 
Gypsy and Traveller sites are viewed as an invasion of white spaces. Shane 
referred to this in terms of “nimbyism”:  
 
Shane (M: 38: Romani): People don’t want you in their proximity, 
especially in greenbelt, you know, picture perfect villages… you’re 
very aware of it from a young age really, you’re hidden from view, 
there’s certain parts of your own country you ain’t welcome in, you 
know, well-to-do areas…when you hear what excuses people 
actually give to say why you shouldn’t be allowed to live in their 
area, you know a Gypsy site, I mean it can make you angry, it can 
be upsetting. Nimbys we call them. These people can suddenly be 
more compassionate for the local snail population, you know 
because that’s the kind of excuses they use. 
 
For Frank, the media are instrumental in shaping such attitudes towards the 
Romanies and he is critical of the media for representing the Romanies in a 
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negative and generalised way. He acknowledges that there are individuals 
within the Romani community that commit crime, yet, he argues the entire 
community is held responsible: 
 
Frank (M: 49: Romany Gypsy): If someone who ain’t gorjer, or 
British, commits a crime then they talk about Gypsies, Roma, 
Eastern Europeans, Asians, Blacks, Muslims. When someone 
white and British commits a crime, it’s just John Smith, Joe Blogs, 
has done it. The person who’s done it is responsible for what they 
done, not every gorjer, but if a Gypsy or an immigrant commits a 
crime, the whole community is getting the blame. You won’t even 
know their name; they’re just a Gypsy, Roma, Arab, whatever. It’s 
bad.  
 
Criticism of the media frequently emerges in the participants’ narratives. All 
the participants stressed that impressions of Romany Gypsies in the UK are 
generally negative. They were critical of generalisations which present Gypsy 
men as violent, sexist and criminal and Gypsy women as oppressed victims. 
Johnny spoke of the negative portrayals of Romany Gypsies both in print 
media and on television:  
 
Johnny (M: 45: Romany Gypsy): TV, newspapers, they show us in 
a bad way. Like, recently there’s been a bit going round about 
Gypsy men mistreating their women. You know, like in Big Fat 
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Gypsy Weddings, this grabbing6 malarkey was made out to be a 
part of our culture. It’s just not true, it’s not how Gypsy men behave. 
Even the Irish Travellers were baffled by it…It felt like such a big 
deal was made out of the women staying home, cleaning, looking 
after the kids. It’s their choice. You don’t see everyone getting in a 
tizz when gorjer women are stay at home mums, or when gorjers 
are all raping their woman…no one says it’s part of gorjer 
culture…they show a misrepresented picture of us. There’s bad in 
every society, you can’t say it’s the whole culture.  
 
Portrayed as backward and immoral under headlines such as ‘the bizarre 
secrets of courtship in My Big Fat Gypsy Wedding’ (Daily Mail, 2011) and 
‘Gypsy teens in TV “assault” to wed’ (The Sun, 2011), “grabbing” was 
explained as fundamental and traditional Gypsy courtship method. As Johnny 
points out, the obvious risk, that this may lead to a collective stigmatisation of 
Gypsies and Travellers, was overlooked, with persistent references to “the 
fact” that violence against and oppression of women was entrenched in Gypsy 
culture and tradition.  
 
Concerning how the Romanies are considered in the media, Melanie and 
James spoke of the employment of stereotypes, such as “child abductors” and 
“perpetual victims”: 
 
                                            
6 A “courtship” method shown on Big Fat Gypsy Weddings in which Irish 
Traveller men attempt to obtain a kiss from a girl by “grabbing” her by 
the arm away from her friends.  
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Melanie (F: 34: Romani): They love to play on the stereotypes, like 
the case of the little albino Gypsy girl Maria, and the Roma kids in 
Ireland. Innocent people accused of stealing children because 
they’re Gypsy. Its madness…and it was just this confirmation of the 
old myth of the Gypsy child snatchers. You see it in the paper four, 
five times a year – it was the Gypsies who took Ben Needham and 
Madeleine McCann, don’t even investigate the families, it must be 
those Gypsies again.  
 
James (M: 20: Romani): Don’t get me wrong, some of the more left 
wing papers, The Guardian, The Independent, they’ve been more 
favourable of us but they only sort of see us as like victims. I mean, 
lefties, they love a good victim story. Then you have the right wing 
ones, you know like The Daily Mail, they won’t even spell Gypsy 
right, they call us gipsy with an “I”… as if they’re trying to say ‘ha! 
We won’t recognise you’… 
 
These narratives refer to the experience of being defined according to 
negative depictions and prejudices and being positioned as society’s “other”. 
As James points out, in spite of the political differences that influence how 
different newspapers describe and portray the “other”, generally there is a 
tendency to define an “us” and “them” in terms of racialised boundaries which 
emphasise identity as some form of cultural property which, in an innate way, 
marks boundaries between human collectivities. The cultural boundaries are 
based upon notions of development, progress, and education, against which 
cultures and peoples can be measured by reference to their level of 
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civilisation. Such boundaries employ assumptions of the “other”, which are 
related to specific places and cultures.  “Grabbing”, crime, migration, begging, 
benefits claiming etc. are represented, by the media, outside their context and, 
thus, culture becomes their only explanation.  
The Other “Others” 
At the same time as emphasising their otherness in British society, the 
participants spoke of their invisibility within policies of multiculturalism. Within 
their lifetimes, participants have witnessed very little improvement to their 
socio-economic status. Rather, they felt ever more restricted in their ability 
and freedom to maintain their cultural way of life and consider Gypsies and 
Travellers excluded from the multicultural project.  
 
Frank (49: M: Romany Gypsy): Well they say we live in a more 
tolerant society these days but I say if that’s the case then why 
when I was a boy could I travel with, you know, a certain amount of 
ease if you will, but since the 80s, definitely since then it’s got more 
and more hard to do the simple things that set us apart as Gypsy 
people.   
Emily: …What is it that’s happened to, shall we say, curb the Gypsy 
way of life? 
Frank: Look I could sit here and run off this policy and that policy 
and this law and that, but let me just summarise here, the 
government, no matter if they’re Tory or Labour, they make it as 
hard as possible for us to live our lives the way we want. They 
stopped us from travelling, they’re forcing us into houses, trying to 
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kill our trades, all of these types of things and what that does is, 
you know I’m not saying it’s eradicated us, we’re still here fighting, 
but Gypsy life isn’t what it used to be.  
 
Frank’s experience exposes the paradoxical nature of British multiculturalism. 
One the one hand, multiculturalism has delivered official state recognition of 
“Gypsy and Traveller” ethnicities and has necessitated strategies of social 
inclusion (whether such strategies have been successfully implemented is a 
matter for debate). On the other, the multiculturalist rhetoric of the recognition 
and celebration of cultural and ethnic difference contradicts the assimilationist 
policies applied to Gypsy and Traveller communities. Romany Gypsies are 
supposedly “free” to practice their culture in a multicultural society, but 
assimilationist policies are simultaneously put in place that restrict nomadism, 
hamper traditional occupations, and redefine the boundaries and definitions 
of Gypsy and Traveller identity in order to evade obligations of social inclusion. 
The participants’ frustrations materialise in terms of inter-ethnic competition. 
Multiculturalism is considered a policy reserved for “non-British minorities” 
who are believed to be the recipients of preferential treatment by the 
government. British multiculturalism thus sows dissension between ethnic 
groups in a competition for resources, power and recognition. 
 
In Shauna’s opinion, other migrant and ethnic communities are not subject to 
processes of assimilation: 
 
Shauna (F: 27: Romany Gypsy): Meanwhile we have every Tom, 
Dick and Harry coming here from Pakistan, Africa, Poland, and the 
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government is falling over themselves to accommodate them and 
their ways. Us lot, we’ve been here our whole lives, can’t even stop 
overnight on land no one bloody uses, but if we’d just arrived from 
bloody Timbuktu they’d leave us to it cause then of course our 
human rights would matter, they’d be scared to offend us.  
 
In Shauna’s account, place of birth is employed as a means to distinguish 
between a deserving and undeserving “other”. Shauna contrasts herself with 
a “non-British” other, differentiating Romany Gypsies from migrants perceived 
to be the recipients of preferential treatment. This sentiment is echoed 
throughout many of the participants’ narratives. Jessica (F: 20: Romany 
Gypsy) stated, ‘multiculturalism… [is] about foreign people or like black 
people, people that ain’t white’; Johnny (M: 45: Romany Gypsy) argued, ‘I’m 
an English Gypsy, born and bred, but I have no right to practice my culture in 
peace, not like Muslims and that lot’; and Dale (32: M: Romany Gypsy) 
contended, ‘build a mosque, Polish shops, what have you, but buy a bit of land 
for your trailer and you’re a threat to British culture’.  
 
This perception of “non-British” migrants as the recipients of “special 
treatment” links multicultural policies to Windrush immigration, as discussed 
in chapter one. Their narratives imply the absence of Romany Gypsies from 
British multiculturalism where they are again overlooked given the equation of 
immigration to racial/ethnic otherness. When considering their exclusion from 
the multicultural project, they expressed a sense of unfairness concerning the 
entitlements they believed to be presented to “non-British” minorities by 
multiculturalism. Being “British born” was invoked specifically by the 
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participants to draw boundaries between a deserving “us” and undeserving 
“them”, thus, discursively positioning themselves into the category of 
whiteness shared with the British majority.  
Strategies of (In)visibility 
Concealing Otherness 
The participants manage their otherness through different strategies, namely, 
through attempts at “passing” - that is, attempts to “blend in” to British society, 
and to disguise or underplay their Gypsy backgrounds in particular contexts - 
or through an amplified process of self-ethnicisation and self-exclusion which 
operate as a means of resistance against British society as well as a form of 
empowerment which allows them to demand recognition. These strategies are 
not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are often used in conjunction with each 
other.  
 
Efforts to “pass” as non-Gypsy are done so strategically and are not an 
attempt at ethnic distancing and denial or grounded in internalised racism. 
Rather, participants are aware that, by concealing their “Gypsyness”, they can 
access more freely the privileges granted to them by the colour of their skin. 
Naomi (F: 18: Romany Gypsy) explained, ‘I ain’t going to work in my horse 
and trap and Swarovski hot pants… I dress for the occasion’. Similarly, 
Rhiannon (F: 27: Romany Gypsy) stated ‘I dress more gorjer, you know, when 
I’m out and about, so people aren’t always like pointing me or owt’ and Billy 
(M: 27: Romany Gypsy) said ‘I can spot another Gypsy a mile off, but a gorjer 
won’t spot me unless I want them to’. Becky, who argues her name and 
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address make her visible as a Gypsy, uses passing in an effort to avoid 
employer discrimination: 
 
Becky (F: 29: Romany Gypsy): I called one place saying I was 
interested in the job they had, and they ask me my name and 
address. So the minute they hear my name they know it’s a Gypsy 
name, you don’t get gorjers called [Participant’s name], and then 
all that’s confirmed when I give them my address on a Travellers 
site. So I waited for the application and I didn’t get anything through 
and I phone them back up asking where it is. They tell us, sorry 
someone got the job already but it was still advertised, I seen it. So 
I decided I’d call back up, change my voice, and say a different 
name and address and funny enough the job was suddenly 
available again…I don’t know, maybe I’m paranoid but I think they 
knew I was a Gypsy…I use a different name now, I “degypsyfied” 
my name… but I’m not ashamed to be a Gypsy, it’s not something 
I hide unless I have to.  
 
Becky’s otherness became visible through her “Gypsy name” and stigmatised 
addressed. She conceals these signifiers of otherness in order to “pass” for 
non-Gypsy and avoid discrimination. This is interesting as it implies that 
Romany Gypsies are assumed white until they “reveal” themselves as not. 
Gypsy names, clothes, addresses etc. deviate from the normalised state of 
whiteness. By concealing her otherness and passing as white, Becky is 
guaranteed a level of social assimilation and is successful in achieving this 
given that, as a white person, she is not physically marked as different.  
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Becky’s “degypsification” is executed out of necessity. She conceals her 
otherness only in specific contexts and remains “proud” of her Gypsy identity.  
 
Reactive Otherness 
“Pride” was often equated to strength and resistance. Participants amplified 
the differences between Gypsy and non-Gypsy communities and took a 
stance against discrimination by making their otherness visible. Rejecting the 
identity of dominant society in favour of a robust Romani identity is, for Billy, 
the result of a continual negotiation of barriers: 
 
Billy (M: 27: Romany Gypsy): I think we spend a lot of time just 
trying to be accepted but you’re meeting brick wall after brick wall 
and I think at some point you get to a turning point and think, fuck 
it, I’m a Gypsy and I’m going to live my life the way I want. They 
build these walls and you get sick of going around them, you got to 
find a way to jump over it and I do that by not giving a fuck, just 
being Gypsy to piss them off.  
 
As Billy suggests above, discrimination can lay the foundations for a reactive 
Romani identity in which one asserts and invests in their Romaniness in a 
stronger way as a method of dealing with discrimination. As already discussed 
in chapter 2, (re)discovering one’s origins and roots can become an effective 
strategy for constructing an alternative source of identification and belonging. 
This reactive identity is the result of the proactive British identity that labels 
certain groups as “other” and denies them an equal position in society. The 
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participants displayed a robust pro-Gypsy identity. They often emphasised 
their ethnic identity reactively by stressing the unequal treatment they have 
received owing to their otherness. Many of the younger participants spoke of 
the unequal treatment they had experienced at school: 
 
Naomi (F: 18: Romany Gypsy): When I was at school like 
sometimes I’d be late and that and my teacher was a bitch, she’d 
come down on me hard, put me in detention, try and keep me after 
school. When it was gorjers, she’d be fine with them, like its okay, 
just sit down, no detention or that. Like we’re not thick, we saw it, 
and we knew she’d let them off with everything, but punish us. 
 
Portes and Rumbaut (2001) contend that collective marginality and 
entrenched inequality racialise the identities of minority ethnic youths, thus 
reinforcing and tightening group boundaries. The belief that they are 
discriminated against because of their ethnicity appears to offer a collective 
dimension to the participants’ marginality.  Naomi’s narrative demonstrates 
this by showing how an awareness of bias – ‘we knew she’d let them off with 
everything, but punish us’ – generates, somewhat, a shared fate for Romany 
Gypsies, and serves as leverage for strengthening group consciousness.  
 
The participants displayed what Eid (2007) refers to as a reactive ethnicity, 
which he defines as a defensive ethnic consciousness which emerges in 
response to ethnic based discrimination, oppression and exclusion. This 
reactive identity provides the participants with a positive collective identity, 
however, reactive ethnicity may develop into resistance identity due to the 
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belief that dominant institutions negatively frame minority ethnic cultures 
(Nagra, 2011). Unlike reactive ethnicity, which involves the defensive 
maintenance of ethnic culture, resistance identity involves actively widening 
the gap between the stigmatised group in question and wider society 
(Castells, 1997). It can, thus, be described as a subculture, developed as a 
result of marginalisation and rejection by dominant society, which rejects 
dominant culture (Willis, 1981).  
 
Participants frequently referred to negative views of Romany Gypsies that are 
expressed in public discourse and the ways in which anti-Gypsy sentiment 
influenced their interactions with wider society. When asked how their non-
Gypsy friends view the Romany Gypsy culture, the majority of the participants 
stated that they had no non-Gypsy or non-Traveller friends. They explained, 
however, that dominant society “looks down” on, and is frightened of, Romany 
Gypsy culture, making reference to common anti-Gypsy stereotypes, such as, 
cultural backwardness, criminality and violence. When asked how they knew 
that wider society considered their culture negatively given they had stated 
they had little contact with non-Gypsy people, the participants referred to both 
explicit and subtle experiences of discrimination. 
 
Dale (M: 32: Romany Gypsy): You know you’ll get gorjers that will 
come smash your windows, fire bomb you, fight you, but I don’t 
know, it’s more everyday than that…I work in construction, when 
you’re on a job with a Gypsy boss they see you as their own people, 
but if it’s a gorjer they don’t see you like they see the gorjer 
labourers…when a Gypsy speaks to me, he speaks with respect, 
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because I’m one of his lot, get me? But when gorjers look at you, 
they look at you like you’re a lazy cunt. They treat you and gorjers 
different.  
Emily: What do you mean by that, I mean, I wonder why? 
Dale: Like, I was working a job for a guy recently…he kept say all 
this shit all the time like “we know how to treat our woman and you 
Gypsies treat them like slaves”. He’d seen it on Big Fat Gypsy 
Weddings apparently. Made me want to knock him out.  
 
Dale felt bitter towards his boss for his essentialisation of the mistreatment of 
women as an innate part of Romani culture. He separates himself from wider 
society and moulds the boundaries of his own ethnic identity by referring to an 
“us” and “them” - ‘I’m one of his lot’. Dale has grown to mistrust his non-Gypsy 
colleagues, which became tangible in his countless disputes and conflicts with 
them. When asked whether such tensions troubled him, he said: 
 
Dale: No, not at all. You know, confrontations they tend to blow 
over pretty quick. They’re pussies basically, gorjers you know, they 
pussy out and won’t fight me or owt. They’re all sucking up to the 
boss and that, but me, I wouldn’t dare. If they start with me, I’ll give 
them it back. Even the bosses like, they’ll pussy out…when I’m in 
a mard, I just don’t give a shit. I don’t care if they sack me.  
 
Claiming a resistant Gypsy identity often involves defying authority and 
challenging institutions, such as, the council, schools and the police – actions 
that the participants endorsed as “cool”, “macho” or “valiant”. The participants’ 
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endorsement of such attitudes is little to do with the maintenance of Romany 
Gypsy culture. Rather, it signifies a subculture in which such bravado and 
ethnic pride equals empowerment, despite the fact it often comes at the 
expense of such things as employment or even freedom.  Indeed, towards the 
end of the fieldwork, Dale informed me that he had lost his job and was facing 
prosecution after physically attacking his boss.  
 
Like Dale, many of the participants expressed their anger with the portrayal of 
Gypsy culture as “backwards”. Whether real or imagined, this portrayal mirrors 
the research findings of many studies that suggest the public view of Romany 
Gypsies as thieves, con-men, sexist and violent. Their awareness of the 
systematic devaluation of Gypsy culture does not estrange the participants 
from their ethnicity. Rather, it contributes to the construction of their resistant 
and oppositional self-identifications. This is illustrated in Sam’s narrative: 
 
Sam (M: 28: Romany Gypsy): You know, they’ll say shit to you, 
provoke you. Some will go to the council, try and get you gone, get 
the council to shut the sites…I mean, these are people who really 
hate us… I fucking hate them, I can’t stand them. I mean, if they 
caused me any shit, I’d finish them off… What the fuck do they even 
achieve? It’s not like we’re going anywhere. We’re not going to be 
like ok pal, I’ll stop being a Gypsy then… it makes me more proud 
to be a Gypsy.  
 
The nuances in the processes of both reactive and resistance identity 
construction are illustrated in Sam’s narrative. Like Sam, many of the 
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participants asserted their ethnic identity by using the terms they/them and 
us/we in their accounts. Though often referring to incidents that appear to be 
individual conflicts, they promoted them to a group level as they believed that 
non-Gypsies despised and disrespected “their people”. The participants 
reactively adhere to their ethnic identity, yet, they transform this identity into 
an oppositional vehicle from which to resist perceived discrimination against 
Romany Gypsies.  
 
Not only in their narratives, but in their interactions at the research sites, I 
observed oppositional and resistant practices. Whilst they mostly used a 
mixed language of English and Anglo-Romani with each other, the participants 
often switched to only Anglo-Romani when in the presence of non-Gypsies. 
When I probed their reasons for doing so they revealed that in this way they 
could speak about non-Gypsies, thus, making them suspicious and unable to 
determine whether they were the focus of the conversation. What is more, one 
of the intervention groups would occasionally speak to each other in Anglo-
Romani during the focus groups. I later discovered that the participants were 
discussing what information they should or should not share with me. The 
participants are thus using language to engage in what Castells refers to as 
‘the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded’ (1997, 9).  
 
Participants made frequent references to various practices of resistance and 
opposition. According to Taylor and Whittier (1992, 113), ‘maintaining 
oppositional identity depends upon creating a world apart from dominant 
society’. This certainly rings true for Romani culture which, as discussed in 
chapter one, has often been described in terms of its exclusivity. Indeed, just 
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as the Romany Gypsies are excluded by dominant society, there is also a 
sense that Romany Gypsies are excluding wider society from Gypsy culture 
and community, thus, living in perpetual opposition. It is, perhaps, unsurprising 
then that some participants found a life without opposition hard to imagine. 
 
Tony (M: 26: Romany Gypsy): …if I woke up tomorrow and 
suddenly the world accepted us, they accepted our culture, we 
were free to live our lives without anyone discriminating, I wouldn’t 
feel, like I wouldn’t be a Gypsy anymore…being a Gypsy, to me 
anyway, is about that constant fight between us and them, without 
it, I wouldn’t feel like a Gypsy, it wouldn’t be the same culture.  
Nathan (M: 26: Romany Gypsy): When you’ve been brought up 
your whole life with people hating you, with them trying to stop you 
live your life the way you want, then I think it’s a big part of your 
identity, like being a Gypsy is like being hated, being on the 
outside…so if you’re not an outsider anymore, if all this pays off, 
and we’re accepted and not outsiders anymore, then yeah we’ll still 
have our ways, but we won’t be the same people we were. 
 
Tony and Nathan consider their otherness as fundamental to shaping their 
identities. Without otherness, they argue that Gypsy culture and mentality 
would be transformed into something almost unrecognisable. For Tony and 
Nathan, resistance identity is not actively or strategically employed - it is not a 
resistance for change. Rather, otherness is an inherent part of Romany Gypsy 
culture. This is not to say that Romany Gypsies do not exercise agency when 
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excluding the dominant society from their cultures and communities, but it is 
not resistance in the traditional, academic sense of the word.  
 
The remainder of this chapter will explore the experiences of the Roma who, 
by virtue of their migration, experience a different type of “otherness” to that 
experienced by Romany Gypsies.  
Migratory Motivations 
In order to begin to explore how Roma participants understand and 
experience Britain, it is essential to take into consideration their reflections on, 
and reasons for, migrating to the UK. In chapter two I refer to Roma migrants 
as the post-2004, or third wave, Romani diaspora. This wave of Romani 
migration to Britain differs from previous waves in that it can be described as 
a voluntary, as opposed to involuntary, diaspora which transpired through the 
search for work (see Cohen, 1996). Largely, the participants understood their 
migration as a means by which to improve their material and social situation. 
The appeal that Britain holds for many of the participants was summarised by 
Rozalina who moved to Britain in 2014. She emphasises the improvement to 
her socioeconomic status: 
 
Rozalina (F: 38: Bulgarian Roma): I am so much grateful for 
England. My life and my children, we have improved here very 
much. In Bulgaria you must be very ashamed to be Gypsy. They 
keep us away from the world, no school for children or medicine for 
if they are sick. Here it is ok to be Roma, you say you are Roma 
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you still have school, NHS, house next to not Gypsy people. I have 
improved, now I am happy, I have freedom.  
 
Similarly, many participants explained that their countries of origin could not 
provide an adequate standard of living, as offered in Britain. Petra, who has 
lived in Britain since 2006, stated: 
 
Petra (F: 49: Slovakian Roma): I miss Slovakia but I’ll never go 
back. My children have really good lives. They have school, they 
are healthy, we have a home, electricity, water, they don’t go 
hungry.  They cannot have that in Slovakia. They cannot be safe in 
Slovakia.  
 
For female participants in particular, living in Britain offered them experiences 
and opportunities that they were previously denied and which were often at 
odds with their parents’ beliefs. Anastasija spoke at length about the conflict 
she has had with her parents about education. She comments: 
 
Anastasija (F: 19: Slovakian Roma): In Slovakia it would not have 
been possible for me to go to school…my parents would have liked 
to see me marry very young, fourteen, fifteen, well in England this 
is not possible, children must stay in education…In Slovakia they 
would never encourage a Roma girl to study at high school, or 
college, but here I can go to college, or university, it doesn’t matter 
that I’m Roma.  
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Madalina (F: 22: Romanian Roma) commented, rather similarly, that ‘living in 
Scotland means having more opportunities and freedom…I’m a Roma woman 
and I can vote, study, have an opinion…I do not just have to be someone’s 
wife, I can talk very freely like I am now’. Indeed, for Ioana (F: 24: Romanian 
Roma) and Marija (F: 24: Slovenian Roma), like Petra, it was hard to imagine 
returning to live in their home countries. ‘I’m very settled here, I’m used to 
having freedom and opportunity…it’s my home, I can’t go back to Romania 
now’ said Ioana, while Marija remarked ‘When I go back to Slovenia I don’t fit 
in anymore. I’m too different from them…I feel sorry for them, they don’t have 
all the opportunities I have in Scotland’.  
 
One of the prevailing views held by the participants was that Britain offers 
them, or their children, a better education and thus a more prosperous future. 
Anastasija, through her new educational opportunities, explained she had 
developed an interest in politics and human rights: 
 
Anastasija (F: 19: Roma): In Slovakia my future was poor. Roma 
are not worthy of education, it is a second rate education for second 
rate people. I come to England and I have a very good education, 
I am thankful, and now I see myself as intelligent person. I know 
many new things about society and politics…my interest is in 
human rights, in Roma rights.  
 
It is of note that Anastasija accredits her interest in Roma rights to her 
increased educational opportunities in Britain. Education is often associated 
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with increased political participation and engagement and, as will become 
clear in the following chapters, Anastasija is among the participants most 
invested in a political narrative of Romani identity. In Britain, the participants 
feel freer to express their “Romaniness” publically. In their countries of origin, 
they had often hidden their Romaniness through fear of stigmatisation, or 
been denied their Roma identity through policies of assimilation. In Britain, 
they consider themselves recognised as an ethnic group and, for many of the 
participants, this signified a strengthening or reawakening of Roma identity.   
 
When Teodor arrived in Britain as a refugee from Kosovo (during the second 
wave of Romani diaspora in the 1990s, which can be described as an 
“involuntary” diaspora), he could not speak fluent Romani. His family, through 
fear of persecution, had discouraged the use of Romani in favour of Serbian.  
Britain represented to them a society where one may be open about their 
ethnicity. In Britain, Teodor had once again felt safe to speak his native tongue 
and it has become important to him that his own children speak Romani, given 
that he was denied this right in Kosovo. He explains: 
 
Teodor (M: 27: Kosovan Roma): I talk Romani with my children 
because I want them to know it. I know of Roma children who go to 
classes in Romani and can now read and write in Romani. I can’t 
read and write in Romani but my children have the possibility to 
learn it here in Britain. In Kosovo that was almost illegal, it didn’t 
happen….here you become more aware of your culture and your 
ethnicity.  
 
- 154 - 
In a similar vein, Michal spoke of his surprise that the Romani language is 
recognised by British authorities: 
 
Michal (20, M, Czech Roma): The first time I am trouble with police 
they ask where I from, do I want Czech or Romani translator. This 
is important in Britain, I’m very surprised…living in Britain has been 
very good, I find my identity here. It is very important. More freedom 
to be Roma, to meet many different people, to talk and debate. It is 
very important to go wherever you want and no fear of attack. It’s a 
very nice country. It has been very good country to me.  
 
Overall, the deprivation and discrimination the participants had experienced 
in their countries of origin, together with their long-term educational and 
socioeconomic goals were at the centre of how they rationalised their 
migration to, and settlement in, Britain. This is significant in that the struggles 
they have faced since moving to Britain (i.e. racism and discrimination, 
integration, separation from family and friends) were compensated by their 
lived and perceived future improvements to their socioeconomic situation.  
 
Otherness as Multiple 
In Britain, Roma participants face a different kind of otherness than they used 
to experience. In their home countries their ethnicity was stigmatised, leaving 
them subject to anti-Roma prejudice, discrimination and violence. In Britain, 
however, they suffer the double stigmatisation of being Roma and a migrant. 
As Lenka (F: 36: Czech Roma) asks ‘I think what is worse? To be Gypsy or to 
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be Eastern European?’ while Madalina (F: 22: Romanian Roma) explained ‘if 
I wasn’t Roma I’d still be hated for being Romanian’. This stigmatisation is 
based principally on two factors which were discussed in chapter 1:  (1) the 
supposed cultural backwardness and inherent criminality of the Roma; and (2) 
the racialisation of Eastern Europeans.  
 
Double stigmatisation is a recent phenomenon tied to freedom of movement 
and the increase of Eastern European migration to Britain. Simeon, a second 
generation Roma migrant, has witnessed the intensification of Roma 
stigmatisation in Britain. He said: 
 
Simeon (M: 19: Bulgarian Roma): I think its [EU migration] been 
bad for us in the way that before I was just a Gypsy and now I’m a 
Bulgarian Gypsy… Roma who moved here in the 80s, like my 
family, didn’t get the same shit that Roma moving here now do and 
like I guess we’ve become more noticeable than we were, like it’s 
suddenly quite a big deal that we’re Roma and Bulgarian even 
though like I was born here.  
 
Mounting concerns over EU migration have increased hostility towards Roma 
and EU migrants. Roma participants are, thus, arriving in an already hostile 
society. Rozalina migrated from Bulgaria in 2014, just weeks after EU 
migration restrictions were lifted. She is critical of the restrictions placed upon 
Bulgarian and Romanian citizens which enabled politicians and the media to 
arouse public fears. She said: 
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Rozalina (F: 38: Bulgarian Roma): I feel looked down on. Spanish, 
French, German migrants are respected, but Bulgaria and 
Romania, the poorer countries, aren’t respected and I moving to a 
country where people already not respected me because I’m 
Bulgarian, because I’m a Gypsy.  
 
As discussed in chapter one, the restrictions placed on Romanians and 
Bulgarians produced racialised effects which symbolically stripped new 
migrants of their “Europeaness”. Rozalina refers to the disparity in the way in 
which “Western” and “Eastern” Europeans are constructed in the British 
imagination. “Eastern Europe” has been characterised as economically and 
socially underdeveloped in comparison to the West. Eastern European states 
are portrayed as impoverished, corrupt, and socially and economically 
backward. Such portrayals are nothing new. Pavel, whose family claimed 
asylum in Britain in 1999, spoke at length in the ways in which such 
characterisations of the Roma and Eastern Europe marred his early 
experiences of Britain. He explained: 
 
Pavel (M: 25: Slovakian Roma): When we got asylum and we were 
learning the language, I just remember the teacher completely 
looking down on us. She would ask us questions like did we live in 
huts in Slovakia, did we have bathrooms, did we know how to 
count? She thought we were from another planet or that we came 
to England because we were feral…I was eight years old, can you 
imagine how I felt? 
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The media have been particularly influential in shaping such stigmatising 
attitudes towards Eastern Europeans. Commentaries have excessively 
focussed upon Roma migration, with the term “Roma”, and associated 
stereotypes, being loosely applied to all Eastern Europeans. Utilising existing 
prejudices towards Romany Gypsies, the media has been successful in calling 
into question the “Europeanness”, and thus whiteness, of both Eastern 
Europeans and Roma.  
 
Ina argues the media have exploited the Roma’s low socio-economic status 
to fashion negative depictions of Eastern European, and specifically Roma, 
migrants. She says: 
 
Ina (F: 26: Romanian Roma): Generally they have recognised the 
terrible situations we’ve left behind but they use that against us. 
There is a lot of scaremongering, look at the poverty they are 
leaving behind, they will come here now to claim benefits, or to 
pickpocket and beg. The newspapers only write about negative 
things.  
 
Ina’s argument corroborates Fox et al.’s (2012) number, and crime frames, 
discussed at length in chapter 1, in which the scale of EU migration is amplified 
to exploit concerns about the risks to jobs, welfare benefits and public 
services, and which identifies criminality as an innate part of the character of 
Eastern Europeans and Roma. As Ina points out, by highlighting the 
socioeconomic status of Europe’s Roma, the stigmatisation of the Roma as 
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socially and culturally backwards is validated, as suggested in the Fox et al.’s 
(2012) Roma frame.  
 
In reference to the Channel 5 documentary Gypsies on Benefits and Proud, 
Deshka said: 
 
Deshka (F: 35: Bulgarian Roma): I move to UK to make a good life 
for myself, my children. How can I get rid of discrimination where 
the TV says that we come to get thousands of benefits and never 
work a job? People believe what they see on TV. Gypsy thieves, 
lazy, that's all the British people think and this is not true. The TV 
is very wrong and very bad to say these lies.  
 
The Channel 5 documentary followed the lives of recently arrived Roma 
migrants, revealing and emphasising the sum of their welfare payments and 
joblessness. Broadcast in early 2014, it fed into wider anxieties and tensions 
surrounding the Roma. In late 2013, just months before the removal of 
transitional employment restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian workers, 
former home secretary David Blunkett warned there would be race riots 
should the Roma fail to integrate (BBC, 2013). Just weeks earlier, the Roma 
had been at the centre of a global media storm after police discovered a 
blonde-haired, blue-eyed girl named Maria at a Roma camp in northern 
Greece. Maria was removed into state care and her parents arrested, despite 
telling police they were caring for Maria on behalf of her Bulgarian Roma 
parents who, due to poverty, was unable to raise the child themselves. In the 
moral panic that ensued, the Roma were vilified by the media and in a knee-
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jerk reaction a seven year old blonde girl was taken from her Roma parents in 
Ireland.  Playing into long held stereotypes of child-stealing Gypsies, Maria 
was positioned as a non-Roma victim of child abduction and exploitation; this 
was, of course, until DNA results confirmed she was in fact the child of 
Bulgarian Roma.   
 
The exposure these stories received has had lasting effects. The notion of 
feeling under constant suspicion was recurrent in the participants’ narratives: 
 
Petra (F: 49: Slovakian Roma): I know two, three, families of 
children taken by child services here in UK, and I think because 
they are Roma. We are on the edge, Maria made us very afraid. A 
lot have fair-haired children, they will be next?  
 
Janka (F: 26: Slovakian Roma): We are not the problem, they are 
the problem. They believe what they read, suspicion is everywhere. 
Are we child snatchers? Are we thieves? Mr Blunkett, if the British 
riot because Roma stand on the street then it is the British who 
need change their culture, not us.  
 
The upshot of heightened anti-Roma and/or anti-Eastern European prejudice 
has been the increasing levels of racism and discrimination experienced by 
participants in their everyday interactions and in a wide array of environments, 
for instance, in shops, the bank, the work place, on public transport, etc. The 
extent to which participants are subject to racism and discrimination, however, 
is dependent on the “visibility” of their otherness. Various signifiers of 
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difference, such as, physical appearance,  accent and command of language, 
religion, and even the area in which one lives, were acknowledged has having 
an impact on how the participants were perceived by wider society. The 
visibility of otherness, or put differently, the participants’ ability to “perform" 
whiteness, greatly impacts the extent to which they undergo racialisation 
processes. In the case of second generation Roma, for example, accent and 
command of language did not project otherness, given that they spoke English 
with regional accents. Muslim participants, on the other hand, spoke of 
bearing the triple stigma of being Roma, migrant and Muslim, thus, enduring 
Islamophobia on top of the already damaging forces of xenophobia and anti-
Roma prejudice.    
 
Anti-Roma and anti-Eastern European prejudices are most pronounced in 
areas knows for their high Roma and Eastern European populations. 
Participants referred to the stigmatisation of “Roma” neighbourhoods through 
which postcodes become a signifier of Roma identity. ‘I avoid telling people I 
live here’ explained Janka (F: 26: Slovakian Roma) ‘only Gypsies live here 
now’. Beyond these ethnically marked neighbourhoods, participants had been 
subject to a “generic otherness” or misidentification. Natalia (F: 29: Slovakian 
Roma) explained ‘I don’t think people look at me saying look at that Gypsy, 
look at that Slovak. I’m just some kind of foreign’. Marija (F: 24: Slovenian 
Roma) elaborated: 
 
I don’t think British people can pick out Roma. In Slovenia, there’s 
less diversity, so if you have dark skin you’re definitely Roma… in 
Britain they know you are foreign… because we sound foreign, our 
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skin is darker… it’s a guessing game of what type of foreign… if 
you’re lucky they’ll think you’re Italian, Spanish, Greek, but I’ve had 
Paki, Asian, Arab…   
 
In general, nearly all of the participants believed that the majority of the 
discrimination they had encountered in Britain was the product of their generic 
“foreignness” and not because they were easily identifiable as Roma or 
Eastern European. Their otherness manifests through non-specific 
embodiments of ethnicity, for example, accent and skin colour, which marks 
them, at best, “white others”, or, at worst, non-European. This can work to 
both their detriment and advantage. To some extent, it acts a safeguard 
against the negative stereotyping of Roma and Eastern Europeans, given that 
Roma can “pass” as Western Europeans. Regrettably, this does not mean that 
Roma are not subject to racialisation, for example, when they are mistaken for 
Asian or a generic non-European other.  
Strategic Invisibility 
Many of the participants spoke of their efforts to integrate into British society 
through adopting British social and cultural norms while simultaneously 
discarding elements of the Romani culture perceived as undesirable. Efforts 
to “fit in”, and by extension mask or lessen otherness, were understood 
differently among the participants; in some instances they were considered a 
positive and rewarding experience, but in others, they were articulated in the 
language of internalised racism.  
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The adoption of British social norms and values were understood, on the 
whole, as a method through which to demonstrate that one could be both 
“British” and “Roma”. Ivana stresses her willingness to embrace British 
culture: 
 
Ivana (F: 52: Bulgarian Roma): …all cultures have good and bad, I 
always have taken the good and bad from British and Romani 
culture and hoped that my children, my grandchildren, will too so 
that they don’t feel like outsider to Gypsies or to British people. I 
live British life and Gypsy life, I’m both.  
 
Here, Ivana makes a compromise. She is unwilling to surrender her Romani 
identity but does not desire “outsider” status either. Her strategy is to adopt 
elements of British culture while simultaneously discarding elements of the 
Romani culture that she perceives as undesirable. In so doing, Ivana 
constructs sameness with British society, thus, “whitening” herself and hoping 
to evade the “othering gaze”. Similarly, Anastasija emphasised the similarities 
between British and Roma values: 
 
Anastasija (F: 19: Slovakian Roma): We have our cultural 
differences but I think we have similar values. British values, 
European values, Christian values, multicultural values. I don’t feel 
like I am less Roma for integrating well into Britain and enjoying 
British culture as well as Roma culture because we are not that 
different morally… other immigrants, Arabs, Muslims, don’t 
integrate as well and are unwilling to accept British values.  
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Anastasija’s claims of sameness are strengthened when contrasting the 
shared “European” and “Christian” values held by the British and Roma with 
the “Muslim”, “non-European” other. By juxtaposing European and non-
European values, Anastasija relies on the same orientalist logic discussed in 
chapter one, that constructs the Roma as a non-European other. In 
emphasising her sameness with British society, and by extension 
emphasising her whiteness, she constructs the Roma as more desirable than 
visibly non-European minorities.  
 
In emphasising sameness, Ivana and Anastasija are not attempting to “pass” 
per se, but they are, whether consciously or unconsciously, attempting to 
acquire whiteness through the adoption of “white British” values.  The 
desirability of whiteness is grounded in the greater economic, political and 
social advantages such a status secures. By “acting white”, they stand to gain 
access to “white privilege” and is a means by which to avoid otherness. Such 
a strategy is employed, in a more active sense, by participants engaged in the 
process of internalised racism. In their opinion, the Roma and other nomadic 
peoples who face discrimination should blame themselves for their failure to 
integrate into British society. Though these participants identify as Roma, their 
relationship with the wider Roma community is complex. They are largely well 
educated migrant Roma and being accepted by British people is of great 
importance to them.  
 
In his study of Jewish self-hatred, Gilman (1990) illustrates how dominant 
ideologies earn compliance by stirring a desire among oppressed people to 
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become like their oppressors. Gilman draws attention to the commonly held 
view that oppressed groups, such as ethnic minorities, can gain equality if they 
mimic the dominant group and abide by their rules and values. The more the 
oppressed group identifies with their oppressors, however, the more they 
accept the ideologies and structural inequalities that keep them subjugated. 
Gilman refers to this situation as a double bind: the myth of the oppressed 
breaking free form their “otherness” by rejecting that which makes them 
different, leads them into defending and maintaining the very systems that 
position them as the “other”. Though they are promised acceptance and 
equality, this is rarely the case.  
 
Igor judges Roma migrant communities somewhat severely as according to 
him they make little effort to integrate into British society. His position is 
somewhat uncertain. On the one hand he is proud of his Roma identity and 
wants to emphasise his “Romaniness”. On the other hand, he keeps his 
distance from Roma who he deems as not behaving according to British 
norms and values. His narrative demonstrates strong ambivalent feelings, 
positionings and identifications. He says: 
 
Igor (M: 21: Slovakian Roma): I see garbage left in the street and 
young Roma people congregating to very late in the evenings and 
I feel ashamed of that. This is the life of Victorian Britain. Very bad 
cleaning of streets and child not a home, being very threatening to 
local people. The British people do not live like this. This is life of 
Roma in Slovakia or Romania because there it is ghettos but this 
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is very nice streets, nice houses and neighbourhoods that they treat 
as ghettos. It does not show progress if they don’t develop from 
what they were in Slovakia. If they can’t do this then they must not 
come here. We ask why are we oppressed. This is simple, no 
change then no progress.  
 
Igor relies on the same stigmatising logic employed by the media and 
politicians which constructs the Roma as socially and culturally backwards. In 
so doing, he distances himself from “bad” Roma migrants and constructs 
himself as “good” or “desirable” in comparison, given his willingness to 
‘progress’ and ‘develop’. There is a sense that, as Roma, he feels inferior in 
relation to the British people, yet superior in relation to other Roma migrants. 
He describes British society as progressive and modern, which according to 
him is the opposite of Roma society: 
 
We do not learn anything when we only complain about racism or 
oppression. I don’t want to see all Roma as my family because we 
all live here in Britain and this is why I respect Roma who come to 
Britain and socialise with British to learn the British life. It is good 
thing to learn, and now I prefer to socialise with British, not Roma.  
 
Igor is engaged in the process of “defensive othering” which Schwalbe et al. 
(2000, 425) define as ‘identity work done by those seeking membership in a 
dominant group or by those seeking to deflect the stigma they experience as 
members of a subordinated group’. It refers to the actions taken by members 
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of an oppressed group to distance themselves from fellow members of their 
group. By attributing negative stereotypes that the dominant society 
associates with the Roma to “other” members of the group, Igor is distancing 
himself from the negative stereotype and marking himself as superior. What 
is more, the process of defensive othering allows Igor to emphasise his 
sameness and make claims to whiteness. According to Schwalbe et al. 
(2000), by demonstrating that they share the same feelings of contempt 
towards their co-ethnics, they attempt to join and gain acceptance from the 
dominant group.  
 
Similar to Igor, Ioana describes British society in terms of progress. British 
people are presented as modern and progressive and she makes use of 
popular stereotypes which stigmatise the Roma as a “backwards” people. 
What is more, she sees racism against the Roma as justifiable given the 
supposed behaviour of Roma people: 
 
Ioana (F: 24: Romanian Roma): I live in [neighbourhood name] and 
this is the worst neighbourhood in [city name] and in all of Scotland. 
I tell you that I am the worst racist in my neighbourhood because I 
see many times the bad things from foreigners, from Roma. This is 
why I say that British who hate Roma are right, because Roma treat 
the country very bad and have very bad respect for their 
neighbourhoods. If Roma treat their neighbourhoods with respect 
and their neighbours with respect then this will make good 
impression for British. I do not think British hate Roma if they have 
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respect because they see that Roma living here because they want 
to learn to improve themselves, but when Roma attacks British on 
the street and steal wallet on the train, then how will British think 
about Roma? 
 
Both Igor and Ioana appear to consider themselves as true representatives of 
the Roma and Roma identity. The behaviour of other Roma is, in their opinion, 
damaging for the image of Roma and does not make a good impression on 
British people. Igor and Ioana judge themselves and other Roma by their 
degree of integration. They have internalised and accepted conceptions of the 
Roma as inferior, uncivilised and unmodern, thus, they wish to distance 
themselves from this group. At the same time they emphasise their Roma 
identity. This can become somewhat dangerous as it is reminiscent of the “true 
Gypsy”/”fake Gypsy” dichotomy discussed in chapter 1 and implies a 
distinction between desirable and undesirable Romani behaviours. While Igor 
and Ioana employ defensive othering as means of resisting the infliction of the 
negative “Gypsy” identity, they do so in a manner that furthers the 
reproduction of inequality (Schwalbe et al. 2000). Defensive othering can, 
thus, be considered a form of internalised racism.   
 
Defensive othering also transpires at the collective level with the formation of 
derogatory sub-group identities which are widely recognised and commonly 
employed by the group, thus constructing internal group conflict and divides 
(Anzaldua, 1993). Many of the participants referred to the sub-group identity 
of Romanian Kalderas in ways that echoed the anti-Roma stereotypes of 
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dominant British society. The terms ‘Romanian Kalderas’ and ‘Romanian 
Gypsies’, were employed to “other” sections of the Romani population: 
 
Velislava (F: 19: Bulgarian Roma): Most the Roma that come to 
England come to find better life, to work hard and have good life for 
family. In the newspapers it is very bad words they write about us, 
these are not true stories, it is Romanian Gypsies, they come to UK 
for claiming benefits and begging on the street.  
 
Katarina (F: 21: Slovakian Roma): I try very hard to adjust to British 
life and be a good citizen, some Cigan7 do not want this…you will 
see the Kalderas in the cities begging, they dress very traditional, 
old-fashioned, they come to Britain for only three months from 
Romania to beg…they sleep outside, they have no homes…they 
give bad idea of Roma people.  
 
Velislava and Katarina strategically employ the terms “Romanian” and 
“Kalderas” to criticise and belittle co-ethnic “others” for exhibiting the 
characteristics that embody anti-Roma stereotypes and prejudices.  By this 
means, they employ defensive othering. While Schwalbe et al. (2000) argue 
this is an adaptive response to oppression, such strategies rationalise anti-
Roma stereotypes by suggesting they are true, though only for certain sub-
groups of the Britain’s Romani population.  
 
                                            
7 Gypsies 
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The terms “Romanian” and “Kalderas” act as a vehicle through which anti-
Roma stereotypes penetrate and mould definitions of appropriate Roma 
behaviour, deeming some supposedly “ethnic” behaviours, such as begging, 
claiming benefits and wearing traditional Romani dress, as incompatible and 
undesirable with the British way of life, while endorsing desirable “white” 
behaviours. This demonstrates that the employment of defensive othering as 
a strategy of sameness can generate simultaneous acceptance of white 
hegemony and the veneration of whiteness.  
Summary 
The focus of this chapter has been the participants’ experiences of, and 
responses to, “otherness”. Experiences of stigmatisation were central to the 
participants’ narratives, with racism and discrimination acknowledged as 
commonplace. The Roma, who are doubly stigmatised, frequently face 
xenophobia which has been exacerbated by the media’s sensationalist and 
fearmongering response to EU migration.  
 
For Romany Gypsies, entrenched societal intolerance to Gypsy culture has 
led to an increase in assimilationist based policies aimed at restricting the 
Gypsy way of life. Romany Gypsies feel abandoned by multicultural ideologies 
which, in their experience, afford “special treatment” to non-British minorities. 
Indeed, Roma migrants held generally positive views of multicultural Britain. 
They felt freer to observe and express their culture and believed Britain offered 
them better opportunities in terms of equal access to education and 
employment. The differences in which British multiculturalism is experienced 
is important. While Roma have seen vast improvements to their 
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socioeconomic positions, Romany Gypsies have experienced a deterioration. 
This has led to animosity towards migrants and other minorities, as Romany 
Gypsies consider themselves more deserving of multicultural rights and 
freedoms, given that they are British. In a similar vein, Roma consider 
themselves as more “desirable” than non-European migrants. They 
emphasise their “sameness” by noting their shared “European vales” with the 
British public, which make them better positioned to successfully integrate.  
 
In response to stigmatisation, the participants adopt various strategies of 
invisibility. Romany Gypsies spoke of concealing their otherness by 
supressing observable markers of “Gypsyness”, such as particular styles of 
dress, accommodation or even names. Roma, too, attempted to conceal their 
ethnicity by utilising their “generic otherness” and passing as less stigmatised 
European others. Although maintaining their culture, the Roma were keen to 
integrate and hoped to disguise their otherness by adopting British culture and 
values. In a minority of Roma participants, this gave rise to internalised racism. 
These participants distanced themselves from, and were greatly critical of, the 
wider Roma population, reaffirming stigmatising attitudes in order to gain 
acceptance into British society.  
 
The Roma’s pro-integration response is markedly different to that of the 
Romany Gypsies, who instead emphasise the differences between Gypsy and 
non-Gypsy communities. For Romany Gypsies, otherness is a source of pride. 
Racism and discrimination strengthen feelings of groupness and collective 
identity and, thus, rather than conceal their ethnicity, Romany Gypsies invest 
more strongly in a sense of “us” and “them”. They recognise that inclusion is 
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dependent on assimilation and, unwilling to give up their culture, they become 
engaged in the process of defensive maintenance. In this way, Romany Gypsy 
communities become as exclusive as they are excluded.  
 
Overall, Britain’s Romanies can be described as sandwiched between their 
feelings and claims to belonging, and a bleak reality of exclusion and 
otherness. There appears a willingness amongst Roma, to integrate, or even 
assimilate, into British society. Romany Gypsies, on the other hand, stress 
their otherness and negotiate their relationship to British society accordingly. 
The following chapter will explore in greater length the narratives of belonging 
(to British society) that have unravelled in this chapter, locating them in 
narratives of home.  
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Chapter 5 
Locating a Home(land) 
This chapter will explore the participants’ understandings of home and 
homeland, which are central to diasporic identity frames.  It will continue to 
explore feelings of belonging, specifically in relation to the participants’ 
experiences of, and relationship to their countries of origin, and in the case of 
the Roma, their country of residence. It will consider the notion of “Britishness” 
and how identifications with Britishness impact upon the participants’ sense 
of belonging to the nation. It will also explore the participants’ identifications 
with an Indian homeland. The chapter will first explore the experiences of 
Roma participants.  
Considering Countries of Origin 
Most Roma participants expressed a strong connection to their home 
countries and national identities, irrespective of how long they had lived in 
Britain. Such expressions were most explicit when participants discussed their 
feelings of “Britishness”; these discussions were often accompanied by 
assertions of strong feelings of their own national identity.  
 
Katarina (F: 21: Slovakian Roma): I lived here four, five, years, but 
no I would not say I feel British now.  
Emily: Do you feel Slovakian? 
Katarina: Yes. I’m definitely not British, I like to stay here now and 
be part of society, but I’m Slovak. My heart is in Slovakia, it will 
always be my home.  
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Madalina (F: 22: Romanian Roma): I’m only a little bit British… I am 
Romanian. Romania is my home. My memories are in Romania, 
my family, I will never have the same feelings for Britain. 
 
Yuliyan (M: 45: Bulgarian Roma): I live here, I work here, I have 
good life here but always I will be Bulgarian. I was born in Bulgaria, 
my family are there… I will live here until I die maybe but I will still 
feel Bulgarian.  
 
These feelings were again expressed when discussing participants’ visits to 
their home countries. In which several participants spoke of a strong 
attachment to their country of birth.  
 
Ivana (F: 52: Roma): I love going back, I wish I could go back 
more… to see my mum, my brothers, even after all these years I 
miss them so much… I miss my village, the community… I love to 
show my children and grandchildren where I am from…  
Emily: Would you ever move back to Bulgaria? 
Ivana: No, because I am disappointed when I go back that nothing 
has changed. It’s still poor, it’s still a bad place for Roma to live and 
I know it will never change… but in my heart I am Bulgarian, I was 
born there and it will always be home, I will always call it home.  
 
These attachments were discussed in reference to the fact that the 
participants were born, and spent a considerable amount of their lives, in their 
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countries of origin. What is more, familial bonds and memories were 
prominently featured in their narratives. Their strong affiliations with their 
home countries are interesting given that it implies that national attachments 
remain central to the multifaceted identities of the Roma participants. This is 
hardly surprising given that the majority of these participants were born in 
former Eastern Bloc nations. Socialist-state regimes across Eastern and 
Central Europe operated on the premise that the Roma were not an ethnic 
group, but an underprivileged “social class”, fated to forceful assimilation. 
Under these regimes, ethnic groups were deprived of their culture, frequently 
by preventing them from speaking in their native language, or through the 
forceful assignment of “ethnically neutral” surnames. A process of cultural 
homogenisation was thus employed to mask national heterogeneity. For 
Marushiakova and Popov (2013), cultural homogenisation had an enormous 
bearing on processes of social integration and the formation of Roma 
identities. They argue that Roma in Central and Eastern Europe are much 
more socially integrated and have a far stronger attachment to the nation state 
in comparison to other Romanies in Western Europe and other parts of the 
world. The effects this has on the construction of a Romani diaspora 
consciousness or transnational identity will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 6, however, it suggests that the participants’ notions of home and 
belonging are territorially bound to the nation state.  
 
Interestingly, the participants’ attachment to their home countries does not 
extend to their co-nationals living in Britain. Many of the participants noted 
they felt little connection to the wider migrant community, stating that the 
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negative attitudes towards Roma, held by their co-nationals, are replicated in 
Britain: 
 
Emily: Are you involved in any way with the Romanian community 
here in Yorkshire? 
Ioana (F: 24: Romanian Roma): No. It is sad, they see us very 
much like they saw in Romania, not equal, real Romanians. They 
distance, because they are scared to be associated with us, they 
will look like Roma.  
 
As discussed in chapter one, the notion of the “Roma migrant” has been 
applied somewhat indiscriminately to all Eastern Europeans, regardless of 
their ethnicity. In Grill’s (2012) study of Slovak and Czech Roma migrants 
living in Scotland, he discovered that “white” Central and Eastern European 
migrants play a fundamental role in identifying certain migrants as Roma. He 
notes, that ‘equipped with some kind of “common-sensical wisdom” about “our 
Gypsies”… many of them felt obliged to explain the differences between 
Roma/Gypsies and non-Roma Slovaks and Czechs in the area… [because] 
the thought of being classified by Scottish persons alongside of 
Roma/Gypsies through one unifying national category of Slovak was a source 
of embarrassment’. As a result, non-Roma migrants avoided interactions and 
symbolic associations with Roma migrants, thus maintaining the exclusive 
ethnic boundaries constructed in their home countries.  This was certainly 
echoed in the narratives of the participants. Anastasija (F: 19: Slovakian 
Roma), for example, stated, ‘It angers them that Roma have come to Britain 
because it reminds them that regardless of how they treat us back home, we 
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have the same right to come here and better our lives as they do’ and Efraim 
(M: 68: Bulgarian Roma) explained, ‘they move yes, but they don’t leave their 
bigotry at the border’. By distancing themselves from Roma co-nationals, non-
Roma migrants implicitly make claims to whiteness and Europeaness while 
simultaneously stripping their Roma co-nationals of theirs.  
Feelings of Britishness Amongst Roma 
In this section, the participants relay their experiences of “Britishness” and the 
barriers that obstruct them from exercising full citizenship rights which they 
legally possess but are informally denied. On the basis of this, it is possible to 
locate the participants’ experiences of Britishness within Jacobson’s (1997) 
three boundaries of Britishness: civic, racial and cultural. The “civic boundary” 
refers to the official or legal definition of Britishness in which one is considered 
British if they hold British citizenship. The “racial boundary” bestows 
Britishness to only those who have British ancestry; here, Britishness is 
dependent on one’s ancestral roots or “blood”. The third boundary, the cultural 
boundary, defines Britishness ‘in terms of values, attitudes, and lifestyle: that 
is, Britishness is regarded as a matter of the culture to which one adheres’ 
(p193).  
The Civic Boundary 
As discussed above, many participants maintained a strong affiliation to their 
home countries. “Britishness”, or British citizenship, was often seen, therefore, 
as a legal necessity as opposed to an integral part of their identity.  
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Petra (F: 49: Slovakian Roma): I’m going to apply for my British 
citizenship. I’ve been here six years now and I’m entitled to 
residency. 
Emily: Will you consider yourself British? 
Petra: No. It is just to make my life easier. To get a passport, to 
make travelling to and from Britain easier.  
 
Igor (M: 21: Slovakian Roma): I will get British citizenship, just to 
be sure, because of this referendum, when Britain leaves the EU. 
So I need to get my papers, maybe I will not need it. 
Emily: Will you consider yourself British after that? 
Igor: No, it’s just for convenience. My life is here, work, family, 
house. I just need the papers.  
 
By applying for British citizenship, the participants do not expect to inherit a 
“British identity”.  Rather, claiming British citizenship is considered a means 
by which to secure certain rights, protections and privileges without 
surrendering one’s ethnic or national affiliation. Acquiring British citizenship 
offers the participants a sense of security given that EU freedom of movement 
leaves Roma migrants in an ambiguous position. EU migrants are not required 
to hold nor apply for British citizenship. Rather, like many of the Roma 
participants, EU migrants remain nationals of their home country. 
 
Feelings of liminality, an “in-betweeness” and uncertainty, were common in 
many of the participants’ narratives. They felt “British”, or were at least eager 
to acquire British citizenship, but questioned the “legitimacy” of their claim to 
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British residency. These anxieties arose around the upcoming referendum on 
European Union membership.  
 
Anastasija (F: 19: Roma):  I’ve grown up here; I came from Slovakia 
when I was eleven. I feel British but I’m not in the eyes of the law 
and it’s scary…Britain don’t want Roma here, if they leave the EU 
what happens to us? Will we be allowed to stay? Will we have to 
fight to stay? We’ll have to apply to the government just to live in 
our own homes and carry on with our lives.  
 
Others argued that EU membership offered the Roma little protection in terms 
of citizenship given the French government’s repatriation of tens of thousands 
of Bulgarian and Romanian Roma since 2009. Deshka (F: 35: Bulgarian) 
explained, ’we are not citizens; look at France, deporting Roma from Bulgaria, 
Romania, back to their country’ while Simeon (M: 19: Roma) expanded ‘no 
one bat an eyelid and I doubt they would if Cameron started deporting Roma 
beggars from London’. France’s mass deportations of Roma were a direct 
contravention of EU anti-discrimination and freedom of movement directives. 
The expulsions undoubtedly raise questions over who is entitled to “European 
citizenship”. By denying the Roma the right of freedom of movement, they are 
symbolically stripped of their “Europeanness”, and by extension their 
whiteness. For Ioana (F: 24: Romanian Roma), the insecurity of EU citizenship 
acts as a barrier to a sense of “Britishness”. She stated, ‘in the EU we don’t 
need to be British citizen so we will never be British, we are Romanian, 
Slovakian, and I don’t think it makes people feel British, or feel a member of 
Britain. If we leave EU we will get citizenship and it will feel permanent, it’s the 
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opposite of that right now, we are guests.’ Whether or not “Britishness” 
remains important in the context of EU or European citizenship and/or identity 
is, of course, greatly contested.  Nevertheless, the notion of European 
citizenship does not provide, for Anastasija, Deshka and Ioana, a sense of 
security. This is compounded by the racial and cultural boundaries, which will 
now be discussed.   
The Racial Boundary 
The “racial boundary” defines Britishness as those people who have British 
“ancestry” or “blood”. This is somewhat contrary to the civic boundary; while 
the civic boundary is relatively inclusive, the racial boundary is by its very 
nature exclusive. Under the racial boundary of Britishness one cannot 
“become” British as a result of migration or legal right. Rather, Britishness is a 
question of one’s genetics, heritage or “blood”. While the civic boundary, as a 
legal definition of Britishness, is somewhat unambiguous, the racial boundary 
is uncertain given there are no explicit markers of British ancestry. 
Nevertheless, whiteness may be deemed an obvious indicator of British 
ancestry. That said, exclusion for the racial boundary was more pronounced 
for the Roma.  
 
Many of the participants stated that ethnic minorities were largely not 
recognised as “fully” British by dominant society. For the most part, they 
deemed racial definitions of Britishness as bigoted and prejudiced, yet, found 
it difficult to challenge such understandings of Britishness given that they are 
so deeply entrenched. Pavel (M: 25: Roma) explained that being Roma 
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signifies being ‘a leech who will never be seen as British’, while Velislava 
described altering her appearance in order to gain acceptance: 
 
Velislava (F: 19: Bulgarian Roma): When you are Gypsy they know 
this very quickly that you are not British. For me is this through my 
accent, and my hair and the colour of my skin. You don’t be British 
by living here and working here. If I was accepted as British, why 
you do think I talk about colouring my hair blonde and learn an 
English accent, is it because I am not accepted and want to be 
accepted. They look at you in a very bad way when you are Gypsy, 
they look down on you.  
 
Miroslav’s neighbourhood has seen a substantial inflow of Roma migrants in 
recent years, resulting in heightened tensions between white British and 
Roma residents. He described an incident he and his friends had had with a 
local resident in the employment centre. The man had pointed at them and 
shouted, ‘This lot are coming here and stealing our jobs. These fucking 
Gypsies have destroyed [the neighbourhood]…this is our neighbourhood, 
we’re Scottish, go home’. As discussed in Chapter One, the public and political 
anxieties, which arose from post-2004 EU migration patterns, have had major 
repercussions for Roma migrants. The Roma have been framed as a 
“problem” and “invasion”, and have been used by politicians and the media as 
means through which to fuel fear and anxiety, predominately by conveying the 
notion that the Roma from Eastern Europe could “swamp” the UK welfare 
state and “steal” jobs from British people.  
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Such experiences were common amongst Roma participants. Many spoke 
about a regression from a more positive initial contact with British society as 
a hospitable and exciting society, to a more negative and harsh reality of 
otherisation and social exclusion: 
 
Miroslav (M: 28: Slovakian Roma): When I came to Scotland it was 
very exciting, a new country, new life. I learn English very quick and 
I feel very much belonging to Scotland at the beginning. But when 
I go to college to learn on a course I start to feel and think about 
not belonging to Scotland when my classmates say things to me – 
you fucking pikey, you fucking gypo. That hurt me very bad; I think 
why can they not accept me? When I ask them, why do you say 
these things to me, they say go home, go back to Slovakia, if I am 
so oppressed in Scotland then I go back then to Slovakia or 
become more Scottish.  
 
Miroslav’s experiences suggest that a sense of non-belonging is not fashioned 
in a political vacuum but is related to exclusionary practices that identify 
insiders and outsiders within the political boundary of the nation-state.  
Exclusionary practices can include Miroslav’s experience of being labelled a 
“gypo” or “pikey”, and his exposure to racist taunts. Even when he has 
challenged these exclusionary practices, he is encouraged to leave Scotland 
or accept his inferiorised position. His experience can be best understood by 
employing the guest/host allegory in which migrants are considered guests 
who should show appreciation for, not criticism of, the “generosity” of the host.  
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When Miroslav challenged racism, his classmates demanded he leave 
Scotland or stay on unequal terms.  The host society, in this case, consider 
themselves as “natural” members of British society whose power and authority 
should not be questioned by migrants or “guests”.  Consequently, an 
“inherited” British citizenship is often connected to unequal power relations 
that define the boundaries of identity and entitles bearers to make powerful 
claims in the name of identity.  
 
There was an agreement amongst the participants that “Roma migrant” is a 
racialised identity which signifies a non-white and non-European group: 
 
Marija (F: 24: Slovenian Roma): I feel different, you see my looks, 
my skin, my culture, this really stands me out. I have an easier time 
here if I was whiter European. A Polish girl does not look foreign, 
Polish are very white like Scottish people…Scottish people look 
one way and the Polish are like this too. Skin colour changes your 
way of treatment….you will be Scottish when you look Scottish and 
if your country is very close to Scotland, you will be Scottish easier.  
 
Marija refers to the Roma in terms of visibility, culture, geographical proximity, 
and race, identifying these as the criteria through which a person will be 
accepted as Scottish. She suggests that whiteness is fundamental in 
constituting the boundaries of the British identity.  The concept of race is still 
crucial to understanding how imagined racial differences are constructed and 
used to justify the inferiorisation and exclusion of people of colour. 
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Additionally, cultural differences have been employed to explain the 
successful or failed integration of migrant groups into British society. When 
this ideological construction of difference is implemented in public institutions 
(for instance, in the labour market, criminal justice system, housing, mass 
media, or education system), a continuum of desirability is fashioned in which 
the dominant group represents the normative measure of difference. This has 
serious consequences for ethnic minorities who are assigned different 
expectations and levels of power according to how culturally similar or 
dissimilar they are. For ethnic minorities with the darkest complexions, and 
whose “origins” are furthest from Europe, the greater the possibility for 
discrimination and otherisation.  
 
Certain physical attributes, as in the case of the Roma, have become a 
signifier of otherness and difference. The extent of this otherisation is 
dependent on various other factors, for example, place of birth, nationality, 
religion and spatial belonging. Some of the participants explained that they 
had “passed” as Spanish or Italian, however, once they had disclosed they 
were Roma they were treated less favourably. This suggests Southern 
Europeans are better received and more welcomed by British people, than 
Eastern Europeans, and particularly Roma. This construction of difference in 
terms of their desirability and similarity to “us” (hence, acceptance and 
tolerance) and undesirability, difference and remoteness from “us” (hence, 
non-acceptance and intolerance) are employed as thresholds to include or 
exclude ethnic minorities from the boundaries of Britishness.  
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The concepts of “Eastern European” and “Roma” are used in the same 
manner as the notion of “blackness” to signify the wealth of difference and 
otherness in relation to the white British identity. This is not to claim that 
whiteness is homogeneous and unambiguous or that white people are instilled 
with “horizontal comradeship” (Anderson. 1991, 7).  We can begin to unravel, 
however, the binary of the “Brit” and the “immigrant”, “us” and “them”, through 
showing that not all immigrants are marginalised and excluded from British 
society. Rather, in the UK the category of “immigrant” has been historically 
contingent on understandings of Europeanness.  
 
Some participants, despite being born in the UK, referred to being considered 
as British ‘on paper’ only: 
 
Simeon (M: 19: Bulgarian Roma): I feel British and I am British if 
I’m allowed to say that…because people are always suspicious 
when I say I’m British like I’m lying or something. Like if I say I’m 
British they always ask like “but originally though?” Originally? Like 
what does that mean? I was born here in England but they only see 
me as British on paper and not as British British.   
 
Being born in the UK is not regarded, therefore, as tantamount to being 
recognised as British. Simeon points out that despite having a strong sense 
of belonging to the British identity, his Britishness becomes an object of 
suspicion and his entitlement to this identity is challenged.  This evokes 
questions of who can be considered authentically British (an inherited 
Britishness) and who can be considered as British on paper only (an acquired 
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Britishness). Notions of an inherited membership to a collective British identity 
inhibit formal citizenship rights from functioning as a symbol of belonging.  
 
Despite the fact that Simeon was born in Britain, his claim to Britishness is 
challenged as his Roma and/or Bulgarian/Turkish ethnicity is assumed to be 
his “real” or “original” identity. As a result, even when Simeon states Britain as 
his place of birth, it is not regarded as a strong enough argument to justify his 
claim to British identity. The construction of the British identity is executed on 
a daily basis through a method of interrogation that commands answers to 
specific questions: Where are you from? Originally? Why don’t you act British? 
These questions are not unintended. Rather, they signify issues of questioned 
belonging and illusions of “other places” as the Romanies original place of 
belonging. As the quotes above indicate, the sustained questioning of one’s 
origin is often a disciplining device to establish, and make distinctions 
between, an “us” and a “them”.  It, thus, legitimatises the unequal power 
relations between dominant groups and minorities. This raises many issues 
about the discriminatory nature and understanding of Britishness and 
citizenship. This is greatly significant in the context of Romani nationalism, 
which offers a “home” or sense of belonging to those excluded from 
Britishness or, as discussed above, “Europeanness”.  
The Cultural Boundary 
The cultural boundary marks as British ‘those individuals whose behaviour, 
life-style, and values are perceived as typically British’ (Jacobson, 1997, 193). 
Defining precisely what “British culture” is, however, is by no means 
uncomplicated. To be culturally British might indicate, for instance, that one is 
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‘attached to the majority language, established religion and cultural heritage 
of Britain; or to exhibit supposedly “typical” British moderation, tolerance, 
reserve and modesty in one’s day-to-life; or to have knowledge of the famous 
people of contemporary Britain, and of currently popular modes of speech, 
dress and food; or to be familiar with the key social and political institutions of 
modern Britain, and the essentially rationalist, individualist norms which 
underpin them’ (Jacobson, 1997, 193). Cultural Britishness, thus, has multiple 
meanings and can be imagined as a continually shifting blend of the above 
components. 
 
The participants’ strong affiliations with their home countries and exclusion 
from “racial” Britishness and Europeanness, did not preclude 
acknowledgments that they had adopted elements of British culture to such 
an extent that it had become part of who they are. ‘I’ve changed many ways 
in Britain. The clothes I wear, I like to go out to party, have fish and chips, 
cheesy chips [laughs] I do the same things as my British friends’ explained 
Velislava (F: 19: Bulgarian Roma) . Similarly, Ina (F: 26: Romanian Roma) 
said ‘I say sorry all the time now [laughs]. When I first moved here I was 
wondering why are British people so polite? Why do strangers say hello? Now 
I smile, I say ‘hello, how are you?’ I’ve become very British in that way.’ Unlike 
the conscious efforts to assimilate discussed in chapter four, which were 
employed as a means to which avert otherness, in this case it was due to the 
fact that they have lived in Britain for some time that these attitudes, values or 
cultural characteristics have become important to who they are. They can be 
described as an unconscious by-product of their post-migratory lives in Britain. 
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The participants adopted these “British” behaviours and, as a result, felt often 
as attached to Britain as they did to their home countries.  
 
Cultural differences remain, however, at the root of “everyday” hostility in the 
participant’s neighbourhoods. Many of the participants noted that their non-
Roma neighbours were unhappy with the practices of the Roma community. 
Ina (F: 26: Romanian Roma) noted, ‘you will see very often Roma socialising 
in large groups on the street and this has become a big issue for local 
residents, they say it is threatening, noisy… in our countries it is very normal 
to socialise in this way in our villages’. Natalia (F: 29: Slovakian Roma) added, 
‘there has been issues between Roma and other locals about rubbish… where 
most Roma have come from, they don’t have the bin service like we have here 
and so at first they were leaving rubbish on the streets and it caused a lot of 
anger’. Such tensions have been the subject of media attention and there 
have been numerous articles and documentaries which have drawn attention 
to the “clash of cultures” in neighbourhoods with large Roma populations.   
 
Katarina and Monika live in an ethnically diverse suburb of South Yorkshire 
with a large Pakistani population. They have both experienced conflict with 
and hostility from their neighbours which has been rooted mainly in cultural 
differences. Their neighbourhood has frequently featured in newspaper 
articles and has featured on television documentaries which sought to 
highlight tensions between the Roma and Asian communities: 
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Katarina (F: 21: Slovakian Roma): I know that I try very hard with 
them [Pakistani community] but there no be harmony for us. When 
I see them its provokácie [provocation], never ending. They know 
you Cigán, Gypsy, they see you, they know. They provoke you 
because you Gypsy. They want to make you feel very little and it 
make me very angry.  
 
Monika (F: 47: Czech Roma): It’s very painful to see neighbours in 
newspapers, the news of the television, saying very bad things 
about us, lies about us. I’ve been told the British say very same 
things about them when they move to England. I think they would 
be more welcome to us, more pleasant, but they are nasty people, 
they hate Roma. I say I’ll be more Roma, I’m not coming invisible 
because they do not like Gypsies moving to their small Asia.  
 
These tensions undoubtedly have an impact on the participants’ sense of 
belonging or “feeling at home”. Many of the participants noted that such 
tensions had brought them closer together with their Roma neighbours from 
other parts of Europe to whom they considered having a cultural “connection” 
with. Pavel (M: 25: Slovakian Roma) stated ‘we can become quite segregated 
in our areas because we have no connection with the other communities in 
the neighbourhood’ and Marija (F: 24: Slovenian Roma) added ‘they [other 
residents] don’t make you feel welcome so you tend to stick to your own’. 
While participants considered cultural exchange a positive feature of living in 
a multi-ethnic neighbourhood, they believed that the various cultural traditions 
and behaviours attached to different ethnic groups, acted as a barrier to social 
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cohesion. For example, Janka (F: 26 Slovakian Roma) noted that Muslim 
residents had been unhappy with groups of young Roma drinking on the 
street, while Velislava (F: 19: Bulgarian Roma) indicated her parents felt it 
inappropriate for her to socialise with non-Roma residents given that she is 
expected to marry within the community. Nonetheless, the majority of the 
participants expressed a desire to build relationships with other local 
residents, albeit they felt the onus was on non-Roma residents to initiate 
interaction. Nevertheless, Ina remains positive that the tensions between 
Roma and other minority ethnic communities will in time reduce, stating: 
 
Ina (F: 26: Romanian Roma): At first it was very hard for both 
communities to get along but many Asian people are reaching out 
to us, who recognise something of themselves in us and I do think 
we will learn to co-operate, to get along.  
Roma Notions of Homeland 
As explored in Chapter Two, the (re)discovery of an Indian homeland has 
been central to the Romani nationalist movement with the IRU (no date) 
drawing on common roots to establish a sense of groupness. The idea of 
shared Indian origins has been employed in an attempt to fashion a collective 
identity which can transcend the geographical, cultural and linguistic 
boundaries that divide the Romani population.  Romani nationalists, thus, 
seek to cultivate a diaspora consciousness to which a collective memory, myth 
or idea of a homeland is elemental (Safran, 1991; Brubaker, 2005). The notion 
of an Indian homeland was central to the narratives of participants who identify 
as Romani nationalists. Zusana (F: 48: Roma) explained, ‘India is our 
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homeland, it is the birthplace of our language’; Anastasija (F: 19: Roma) 
added, ‘We are from India, we travelled through the Middle East to Europe’; 
while Roman (M: 31: Czech Roma) suggested ‘we are stateless people of 
Indian origins… India is our motherland’.  
 
The majority of Roma participants, however, had little, if any, knowledge of 
the Romanies’ Indian origins. Rozalina (F: 38: Bulgarian Roma), for example, 
explained ‘I didn’t know this, I learn this today. This is very interesting’. Monika 
(F: 47: Czech Roma) added, ‘I heard India before but I don’t know a lot of 
things about this’. Others explained they had become more aware of their 
ancestry since moving to Britain.  Katarina noted ‘I come to UK and I learn 
many things. I learn about India and this makes much sense to me’. Similarly, 
Miroslav (28: M: Slovakian Roma) stated ‘…we learn much about the journeys 
of Roma from India to Scotland. This is very interesting to me; I did not know 
these histories before’. The relatively recent increase in the consciousness of 
Indian origins amongst the Roma suggests that collective Romani identity is 
rooted in neither myth nor memory of a homeland. 
 
Their narratives echoes the research of scholars, such as Marushiakova and 
Popov (2000), who argue that the Romanies have defined their homeland in 
various inconsistent and conflicting ways, with the narrative of Indian origins 
rarely being passed down from  generation to generation. Ivana, for example, 
situates the Romani homeland in Egypt:  
 
Ivana (F: 52: Roma): I don’t believe this Indian thing, this is new, it 
isn’t the story we know. To me, the Gypsies were Jews that 
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followed Moses from Egypt and were separated and continued to 
travel away from Egypt. Gypsies and Jews have very similar 
culture, music, journey through Europe, and very same experience 
of hate and suffering. Gypsies are chosen people….Gypsy comes 
from Egyptian.  
 
Her account of Romani origins was shared by many of the participants. 
Indeed, in response to questions about the Romani homeland, Egypt was 
cited more often by the participants than India. The participants do, therefore, 
appear to ascribe to a notion of diaspora and were largely aware of their 
history of dispersal. They nevertheless were unable to locate an agreed land 
of origin and had no clear account of their ancestry let alone their Indian 
origins. Petra (F: 49: Slovakian Roma), for example, spoke of the Roma as a 
“scattered” people but did not locate a homeland: 
 
I can see Roma as people scattered throughout the world, so yes, 
we come from the same. I don’t know where this place is the same 
– you say India, she say Egypt, I think just I am Slovak. I know our 
home start somewhere else. We scattered across the world over 
history.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars such as Hall (1990), Gilroy (2000) and 
Clifford (1994) argue that diaspora consciousness does not necessarily entail 
an emotional investment in a territorial homeland. Rather, the processes of 
dispersal, displacement and suffering can play a significant role in the 
formation of diasporic identities. It is clear from the narratives that the 
- 192 - 
participants have a sense of “we-ness” regardless of their awareness of an 
Indian homeland. As Petra’s narrative suggests, the dispersal of the Romani 
people does not have to be understood as rooted in a defined geographical 
territory. Indeed, the location of a Romani homeland was of little importance 
to the participants. 
 
Teodor (M: 27: Kosovan Roma): I mean it’s interesting to read 
about our history but it doesn’t really change the way I think about 
myself. I’m Kosovan, like for me that is my homeland, and now I 
live in England and I tell my children about our past in Kosovo, 
Serbia, because it’s fact and proven, I was there. India is not part 
of my history and I don’t even think it is proven without a doubt.  
 
Efraim (M: 68: Bulgarian Roma): Roma, especially now, we don’t 
need very long histories because like myself I was born in Bulgaria, 
I have worked in Germany, I have been here in England a long 
time. I know I have grandparent from Turkey. Here I trace my 
origins to more recent places and these I see as homelands… we 
have had many homelands.  
 
For Teodor and Efraim, the Indian homeland is a remote past and somewhat 
irrelevant to the present. Their identities are rooted in lived memories and 
homelands are traced back only a few generations. As Efraim implies, the 
increased mobility and migration of the Roma has meant that understandings 
of home are rooted in the present and recent past, with their home countries 
being considered their homelands. A notable divergence from this is 
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observable in the narratives of Velislava and Simeon, both of whom are 
Bulgarian “Muslim Roma”. As opposed to seeing Bulgaria, or indeed India, as 
a homeland, they consider Turkey their homeland. Velislava (19: F: Bulgarian 
Roma) explained:  
 
You visit my village in Bulgaria, you see that we very like much 
Turkish culture, speak Turkish. The big satellite to get the Turkish 
TV and music. We think really we are Turkish people, that we come 
from Turkey, so Turkey maybe homeland and not India.  
 
What is clear is that the Roma’s understandings of homeland are not 
heterogeneous. Hall (1990) urges us to recognise the differences and 
discontinuities which shape diaspora identities (see Chapter 2). Groups are 
divided along lines of class, sexuality, gender, country of residence, country 
of origin etc. and, thus, each participant will navigate feelings of “home” 
differently. Indeed, the above narratives suggest that the participants’ 
understanding of homeland differs depending on their country of origin, 
religion and migratory history and, as Hall suggests, they are under constant 
transformation. The Romany Gypsies, on the other hand, do not have a history 
of migration which poses the question of whether they will have stronger 
identifications with the notion of an Indian homeland. The remainder of this 
chapter will explore the concepts of home and homeland in relation to Romany 
Gypsies.  
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Home is Everywhere and Nowhere  
The term “Gypsy” infers that mobility and rootlessness are central to Romany 
Gypsy identity thus distinguishing them from the settled population, to whom 
home is a physical space within fixed regional and national boundaries.  
Nomadism, however, does not signify that Romany Gypsies do not have a 
home, or indeed “homes”, but it does imply that understandings of diaspora 
and homeland will be problematic when applied to the Romany Gypsies 
(Toninato, 2009). Scholarly understandings of nomadism and mobility tend to 
prioritise their physical aspects, given that they are written from the 
perspective of sedentary societies (Toninanto, 2009) and often, therefore, 
overstate Romany Gypsies detachment from place.  
 
In response to the question “where is home?” the participants referred to a 
multitude of physical locales. ‘My grandparents were from down south, round 
Dorset way’ said Max (M: 20: Romany Gypsy). Dale (M: 32: Romany Gypsy) 
explained ‘I’ve lived in Doncaster, Hull, Salford… my Nan was from 
Shropshire…we’ve always travelled round the Midlands too’.  Melody (F: 30: 
Romany Gypsy) added ‘My Granny is actually Scottish, we were well known 
up in Aberdeen but my dad’s folk were always Yorkshire, York way and down 
the coast’. These narratives can be described as memories of where home 
has been. Collective histories and memories of “homes past” reaffirm nomadic 
identities and maintain connections to fixed physical locales that the 
participants continue to visit and feel attachment to. Participants often spoke 
of having strong attachments to towns, such as Appleby, Kenilworth and 
Scarborough, in which horse fairs have been held for generations.   
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The participants discursively construct their nomadism as a journey from 
where home has been, where it is now, and where it will be in the future. 
Narratives of the past are often rooted in nostalgia for the nomadic lifestyle 
that has since been lost. Homes of the present, such as, “bricks and mortar” 
accommodation, are often viewed as undesirable and impermanent, as will be 
discussed later in the chapter. As such, participants are always often 
considering their “future homes” whether it be a return to a more nomadic 
lifestyle or a Gypsy and Traveller site, etc.  For James, 
 
James (M: 20: Romany Gypsy): ….home is everywhere and 
nowhere. When I travel I’m happy. Wherever you are in the country 
there are memories, family, friends. Freedom - that is home to me 
and I can find it anywhere but the problem is I’m not allowed it. We 
can set up home anywhere but we know we’ll be moved on in a 
day, a week, a month, or chased out of neighbourhoods, so is it 
really home or is it someone else’s home? 
 
For Romany Gypsies, notions of “home” are complex. The participants shared 
narratives of liminality, displacement and instability in which home is not fixed 
nor guaranteed. Nicole (F: 31: Romany Gypsy) explained, ‘…in the last two 
years I’ve been moved on probably fifty, sixty times. We don’t know where 
we’ll be calling home from one week to the next’. Ben (M: 26: Romany Gypsy) 
added, ‘we have homes, just nowhere to put them’. The participants refer here 
to the multitude of legislation aimed at curbing the nomadic way of life (see 
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Chapter 1). They have all, to varying degrees, been the object of legislative 
control and regulation and spoke at length of their experiences of eviction and 
displacement. Such legislation has instigated, over the past three decades, a 
decline in the traditional nomadic lifestyle. As Frank (M: 49: Romany Gypsy) 
explains: 
 
I’d say since the 80s really, with the troubles with the New 
Travellers, it’s been hard to travel like we used to. The Romany 
way has been ruined with law after law. You can travel, sure, but 
stopping you know council will be down by the end of the next 
working day serving you notice, legal action and all that. It just ain’t 
like it was before, we don’t travel like we used to. We’re not the 
same people we were, we’ve lost something, communities, 
families, torn apart.  
 
Sedentarism is deeply embedded in Western modernist thinking in which 
nomadism has traditionally contradicted the physical fixity of home. The 
increasing regulation of Romany lifestyles demonstrate that Romany 
mobilities are considered undesirable and as something that must be brought 
under control. As Frank’s narrative implies, legislation has not only enforced 
physical restrictions on mobility, but has curbed their opportunities to maintain 
community and family networks. This arguably is an attempt to weaken 
collective Romany identities. Indeed, as McVeigh (1997, 2) argues the 
Romany Gypsies ‘very existence threatens, undermines, “invades” sedentary 
identity’. Policies of spatial exclusion, as discussed in chapter one, have 
always been employed to keep poor, white, marginalised groups apart from 
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the wider, respectable, white population. Policies towards the Romanies, 
however, go far beyond spatial confinement and instead encourage 
assimilation and sedentarisation (Mayall, 1988).   
 
Legislation has thus sought to constrain Gypsy and Traveller identity. 
Changes to planning policy, quietly introduced in 2015, prevent Gypsies and 
Travellers from settling on permanent Gypsy and Traveller sites unless they 
can prove that they maintain a nomadic lifestyle (see chapter 1). 
Consequently, in order to retain their ethnicity, Romany Gypsies must travel 
for part of the year despite facing increasing legislative restrictions on their 
mobility. Peggy (F: 47: Romany Gypsy) explains: 
 
It’s a catch-22. We can’t travel because of the laws they made but 
if we don’t travel they’ll take our ethnicity away from us and say we 
can’t live on sites anymore. Being a Gypsy is something you’re born 
as, not something you can become. If I don’t travel I’m still a Gypsy 
but not in the eyes of the law.  
 
Legislation, thus, assumes the continual movement of Romany Gypsy families 
between permanent sites, despite the willingness of some, including the 
majority of the participants, to establish and settle in permanent homes on 
Gypsy and Traveller sites. It is not only their mobility, therefore, that disrupts 
the settled populations’ understandings of home, but their immobility as well. 
Even when settled in Gypsy and Traveller sites their presence is deemed 
problematic. Many of the participants referred to instances of hostility between 
Gypsies and Travellers living on sites and local residents. Mary (F: 43: 
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Romany Gypsy) explained she found it hard to ‘feel at home’ in such an 
environment:  
 
There was a lot of opposition to the site being here, there still is. 
We get a lot of trouble, they don’t want us here and, to be honest, 
I don’t want to be here either. I mean, it gives me security. I know I 
have somewhere to put my trailer but the trouble we get from the 
gorjers is not a nice way to live… I’m trapped, I ask God where can 
I go? I have to stay here because there aren’t any other sites, I 
can’t travel. It’s not the home I want, I don’t feel at home… 
 
The opposition and hostility from Mary’s neighbours can be explained in terms 
of the boundaries of whiteness discussed in chapter one. Mary’s non-Gypsy 
neighbours seek to defend their homes and neighbourhoods in response to 
the “invasion” of abject white others who appear to threaten the boundaries of 
whiteness. Whiteness is equated with sedentarism – an ideology that is rooted 
in territory. Sedentarism implies civilisation and progress whereas nomadism 
is seen as backward and wild. In this way, it upholds and justifies orientalist 
thinking and nomadism is marked as a non-white lifestyle. The only way to be 
accepted in British society, therefore, is via full assimilation. As Bancroft 
(2005, 91) argues, ‘Gypsies either have to stop being Gypsies (spatial control) 
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Assimilationist policy has led to the forced settlement of Romany Gypsies into 
housing. For many of the participants, “bricks and mortar” housing is 
considered a source of deep shame: 
 
Melody (F: 30: Romany Gypsy): We only stopped travelling 
because my mum got cancer….then we had to sell the trailer 
because there was nowhere to keep it here…I don’t really want to 
unsettle the kids from school now…we’re not staying in a house 
forever, when my mum’s better we’ll be travelling again.  
 
Chloe (F: 22: Romany Gypsy): I couldn’t get the kids into school 
when we was travelling…when they’ve done with primary school 
we’ll be travelling again.  
 
Both Melody and Chloe went to great lengths to justify their settlement into 
housing – family sickness, their children’s education, and so on. Likewise, 
other participants attempted to make the impression that settling in a house 
was a short-term solution to a specific situation. A decline in the nomadic way 
of life has signified for many the weakening of community cohesion and 
collective identity. Many participants expressed a feeling of isolation.  
 
Mary (F: 43: Romany Gypsy): It’s very sad to see, we’re just not 
like we used to be…when I grew up, we we’re one big community, 
you’d be travelling together, living in your extended family, 
travelling with friends…I think people are isolated now, in most 
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towns there’s only a handful of Gypsy families, if that…that kind of 
life, that kind of community, just doesn’t work when we’re housed. 
 
A decline in nomadism was associated with a loss of identity. Indeed, 
nomadism was considered central to the notion of “Romaniness”. In the 
absence of nomadism, Gypsy culture becomes hard to “practice” or “observe”. 
For James the transitioning into housing signified a loss of culture and loss of 
ethnic authenticity: 
 
James (M: 20: Romany Gypsy): My relationship with my family 
broke down to a point where I couldn’t live there anymore. I hate 
living in a house, sometimes I just stop and think what the hell have 
you become? I don’t feel like a Gypsy, I’m like ashamed almost, I 
don’t travel. I don’t stay in my trailer, I barely see other Gypsies 
anymore, I just honestly don’t know who I am anymore...like when 
people refer to me as a Gypsy I feel like a fraud…. 
 
As the above narrative demonstrates, the impact of forced settlement can be 
profound and those who have made the transition to housing can suffer from 
a unique sense of imprisonment and physical oppression. Indeed, many of the 
participants stated that the most routine features of bricks and mortar 
accommodation - for instance, staircases, walls, doors, etc. – can provoke 
anxiety and depression. For many participants, housing was somewhat 
suffocating or claustrophobic compared to the relative freedom of nomadism.  
This is in spite of the fact that houses were often substantially larger than their 
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old trailers, caravans or homes. Not only is it difficult to adapt to this new 
environment, the transitioning to housing often involves feelings of grief and 
loss. 
 
In spite of assimilationist policy, nomadism remains, both on an intragroup and 
intergroup level, one of the fundamental and observable markers of Gypsy 
ethnicity and an innate characteristic differentiating Gypsies from the wider 
population. As Liegeois (1998, 53) explains, ‘to travel, to be “a Travelling 
person”, is an essential identifying symbol for those concerned’. Or as Frank 
(M: 49: Romany Gypsy) puts it: ‘just because we’re in houses, it don’t mean 
we’ve stopped travelling’. It appears, then, that the notion of nomadism can 
survive its physical demise. It holds various different meanings, with different 
participants emphasising economic, social, cultural and psychological 
understandings of nomadism. Nomadism is, therefore, as much a state of 
mind as it is way of life. What is palpable is that nomadism is far more than a 
lifestyle choice for these participants. Such a line of reasoning necessitates 
consideration of both nomadism in the physical sense, as a practical and 
preferred socioeconomic existence, and nomadism in the “emotional” or 
“spiritual” sense.  
 
This is captured in the following quote from James: 
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James (M: 20: Romany Gypsy): In the world of the gadze8 it’s all 
about land and property. This is my house, in my town, and it cost 
this much and I work a boring job that makes me miserable so I can 
have my piece of Britain. That’s my idea of hell. It’s the opposite of 
nomadism. Nomadism can be, you know, travelling but there’s also 
the aspect of being free from all that bullshit. Not wanting land, just 
wanting to be free to go and explore the land, to work wherever, to 
live wherever, to sort of reject that very British aspiration of owing 
bricks and thinking it makes them successful. I never want that. 
That feels like prison to me, I just want to feel free.  
 
The above narrative illustrates that nomadism comprises an emotional as well 
as a physical domain. As James states, it signifies freedom from the “official” 
or “bureaucratic” world. His account of nomadism, however, somewhat 
bolsters the romanticised notions of the Romanies that were propagated by 
the Gypsylorists which paint them as quaintly rebellious free-spirits ‘living a 
natural, alfresco existence in the highways and byways…’ (Holloway, 2005, 
355). Indeed, at times, it was hard to move beyond such idealised 
understandings of the Romanies, as many of the participants themselves 
appeared to be “buy into” these romanticised stereotypes. By portraying 
Romany Gypsies as an unreservedly travelling people they are understood as 
rootless others, distinct from the wider population. They are considered, 
therefore, not as a people at home in Britain, with attachments to physical 
                                            
8 Non-Romanies 
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places, but as “guests”, “strangers”, or “invaders”. With this in mind, the 
participants’ feelings of “Britishness” will now be explored. 
Feelings of Britishness amongst Romany Gypsies 
Tara (F: 35: Romany Gypsy): I’m only British because I was born 
here. I don’t identify with it...the whole proud to be British thing just 
isn’t me…it just doesn’t raise the same feelings I get when I think 
about being Romani, it’s just a fact of life.  
 
Max (M: 20: Romany Gypsy): I see myself as British and I’m proud 
to British. I’m an English Gypsy. I was born here, my parents were 
born here, their parents were born here. You know, my 
grandparents fought for this country in the war…. I love this county. 
I’ve travelled every part of it…. I was born here and I’ll die here.  
 
These two quotes illustrate the two predominant approaches to Britishness 
amongst the Romany Gypsy participants. Both invoke civic definitions of 
nationalism which infer that everyone living in the territory of a state belongs 
to the nation, irrespective of their ethnic or cultural identity (Jacobson, 1997). 
Britishness, for the participants, is secured through being born in Britain and 
holding British citizenship and nationality. Civic Britishness, however, 
provoked varying emotional responses from participants. For some 
participants, Britishness is an issue of minor importance. ‘It says it on my birth 
certificate - born in Britain. It doesn’t really mean much else to me’ said 
Melanie. As Tara inferred, this is perhaps due to strong feelings of 
Romaniness which offset the need for strong emotional attachments to 
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national identity.  Alternatively, it suggests that Britishness can remain an 
unacknowledged privilege and certainty for Romany Gypsies who, owing to 
their whiteness, do not occupy the same politically charged relationship with 
Britishness as migrants and people of colour. In this sense, Britishness can 
be “taken for granted”. 
 
Britishness evoked, for others, a deep sense of pride and patriotism. ‘I’m very 
proud to be British’ explained Sam (M: 28: Romany Gypsy), ‘Gypsies have a 
long history in Britain, we’re proudly British people’.  Here the participants 
define Britishness in terms of “racial” boundaries. Britishness is related to a 
common descent and history with the rest of the British population. What is 
more, the participants referred to cultural markers of Britishness such as a 
common language and common religion. Chloe (F: 22: Romany Gypsy) 
stated: 
 
You get all these immigrants coming here now that don’t speak 
English and we’re not like them, we’ve been here generations… we 
are British, we speak English, we were born here, we’re  part of 
Britain….not like these Muslims, we go to church.  
 
Chloe constructs boundaries here between a British “us” and a non-British 
“them”. She discursively positions Romany Gypsies into the category of 
Britishness by highlighting, what she considers, the important markers of 
Britishness. These include a traceable British ancestry, fluency in English, and 
following Christianity. History also becomes important for substantiating 
Britishness. The participants often, for example, referred to the role of Romany 
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Gypsies in WW1 and WW2. Narratives attached to defending the nation often 
evoke a sense of patriotism. This was palpable in the participants’ narratives: 
 
Johnny (M: 45: Romany Gypsy): Gypsies fought in both world wars 
just like every other British man, they fought for Queen and country 
and sacrificed their lives. That makes me proud that we fought for 
our country. It says a lot about us. We’re British, we love our 
country, we’ll die for our country.  
 
This essentialised understanding of Britishness is important. Unlike the Roma, 
Romany Gypsies can draw on a long historical legacy when making claims to 
Britishness and many of the participants expressed a strong national identity. 
It is paradoxical, therefore, that the same participants construct cultural 
Britishness as a barrier to inclusion. Max is critical of the notion of “British 
values”. Despite having a strong emotional attachment to his national identity, 
he considers British values and culture as impeding his access to Britishness:  
 
Max (M: 20: Romany Gypsy): I’m British as they come, my family 
are from Hampshire originally, nowhere else, but if I say I’m proud 
to be British then gorjers will be like well why don’t you act British 
then? You don’t have British values or British culture so you’re not 
really British. Like basically I can’t properly be British unless I live 
in a house and have these British values they always harking on 
about.  
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Like Max, many of the participants believed that they were excluded from 
Britishness not because they were assumed to have a “foreign” heritage, but 
because of their cultural otherness. As discussed in chapter one, notions of 
“otherness” are now increasingly grounded in assumptions about cultural, as 
opposed to racial difference. Gliroy (1991) and Hall (1998) refer to “new” or 
“cultural” racism in which differences in culture, ways of life, and morals and 
beliefs have overtaken biological characteristics as the main signifiers of 
difference. Cultural racism exploits these difference to construct a British norm 
or “British values”, used to condemn and marginalise cultural “others”, and 
justify cultural assimilation (Modood, 1997). Romany Gypsies, by virtue of 
their way of life, sit on the margins of cultural Britishness. A consciousness of 
cultural non-belonging, of an exclusion from Britishness, was shared by the 
majority of the participants and is illustrated in the following quote: 
 
Tommy (M: 35: Romany Gypsy): If you act British, you know live 
your life the way that it supposed to be British, then you’re going to 
go further in life in a lot of ways, like you’ll get a good job and all 
that and respect in society…they don’t see me as like them, like 
living a British life, the British culture, and that is part of your daily 
life and there’s no getting away from it.  
 
Tommy indicates that being defined and recognised as British remains a solid 
foundation for exercising one’s citizenship rights and accessing opportunities. 
Not being recognised as British negatively impacts one’s position in a society 
that is structured by unequal power relations between the dominant British 
position and the inferiorised minority position. Being defined or marked as a 
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minority suggests an inferior social status in which one is not recognised or 
accepted as equal to the dominant members of society. Lack of recognition 
has direct consequences, therefore, for the participants social and material 
lives. Many participants refer to an “exclusive” British identity and consider it 
impenetrable, even if changes are made to their cultural attributes:   
 
Shauna (F: 27: Romany): I’m born and bred in England but I don’t 
feel like I’m completely British, not because I think I’m like foreign 
or anything but because I’m surrounded by people who think I’m 
some kind of alien. Even if I didn’t live in a caravan, they’d not 
accept me as a real English person. Even if I changed my clothes 
and didn’t dress like a typical Gypsy girl, they’d think I’m not 
properly English.  
 
Experiences of discrimination entail the identification and awareness of the 
different physical or cultural markers that one has or lacks and the possibility 
or impossibility of obtaining them.  Living in Britain, whether from birth or 
through migration, certainly provides a baseline of rights, yet the respondents 
encounter informal exclusion from these rights in their everyday lives.  Shauna 
and Tommy refer to the ways in which their claims to Britishness are rejected. 
Their experiences imply a conflict and contradiction between the formal 
criteria for accessing citizenship rights and the informal criteria of who does 
and who does not belong to the “British identity”. Their dialogue above 
suggests that a sense of belonging is entangled with processes of inclusion 
and exclusion. Although there is a will to be accepted as British, Tommy and 
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Shauna appear to have lost hope in obtaining access to equal citizenship in 
the UK.  
 
The participants expressed frustration with the exclusivity of British society, 
making reference to the exclusionary experiences they encounter in their day 
to day lives. They live in a society which confronts them with a sense of non-
belonging. This is an acute and uncomfortable feeling that can be experienced 
in many ways. Naomi draws attention to the ways in which her claim to 
Britishness is contested and rejected: 
 
Naomi (F: 18: Romany Gypsy): Once I was coming home from the 
footie, down where we was stopping in our trailers, and some gorjer 
girls come up to me, they was from the village we was stopping in, 
and they’re shouting “fucking Pikey” and “fuck off back to where 
you come from” because I’m a Gypsy and I don’t belong in their 
village. You know I just told them to do one, just because they’re 
gorjers they shouldn’t think they own towns or whatever. To be 
honest, it happens all the time.   
 
In Naomi’s experience, being a “gorjer” – that is, being non-Gypsy – appears 
to be a central criterion for defining Britishness and who or who doesn’t 
belong. Nomadism is viewed as an occupation of land and the Romanies are 
labelled as intruders who confront the boundaries of Britishness. Naomi 
rejects the accusation of non-belonging and makes claims to Britishness. 
Nomadism, thus, challenges the boundaries of national identities and 
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citizenship and urges a redefinition of the boundaries of the British nation state 
that is composed of so many various groups.  
 
Interestingly, Naomi and a number of other participants implied that to some 
degree they exclude themselves from Britishness. When asked what it means 
to be British, Naomi responded ‘I don’t know, ask them [non-Gypsies]…’ 
Indeed, cultural understandings of Britishness left some participants feeling 
somewhat conflicted about their own Britishness. In response to the same 
question, Shane (M: 38: Romani) commented, ‘I was born In Britain so I’m 
British, but culturally I am a Gypsy, like I don’t really like British culture at all’. 
When asked what he does not like about “British culture”, he responded, ‘they 
treat their old really bad, putting them in homes, that is disgusting to 
me…young girls having sex and drinking…keeping themselves to 
themselves, like they’re scared of their neighbours, they just don’t have a 
community…’. To “opt out” of cultural Britishness is, evidently, one approach 
to challenging the imposition of otherness by the non-Romani majority. It gives 
rise to, what Castells (1997) termed, resistance identity which was discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
Romany Gypsy Notions of Homeland 
Shauna (F: 27: Romany Gypsy): I’ve been discriminated against a 
lot but one of the times that stands out is I heard a gorjer telling me 
“go back to where you came from, get out our country”. Like, I 
started to think, well where are we from? Where do we belong? 
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As Shauna indicates, homeland is considered an important marker of 
belonging and operates as a means through which to include and exclude 
people. The incident described above stood out to Shauna because Romany 
Gypsies were not viewed as belonging to the same homeland as the British 
people. This confronted her sense of belonging to Britain. Indeed, the issue of 
belonging was often evoked when the participants described their ideas of 
homeland. India was identified as self-evident Romani homeland by the 
majority of participants: 
 
Jessica (F: 20: Romany Gypsy): We’re originally from India, about 
six hundred years ago I think. We were chased out and we travelled 
to Europe and then came to Scotland… and that’s why people have 
always been suspicious with us, because we came over from India. 
They’ve done DNA tests, blood tests, it’s scientifically proven. Our 
language is Indian too.  
 
The participants recognise themselves as a dispersed people, largely of 
Indian origins. They appear, therefore, to have preserved a myth of their 
homeland. As discussed in Chapter two, this is considered of great importance 
to the formation of diaspora consciousness and identity (Safran, 1991 and 
Cohen, 1996). Their awareness of their origins seemingly contradicts previous 
research (see Hancock (1997) and Fonseca (2011) which suggests that the 
Romanies do not possess a collective memory or myth of a Romany 
homeland.  The participants accounts of an Indian homeland were not, 
however, a “memory” of a homeland passed down through generations. 
Rather, the notion of a Romani homeland in India was a relatively new 
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discovery.  Many of the participants had (re)discovered their Indian origins 
through events and workshops hosted by Gypsy and Traveller organisations, 
or through conducting their own research online. The development of Gypsy 
Roma Traveller History Month was also recognised as raising consciousness 
of their Indian connections. This is illustrated in the following discussion: 
 
Naomi (F: 18: Romany Gypsy): [Local Gypsy and Traveller 
organisation] are quite big on Gypsy history month now and that, 
it’s not bad actually cause I found out a lot about us. I think maybe 
I knew a little bit about India but I learnt most through them, like 
how we got from India to here.  
Mary (F: 43: Romany Gypsy): Well the kids are even learning this 
at school now. I know a couple school’s round here have done a bit 
about Gypsy history, you know with all the Roma moving in.  
Billy (M: 27: Romany Gypsy): Most folk got the internet now 
anyway, it’s all on Wikipedia, you don’t have to be reading books 
or owt. It’s pretty much common knowledge these days.  
Mary (F: 43: Romany Gypsy): See I don’t remember it being such 
a big thing when I was a girl. We definitely know more about it these 
days… I was told Egypt growing up,  
 
The above exchange suggests that knowledge and recognition of a Romani 
homeland has coincided with the growth of Gypsy and Traveller organisations 
and the subsequent success of initiatives, such as Gypsy, Roma and Traveller 
History month, which seek to educate the Romani community about their 
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history. It resembles, therefore, Hobsbawm and Rangers (1983) “invented 
tradition” given that a memory of an Indian homeland has not been preserved 
in popular memory. Rather, it has been popularised by Gypsy and Traveller 
organisations and activists. Collective Romani identity is thus unlikely to be 
rooted in notions of an Indian homeland. Nevertheless, as Mary implies, the 
notion of a homeland, albeit an Egyptian one, has been common to Romany 
oral tradition long before the theory of Indian origins was popularised.  
 
Annie (F: 74: Romany Gypsy): I don’t know if you’ve ever gone 
back in history, but when we was originally discovered in Scotland 
in the fourteenth century our title was little Egyptians. I can’t believe 
India would give us a title like that. I believe we came from Egypt, 
and that is what they called the nomadic groups that was travelling 
around their country. You know, I think it was quite an endearing 
name, which got corrected over the generations to Gypsy.  
 
Annie shows resistance to the academically acknowledged accounts of 
Romani origins. An Egyptian homeland has been important to her 
understanding of her ethnic identity. Indeed, many of the participants had 
been given a similar account of their origins by their parents or grandparents. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous research has indicated that the theory of 
Indian origins has failed to resonate beyond Romani activists and scholars. 
As Hancock (1997) explained, the Romani homeland has traditionally been 
situated in Egypt. Annie’s resistance to scholarly accounts of her origins was 
shared by other participants. Tara suggests it undermines the tradition of oral 
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storytelling amongst Romani communities, in which stories of Romani origins 
seldom include references to India: 
 
Tara (F: 35: Romany Gypsy): I think it’s a wee shame really, it sort 
of shits all over the stories that people like my mam told us growing 
up. There’s all sorts of stories out there about where we come from, 
I just don’t think this Indian thing, it sort of tells a lot of people that 
they’re wrong but who’s to say that these academics have any 
more proof than your old Gypsy lady telling her grandkids that the 
Gypsies come from Egypt.  
 
Similarly, Shannon questioned whether research into the origins of the 
Romani people was beneficial to Romani communities themselves. 
Throughout her interview she made a distinction between India, as an 
imaginary homeland, and Britain as a tangible homeland in which she lives 
and has memories of. She explains: 
 
Shannon (F: 58: Romany Gypsy): …I don’t identify with it 
[India]…you know I think we’re going into the realms of testing our 
DNA, which we can do these days, and find journeys our ancestors 
took, or we can pick some obscure place in the distance and say 
that’s me…we need to preserve our culture….and identity, our 
traditional ways as far as possible but this, this preoccupation with 
India, no I don’t agree with that.  
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Shannon’s criticism is important because it suggests there is not an innate 
bond between the Romanies and India just because scholarly research has 
“proven” a link. The bonds the participants have with certain places are 
contextually situated. Their identifications with home, homeland and place are 
historical, changeable, and adaptable given the socio-political factors that 
impinge on their personal and collective histories and experiences. As Hall 
(1990) argues, diasporic identities, too, are constantly transforming (see 
Chapter 2). The following quote illuminates the transitory nature of “home” and 
“origin” and highlights the political potential of the theory of Indian origins:  
 
Tony (M: 26: Romany Gypsy): When I found out [the Romanies 
were originally from India] it didn’t change how I feel about myself 
really. I still feel British, like England, Britain, will always be my 
home… but I didn’t just forget it either, you know? I’m interested, I 
do feel like it’s an important part of our history. I always said I’ll save 
up so I can travel to India and see where we’re from. I want to do 
like a pilgrimage, travel the route we took to get here.  
 
Tony’s desire to visit India indicates that new meanings can be assigned to 
places once they have been described as a homeland. His understanding of 
“home” has undergone transformation and, though he still sees himself as 
British, India and a history of dispersal have become important to his 
understanding of his Romani identity. The idea of “pilgrimage” to a mythical 
homeland was shared by other participants who also expresses a desire to 
return to India. Shauna (F: 27: Romany Gypsy) states ‘I’d love to go to India, 
I think it would be very spiritual to retrace our steps’ while Johnny (M: 45: 
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Romany Gypsy) said ‘I think I’ll go to India before I die, see where it all began’. 
They display, then, not a desire to return permanently to India, but a cultural 
identification or spiritual connection to India. They exhibit what Brah (1996, 
192) terms ‘homing desire’ (see Chapter 2). They do not long for permanent 
return. Rather, they seek to reconcile their Romani identity with its mythical 
and historical origins.  
Summary 
This chapter has focussed on the participants’ understandings of home and 
their sense of belonging to British society. The Roma maintain connections to 
their countries of origin and assert a strong sense of national identity. They 
consider British citizenship as a legal necessity, as opposed to a source of 
identification. In many ways they can be considered British “on paper only”, 
and have little confidence in ever being “accepted” into British society. Often 
this lack of belonging is rooted in cultural differences. Many Roma have faced 
hostility and conflict due to assumed cultural clashes between Roma and non-
Roma. Nevertheless, many Roma felt they had adopted aspects of British 
culture to such an extent that it had altered their identity and become part of 
who they are.  
 
Romany Gypsies, on the other hand, were largely patriotic and expressed 
strong attachments to their British identity. They draw on a long historical 
legacy when making claims to Britishness, in which a traceable British 
ancestry and history of military service are deemed greatly important. 
Nonetheless, they are critical of the cultural element of Britishness from which 
they feel excluded. In many ways nomadism sets Romany Gypsies apart from 
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the rest of British society. For Romany Gypsies, land is to be roamed over and 
not owned and, thus, it becomes difficult to find a “home” in Britain’s culture of 
sedentarism which has led to their forced settlement and isolation.  
 
Given that the Romanies strongly identify with their countries of origin, it is not 
surprising that they have little interest in, or even knowledge of, an Indian 
homeland. Needless to say, the minority of Roma who identified as 
nationalists spoke passionately of India. The majority of Roma, however, had 
very little knowledge of their supposed ancestry, whereas Romany Gypsies 
had learnt only recently of their Indian roots. Though the notion of an Indian 
homeland is gaining popularity, many participants instead located a Romani 
homeland in Egypt. What was clear is that distant homelands held little 
importance to the participants and national identities were largely rooted in 
lived memories or in the recent past. In the next chapter, the notion of 
homeland will be revisited, exploring diasporic claims to a Romani homeland 
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Chapter 6 
The Roma Nation 
This chapter will explore the extent to which participants support, or actively 
adopt, the ideology of Romani nationalism. It will focus on the concept of 
collective identity and attempt to measure the participants’ identifications with 
the “Roma Nation”. It will pay particular heed to the specific circumstances 
and contexts in which the greatest levels of groupness and solidarity arise. It 
will end by considering critiques of Romani nationalism and will explore 
alternative approaches to mobilisation.  
Narratives of Diaspora 
Of the fifty-two participants, just five identified as Romani nationalists. The 
adoption of such an ideological stance was often in response to the assumed 
exclusivity of other European national identities and in resistance to forced 
assimilation and attempted eradication of Romani culture and identity. To be 
“Roma” and to fight for the maintenance of Romani identity is one of the central 
concerns of Romani diasporic politics. For many years, Romanies in Britain 
have organised politically with aim to protect and preserve their culture. 
Irrespective of how they define themselves, however, they are defined by 
society as “Gypsies”. It is the Gypsy identity, a site of non-Britishness and 
otherness, which determines their position in society. “Gypsyness” is 
undesirable and is positioned as the negative counterpart of the British 
identity. Claiming “Romani” identity has, thus, become an active strategy for 
many Romanies to resist both the imposed Gypsy identity and assimilation. 
As Anastasija explains:  
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Anastasija (F: 19: Roma): Gypsy is like the n-word. People use it 
to slur us, it’s demeaning. Roma, Romani, this is who we really are, 
this is how we define ourselves, Gypsy is how we are defined by 
others.  
 
Anastasija is engaged in what Taylor and Whittier (1992) refer to as 
“negotiation” – that is, the process of resisting and/or redefining stigmatising 
stereotypes of Romani identity. For Anastasija, “Gypsy” represents 
stigmatised representations of the Romanies which portray them as inherently 
criminal, workshy and culturally backward. She instead adopts the term 
“Romani” or “Roma” – a counter-narrative which frames the Romanies as an 
ethnic group with a rich cultural heritage. It is this focus on ethnocultural 
heritage which was predominantly cited when defining the boundaries of 
Romani identity. ‘We are an ethnic group of Indian origins’ said Igor (M: 21: 
Slovakian Roma). Zusana (F: 48: Czech Roma) added ‘we share a language, 
culture and history’. Roman (M: 31: Czech Roma) elaborated ‘we are a people 
of Indian origins living as nomads as we travelled towards Europe… we share 
a philosophy on life, cultural traditions and a violent history of oppression’. 
Understandings of “who we are”, therefore, are territorially rooted in India with 
boundaries between Romanies and non-Romanies being drawn along cultural 
lines and historical narratives.   
 
Accordingly, this group of participants employ a diasporic identity frame which 
closely follows Safran’s (1991) territorially based definition of diaspora. As is 
seen in the above quotes, often their explanations of Romani identity begin 
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with reference to the Romanies assumed dispersal from India and subsequent 
journeys across the Middle East and Europe. Indian origins are thus a central 
marker of Romani identity, distinguishing them from other traditionally 
nomadic peoples. An Indian homeland is arguably a myth, with none of the 
participants retaining memories or lived experiences of India. Nonetheless, 
these participants feel a deep connection to India, as Frida (F: 43: Hungarian 
Roma) explains: 
 
I don’t know India, you know, I’ve never been, but I have very strong 
spiritual connection to India. It’s where it began… I do think it’s the 
homeland of my people so I feel very connected… It is my hope to 
go to India, to Northern India, to visit, you know, the ancestral 
home. 
  
Like Frida, many of the participants in this group had a desire to visit India. 
This is not to be confused as a longing to return, at least not in Safran’s 
understanding on the term. The participants do wish to return to India but as 
visitors or “spiritual tourists”, as opposed to settlers intending to (re)establish 
a Romani homeland. They exhibit Brah’s (1996) “homing desire” – not a 
longing to return, but a longing to maintain a cultural identification with the 
homeland. These participants consider it important to Romani identity to 
uphold a connection to India. Zusana (F: 48: Czech Roma) explained, 
‘…because over many years we have lost the connection to India, it is very 
important for us to teach our children and, of course, teach ourselves too about 
our ancestors’. They make considerable efforts, therefore, to maintain and 
restore the myth of the homeland.  
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Narratives of Groupness: 
Fundamental to Safran’s (1991) definition of diaspora is the manifestation of 
a collective consciousness and group solidarity. The participants who have 
adopted a diasporic identity frame are by no means ignorant of the divisions 
within the Romani community. As uncovered in Chapter 5, the majority of 
Roma participants had little, if any, knowledge of an Indian homeland, 
whereas Romany Gypsy participants displayed little emotional attachment to 
India despite having some awareness of its historical significance. A collective 
Romani identity and/or sense of solidarity is not, therefore, fashioned in 
relation to the homeland. What is more, the Romani people are deeply 
fragmented who, by consequence of their varying migratory paths, have 
differing lifestyles, customs and relationships with, and socioeconomic 
positions in, their countries of residence (Hancock, 1998; Marushiakova and 
Popov, 2004).  
 
Identifying as Romani reveals very little, therefore, about the extent to which 
the participants’ lived experiences fashion a sense of solidarity and/or 
collective identity. The task of participants engaged in diasporic politics, 
therefore, is to fashion a sense of “groupness” which transcends internal 
divisions. It is perhaps unsurprising, given their territorially rooted 
understandings of Romani identity, that these participants turn to the ideology 
of nationalism in an attempt to inspire groupness. Indeed, nationalist ideology 
necessitates setting aside differences within the group in favour of the nation.  
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In the process of constructing a “Roma Nation”, these participants are 
selectively preserving the narrative of Indian origins. Anastasija (F: 19: 
Slovakian Roma), for example, argues ‘the people believing we are from 
Egypt need correcting, this is a false story told by gadze… we need to teach 
all Roma our Indian origins’. Disregarding the process of creolisation, they 
also favour a version of Romani culture that is “untouched” by the cultures of 
European nation states. They downplay internal divisions, attributing any 
differences to forceful non-Romani influences: 
 
Roman (M: 31: Czech Roma): It is very important to remember that 
Roma were one people when they leave India and they are one 
people now. We are one language, one culture…let us look at the 
difference between, I give example, Roma in Czech Republic and 
Roma in Poland. They share Roma culture, very similar, they do 
not share the Czech culture, the Polish culture, the gadze culture 
that is forced on us with assimilation. This is what differs us, the 
gadze culture, not the Roma culture and Romani nationalism is to 
fight this, to fight assimilation, to practice Roma culture as it should 
be… 
 
The risk with such understandings of Romani identity is that they redraw the 
boundaries of “Romaniness” to exclude anyone lacking Romani culture, as 
defined by political entrepreneurs. What is more, they inevitably exclude other 
nomadic peoples subject to similar discrimination, stigmatisation and policies 
of assimilation. This becomes problematic in the British context given that 
Romany Gypsies have historically aligned themselves, at least in the political 
- 222 - 
sense, with the culturally similar Irish Travellers. For Anastasija, however, this 
is to the detriment of Romani unity: 
 
Anastasija (F: 19: Roma): I don’t join in activism organised by 
Gypsy Traveller organisations for purpose of Irish Traveller 
problems like Dale Farm. I join in activism when, I give example, 
the media and politician lie about Roma, example the story of Maria 
in Greece, Roma invasions of UK, and France expel Roma from 
the country to return to Romania and Bulgaria. Irish Traveller have 
problems yes, but it is not connected to the Roma and the Roma 
Nation…my father is more involved with problems of Irish 
Travellers but I don’t like that because it divides the Roma. The 
most important thing is…the Romani spirit and not Irish Travellers 
and the TV show they embarrass themselves on now.  
  
Anastasija describes what she believe should constitute the boundary of 
Romani identity and why collective mobilisations should be enacted through 
Romani nationalism. Her stance on Romani identity assigns Romani 
nationalism a rank above other forms of groupness that are based on Gypsy 
and Traveller cooperation. Here shared origins (identity based claims) are 
considered a greater source of identification than shared experience (interest 
based claims). Often this was related to a fear of being discriminated against, 
on an international stage: 
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Roman (M: 31: Czech Roma): It is important for the Roma to have 
something that unites us. We have our own culture, history that 
goes back further than many other groups, our own language. We’ll 
never be accepted as a distinct people by the international 
community if we’re not recognised as a nation – a figurative 
Romastan – where we can maintain our own culture, beliefs and 
values. It is only then the world will accept us. I don’t want to be 
associated with people like Irish Travellers – that is belittling. A 
people who live a backwards, idle life, who steal and rob, who turn 
their back on progress and have no distinct homeland from the Irish 
people. I don’t want to be associated with people like them because 
the Roma have good values. Just look at how people look at Irish 
Travellers – they are not ethnically distinct and they do not wish to 
make any effort at integration or adaption. I don’t want people to 
think of the Roma in a similar way.  
 
In the process of constructing the boundaries of the nation, Gamson (1997, 
80) argues that an “us” is defined ‘not just against an external them but also 
against thems inside’ (see Chapter 2). At present, Britain’s Roma and Romany 
Gypsies are incorporated under the umbrella term of “Gypsies and Travellers” 
and are represented at a political level accordingly. For Romani nationalists 
this is problematic given that such a constituency does not share an ancestral 
homeland and cannot, therefore, make claims to nationhood. Roman and 
Anastasija mark Irish Travellers as undesirable “thems inside” who threaten 
the construction of a political constituency based on shared origins. Roman 
regards Irish Travellers and their negative representations (whether real or as 
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he imagines them) as a fitting example of the cost of not having a claim to 
nationhood. He uses their lack of a homeland distinct ‘from the Irish people’ 
to legitimise the Romanies as a nation. The Romanies, with their homeland in 
India, are thus enrolled into the alleged normative order of Europe while Irish 
Travellers remain, at least in Roman’s eyes, a social problem. 
 
He falls, then, into the trap of identity politics, as outlined by Butler (2004), 
which preserves a history of division. Using a homeland narrative, he 
distinguishes between those with the power to make claims (the Romanies 
with their territorial homeland) and those without power to make claims (the 
Irish Travellers). What is more, he privileges a specific form of Romani 
experience, namely one that necessitates that an individual must be well 
integrated and hold ambiguously defined “good values”. Roman, thus, 
impedes other experience of Romaniness that may include estrangement 
from society and a sense of unity or solidarity with Irish Travellers.   
Can We Speak of a Roma Community? 
Marushiakova and Popov (2004: 88) ask ‘how realistic is it to use the concept 
of community (let alone nation)’ to describe the Romani peoples. This 
research has already indicated relatively weak attachments to an Indian 
homeland and a diversity in lived experiences. This section describes the 
degree of unity among Britain’s Romanies through an exploration of the 
participants’ relationships with, and connection to, the wider Romani 
community. Two important questions to consider, therefore, are: to what 
extent is it possible to talk about a single “Romani community” and to what 
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extent do Romanies from different countries form their own separate Romani 
communities?  
 
If we turn, firstly, to the post-migratory networks of Roma migrants; many of 
the Roma participants moved to areas where they already had friends and 
relatives. These pre-existing networks continue to be important to them. 
Miroslav (M: 28: Slovakian Roma) explained: 
 
I have more in common with Roma from Slovakia because these 
persons have lived similar life to me, many arrive from same 
neighbourhood or nearby. And if I do not know them very well I 
probably know their family or have shared friendships… It was very 
useful to me when I arrive in Britain, they help to get me a house 
and job.  
 
Like Miroslav, upon arrival in Britain many of the Roma participants were 
already part of a wider Romani community which could provide them with 
support and advice. The Roma networks, in which the participants found 
themselves part of, replicated their pre-migratory social networks in their home 
countries. Arguably, then, Romanies in Britain are divided into several smaller 
communities, as opposed to one united Romani community. Indeed, 
participants from different parts of Europe did not feel that they had much in 
common. They often stressed their national identities and explained that 
Roma migrants from different parts of Europe organise on the basis of national 
belonging. For example, they rent houses in the same neighbourhoods, 
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pursue the same occupations and build social networks with Roma from their 
own countries.  
 
Muslim Roma often placed more priority on their religious affiliations as 
opposed to their Romani identity. The identities of Muslim Roma participants 
are influenced by their active involvement in British Muslim community life, 
which arguably strengthens their religious identities. Religion has an important 
function for these participants, who imagine themselves to be “Turks” 
regardless of their country of birth. Their religion is determined by their 
expression of a strong Turkish national identity, for example, Velislava (F: 19: 
Bulgarian Roma) said ‘I am Muslim because I am Turkish’. At the same time, 
their religious affiliation strengthened their Turkish identity. Indeed, through a 
common religion Muslim Roma felt an attachment to the Turkish people. In 
the following exchange, Simeon, who is Muslim, explained that Muslim Roma 
often feel they have more in common with Turkish people than they do other 
Roma.  
 
Simeon (M: 19: Bulgarian Roma): I think because we share a 
religion, we speak Turkish, we think of ourselves as Turkish first, 
Roma second. Turkish culture, pop culture, is a big thing, like more 
so than Roma culture. I mean, I know, you [non-Muslim Roma] look 
at us badly. 
Efraim (M: 45: Bulgarian Roma): I don’t look at you bad. I wonder 
when you say we are Turkish, we are Turks, we are Muslims, is this 
- 227 - 
because of shame to be Roma? I think this look disloyal to some 
people.  
Simeon: I don’t know, it’s a status thing… the end goal, it’s to be 
accepted as a Turkish Muslim not a Roma Muslim. Turks have 
better lives than Roma.  
 
Efraim indicts Muslim Roma of assuming a preferred Turkish identity in order 
to hide their Roma identity. As Simeon implies, by identifying as Turkish, the 
Muslim Roma strive to distinguish themselves from other Roma by embracing 
Turkish cultural and religious elements, thereby advancing their social status.  
Simeon later acknowledged, however, that Turks seldom accept Muslim 
Roma and continue to recognise them as Roma. Like Efraim, other 
participants viewed negatively the attempts of Muslim Roma to differentiate 
themselves from the wider Roma population. What is more, many saw the 
religious lifestyles and practices of Muslim Roma as weakening their ties to 
Romani culture and traditions.  
 
The participants often referred to a common Romani culture or shared Romani 
traditions but were often unable to define what these were outside the context 
of their own subgroup. Nevertheless, examples of universally shared customs 
and values included: the centrality of family and kinship, respect and care for 
the elderly, strong community spirit, observance of strict codes of cleanliness 
and purity, economic self-sufficiency, importance of marriage; music and 
storytelling, and remaining detached from non-Romanies. The participants 
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considered these shared characteristics as ethno-cultural makers that unite 
the community and that distinguish them from the non-Romani population.   
 
Roma participants felt they had more in common with other Roma, in terms of 
way of life, and lived experience of migration, than they did with Romany 
Gypsies. Indeed, cultural differences became most pronounced when 
considering the relationship between Roma migrants and Romany Gypsies. 
In the following exchange, these differences are discussed: 
 
Nathan (M: 26: Romany Gypsy): Do you see us as like the same? 
Yuliyan (M: 45: Bulgarian Roma): I not know for a long time that 
you are Romani, I think you are Irish because I watch Big Fat Gypsy 
Weddings and they say British Gypsies are Irish. I think we have 
some sameness in culture but I have more sameness with Roma 
from Balkans, East Europe.  
Rozalina (F: 38: Bulgarian Roma): I didn’t know Britain have 
Gypsies… your caravans are very different life to us… this is first 
time I meet British Gypsy so how do I know if we are same? 
Nathan: We have different lifestyles because you don’t travel. I 
think we have more in common with Irish Travellers, because they 
live a life on the road too… we have more of a history together.  
 
The nomadic lifestyle of the Romany Gypsies is considered one of the 
greatest differences between the lifestyles of Roma and Romany Gypsies. 
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The sedentary lifestyle of Roma migrants contradicts Romany Gypsy culture, 
to which travelling is central. Shannon explained that some Roma activists 
have been critical of the Romany Gypsy nomadic lifestyle and have argued 
that it should be eradicated. She revealed that some Roma activists have 
argued that ‘the cultural traditional way of life of Romany Gypsy people in UK, 
is not a desirable way of life and should cease’. 
 
 It is unsurprising then that, like Nathan, many Romany Gypsies identify more 
strongly with Irish Travellers whose culture seems more familiar to them than 
that of Roma migrants. Under government policy, Romany Gypsies and Irish 
Travellers have often been deemed a homogenous group. They have, 
therefore, similar experiences of regulation and discrimination. The two 
groups maintain close relations and often socialise at shared culture events, 
such as Gypsy fairs. What is more, participants noted that intermarriage was 
not uncommon. Given that large-scale Roma migration to Britain is essentially 
a contemporary phenomenon, the absence of a similar relationship between 
Romany Gypsies and Roma is not surprising. 
 
Rozalina points out that there had been limited opportunities for Roma from 
different countries to interact before they moved to Britain. For the majority of 
the participants, migration of Roma to Britain had been their first opportunity 
to meet Romanies from other countries:  
 
Rozalina (F: 38: Bulgaria): I only knew Roma who live in my village 
in Bulgaria and I came to England and I met Roma from England, 
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Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, all over Europe. Roma are a 
very big people, in Europe we are in every country and now we can 
come together. We are one Roma people in Britain and we can do 
a lot together.  
 
Mary (F: 43: Romany Gypsy): I never appreciated the size of the 
Romani population until, you know, we had a lot of Roma come 
here and they’re from so many different countries. This is the first 
time I’ve had contact with Gypsies from another country…it’s a big 
place out there, together we could probably be quite powerful.  
 
Romani migration across Europe can be understood in two ways. On the one 
hand it signifies diaspora and dispersal. On the other it signifies the integration 
of previously detached Romani populations, given that it builds a bridge 
between the different national boundaries that once divided the Romanies. As 
Rozalina and Mary state, many of the participants had never met Romanies 
from other countries before the increase in Roma migration. In Britain they 
have the opportunity to meet Romanies from across Europe. In Britain it has 
become possible for the Romanies to meet across national boundaries, thus 
providing an opportunity for the Romanies to extend their social networks and 
develop a sense of community that transcends national borders.  
 
It must be emphasised that the participants did, at times, express a feeling of 
unity. To a large extent, this was discursively expressed rather than 
experienced or practiced directly. Nonetheless, groupness is an event 
(Brubaker, 2004). It is felt intermittently and the participants expressed a 
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greater sense of unity in regards to some issues as opposed to others. The 
remainder of this chapter will explore the extent to which groupness 
materialises when invoked via a nationalist framework.  
Language Standardisation 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the objectives of Romani nationalism have been 
constructed around the reunification of the Romani diaspora. Their efforts 
have taken inspiration from traditional projects of nation building in which 
uniformity is often enforced via programs which aim to “regulate” the 
population and manipulate and mould subjects and their identities (Foucault, 
1980). The promotion of a common language is often cited as vital to this 
process (Kymlicka, 1997:28) and is central to Safran’s definition of diaspora. 
As discussed in chapter 2, there has never been a homogenous Romani 
language and there are many various dialects of the Romani language. Great 
efforts have been made by the IRU to determine and universalise a 
standardised Romani language (Acton and Klímová, 2001). For Zusana and 
Frida, linguistic pluralism contributes to the fragmentation of the Romani 
people: 
 
Zusana (F: 48: Czech Roma): It is very bad, Roma come to UK 
from Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania but we speak to other 
Roma in English.  My neighbour can be Roma but we do not have 
share language because Romani is very different in Romania and 
Czech Republic. In Czech Republic there is very many Romani 
languages, and in UK with very many migrants there is many 
Romani languages….this is similar but not always can we 
- 232 - 
understand, it makes us very separate…this would be better for us 
as people to speak the same language, one Romani language for 
one Romani people. 
 
Frida (F: 43: Hungarian Roma): Yes, there is true Romani 
language, it’s been spoiled by European languages mixing with it 
to make a crossbreed of language that is not true, pure 
Romani…the Roma nation has one true language, not crossbreed 
language, this is not Romani, this is what parts us.  
 
Frida’s reference to a “true” and “pure” Romani language raises questions 
about what counts as authentic Romani language, which Romani dialect 
should be used in projects of standardisation and who should decide such 
matters. There is a risk, therefore, that in the pursuit of the standardisation of 
a “true” and “pure” Romani language, scores of Romani people may be 
excluded from the notion of the “Roma Nation” depending on their proficiency 
in this supposedly authentic Romani dialect. Frida later referred to the Romani 
language as a defining marker of Romani identity and considered her own 
dialect of Romani as “purer” or more advanced than other “spoiled” dialects. 
The risk with such attitudes, as argued in Chapter 2, is they permit political 
entrepreneurs to certify who can and who can’t claim Romani identity.  
 
For Roman, the standardisation of Romani language is not about selecting a 
“true” or “authentic” dialect of Romani. Rather, he sees it as a necessity given 
the transnational space the Romanies now occupy: 
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Roman (M: 31: Czech Roma): I meet with Roma activists from 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Sweden, Romania, all over 
the world. We meet for one purpose, we are Roma, we are one 
people but we will talk in English because dialects of Romani are 
not mutually understandable. Now tell me this? Is it wrong to wish 
for an official Romani language? One that we can all understand 
and communicate in? It is very necessary in the international world 
we now live in.  
 
Roman’s concerns are not unfounded given that in the past two decades, 
there has been greater cooperation between Europe’s various Romani 
organisations in an attempt to coordinate and unify Romani rights activism. 
The lack of a standardised Romani language, however, often restricts the 
distribution of activist literature and publications to the national level. At the 
same time, it throws doubt to the Romanies diasporic claims. Safran (1991) 
argues a minority group that has been dispersed from its homeland cannot be 
considered a diaspora if they no longer speak the language of the homeland. 
Standardisation of language, thus, becomes a priority for political 
entrepreneurs framing Romani identity according to definitions of diaspora.  
 
Among the remainder of the participants, there was scepticism about the 
practicality of language standardisation. Michal (20: M: Czech Roma) noted: 
 
We don’t understand each other. Everyone not speak Romani and 
different types of Romani can be very different they are not easy to 
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understand. I not see how this can become one language when it 
is very different… official Romani language like this will not 
understand to everyone.  
 
As Michal explains, very few Romani people in Britain are able to 
communicate successfully between different dialects, thus questioning the 
feasibility of establishing a standardised form of Romani that is intelligible to 
the vast majority of Romani people. It is important to emphasise that some of 
the participants could not speak any dialect of Romani. Often these 
participants were from former communist countries where the Romani 
language had been supressed. Deshka (F: 35: Bulgarian Roma) spoke of her 
experience of growing up in Bulgaria: 
 
I was always talking Romani with my mother and baba but when I 
went to school in Bulgaria my teacher would hit me because I 
shouldn’t speak Romani… and I almost forgot Romani. And when 
I came to England I had to learn English… that’s why I can’t speak 
Romani now.  
 
James, a young Romany Gypsy noted: 
 
James (M: 20: Romany Gypsy): You know the problem for Romani 
people is that my English is better than my Romani. The Romani 
dialect here as we know it is very anglicised, almost a mash up of 
English and Romani… our culture changed, it became for 
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anglicised as well, through assimilation, through oppression... we 
don’t live as much in communities anymore where we get the 
chance to speak Romani… the younger generations are 
assimilated more. I am assimilated more than my grandparents. 
They think in Romani, not like me. I don’t like it though, I feel like 
part of me is missing in a way. I listen to Romani music, I read 
Romani books, I try to learn more of the language.  
 
Many other participants were in the same position of having to actively learn 
the langauge they felt they had been deprived of due to aggressive policies of 
assimilation. James attempts to recover an element of Romani identity he 
considers lost by listening to Romani music and reading Romani literature. 
Often the participants independent study of the Romani language had 
instigated a sense of groupness which often led to a degree of involvemnet in, 
or engagement with, Romani nationalism. In many nationalist movements, the 
revival of the national langauge has acted as a precurrsor to political 
mobilisation. In the case of the Romanies, the revival of the national langauge 
is closely linked to the emergence of a  politically united Romani diapora. High 
levels of illiteracy among the Romanies, however, makes the task of reviving  
the Romani langauge particularly arduous.  
 
For participants, particularly young Roma migrants, who felt they were forcibly 
assimilated into the culture of their country of origin, there has been a coming 
of awareness of their Romani idenity. Supressed in their home countries, their 
Romani identity has been (re)discovered after a period of sustained linguistic 
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and cultural education which, in the case of the Roma, has only become 
available to them as they have struggled to make sense of their lives in Britain. 
The effort to learn the language, and some case the culture, of the Romani 
people involves the (re)discovery of the past. A diapsoric Romani identity is, 
thus, actively being invented by linking elements of the past, present and 
future.  
A Community of Suffering 
In nationalist discourse, "suffering in common unifies more than joy does. 
Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than 
triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort" (Renan, 1990, 
p.19). Accordingly political entrepreneurs have attempted to rouse groupness 
by emphasising the Romanies shared history of suffering. Zusana argues that 
the aspiration towards a Roma Nation is related to sufferings and atrocities 
that the Romani people have undergone: 
 
Zusana (F: 48: Czech Roma): My Roma identity is very, very, 
important to me. I don’t want the Roma to be forgot and this is why 
I call myself Roma. I leave Czech Republic because I am Roma 
and this is the only reason I leave. The independence of Czech 
Republic was very bad for Roma. A lot of very bad racism and Nazi 
groups, you understand these people very right wing, they very like 
Nazis. I don’t want this to be forgot….  
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For Zusana, it is becomes important to recognise the Romanies as political 
subjects. Her experience of fleeing the Czech Republic – as someone 
subjected to oppression, suffering and forced migration – is an important 
argument to legitimatise Romani claims to a national identity.  Anastasija, like 
Zusana, politicises the suffering of the Romanies and uses this as a source of 
political justification for a Roma nation.  
 
Anastasija (F: 19: Roma): Hundreds of thousands of Roma were 
murdered with the Jews by the Nazis. This we can say is the 
summit of our suffering, but we suffered a long time before this and 
a long after this…our Jewish friends live prosperously in Israel, 
they’ve been, this sounds tactless, but compensated. What did 
Roma receive? Late apologies and more suffering…the Porajmos9 
should be remembered by Roma and the world…for this reason 
alone we should be recognised as a people, a nation.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the “victim narrative”, which positions the 
Romanies as the objects of perpetual suffering, is an effective strategy of 
ethnopolitical mobilisation. Zuzana and Anastasija employ a “victim narrative” 
to make the case for Romani nationalism and, as Anastasija alludes to, 
present their demands for official recognition as an ethnic minority and nation. 
Their narratives are redolent of Brown’s (1995) “politics of ressentiment”. 
Anastasija, in particular, implies that the Romanies should be recognised as 
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a nation precisely because they are a historically subjugated people deserving 
of compensation. This confines the Romanies to a position of victimhood 
which, as argued in Chapter two, leads to the internalisation of victimhood as 
an ‘unchanging reality of life’ (PER Report, 1992, no pagination). This is 
reflected in Anastasija’s narrative:   
 
When you think of the big moments of Roma history… it is the 
moments that we were treated the very worst, fleeing India, slavery 
in Romania, Nazi regime, in the past, and in the more recent times 
the sterilisation of Roma woman, destruction of our homes and 
neighbourhoods, young Roma children placed in state institutions 
and schools for the retarded…suffering is very real to us, it’s the 
only thing we can expect for certain for our future… 
 
Brown (1995) warns that identity-based politics rooted in victimhood ‘fix the 
identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions’, thus reducing the 
possibilities for resignification. This is detrimental to Anastasija’s own counter-
narrative of Romani identity, which aims to reposition stigmatised “Gypsies” 
as the Romanies - a stateless nation with a rich cultural heritage. Nonetheless, 
groupness materialised most strongly, among the participants, during 
discussions of collective suffering. Frequently, the participants referred to 
incidents of individual and collective suffering both in Britain and, in the case 
of migrants, their home countries. For the participants the acts of remembering 
together and memorialising the historic collective sufferings of the Romani 
people is vital to Romani identity and culture: 
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Yuliyan (M: 45: Bulgarian Roma): To be a Gypsy, a Roma, is very 
important to me. This is why I come to England. In Bulgaria it’s very 
difficult to be Gypsy, very racist, oppression, and I do not come to 
England to be English, to be British, I come to be Gypsy, to be 
Roma. It is not good…to forget who are you and your culture. We 
have much racism from the das10…we have been killed, assaulted, 
children take from parents to institution, very bad things, much 
violence. You hold this, you hold it in your heart, from child to adult.  
 
Shane (M: 38: Romany Gypsy): My granny always end her stories, 
kekkana bishano…the stories granny told me were about the 
Romani fowki, cast out of Egypt, cast out of every country we 
travelled…they made slaves of us, they beat us, they killed us, they 
cast us away…and she’d say kekkana bishano, never forget…later 
on, when it hit me, you know what the Nazis had done to our fowki, 
well that’s when I knew them words are important. Kekkana 
bishano, na bister…if we don’t tell our stories were forgotten…not 
just by the world but we’ll forget ourselves… 
 
Remembrance of suffering characterises Yuliyan’s experience of being 
Romani in Europe. He deems his personal experiences of racism and 
oppression in Bulgaria a reflection of the collective suffering of the Romanies 
across Europe. As Yuliyan suggests, racism and oppression are among the 
                                            
10 Non-Gypsies.  
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main reasons why the Roma have migrated to the UK and also why they 
should maintain their identity and culture. Being Romani, is considered by 
Yuliyan and Shane, to be synonymous with the suffering and oppression that 
the Romanies, as a group, are subjected to by non-Romani authorities across 
Europe. It is this victim centred narrative of Romani identity that acts as the 
motivating force behind the maintenance of Romani identity and culture, or as 
Yuliyan puts it, remembering ‘who you are’.  The suffering experienced by the 
Romanies has become a symbol of shared and on-going oppression that 
materialises in a deeply felt sense of groupness.  
 
Ethnic minorities, like the Romanies, who have been exposed to sustained 
oppression may have a strong need to maintain their ethnic identity. In such 
cases, assimilation is considered a threat to their political aspirations as an 
ethnic group, particularly if such aspirations involve the establishment of a 
nation state or national identity.  Within this victim centred narrative, 
assimilation is considered a victory for the oppressor. Collective suffering thus 
inspires collective action, as Madalina implies: 
 
Madalina (F: 22: Romanian Roma): It is important to know where 
you come from. If you know where you come from you will know 
where you belong and you will know your history. The Gypsies are 
very oppressed and this is very bad. We do not have country to say 
is ours. It is very important to know who you are, a Gypsy, and the 
history of the Gypsy people because we fight for equal rights and 
we need know Gypsy history and the bad situation in Europe.  
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As Madalina argues above, an awareness of Romani history and origins is 
related to the struggle for equal rights and freedom from oppression. 
Oppression, lack of a nation state, and a notion of statelessness reinforces 
the importance of knowing one’s roots, history and origins. The recording of 
history and the marking of origins are central elements to the nationalist 
project (Vali, 2003), as their discursive construction shapes how the present 
political situation is experienced. To gain legitimacy, it is vital to construct 
history as linear. A coherent Romani identity can connect the political 
challenges, sufferings and losses of the past to the struggle for a cohesive 
collective identity in the present.  
 
As argued in Chapter Two, the historical documentation of suffering is greatly 
valuable to the Romani nationalist project. As the above narratives have 
indicated, the suffering undergone by the Romanies has become a symbol of 
a shared and enduring oppression that offers the Romani people a foundation 
for solidarity. As Kapralski (1997) argues, the historical and contemporary 
suffering of the Romani people has the power to unite typically disparate 
Romani populations into a single group. For Melanie, a Romany Gypsy, 
collective suffering has influenced her identification with Roma across Europe:  
 
Melanie (F: 34: Romany Gypsy): I didn’t always feel that connection 
with Roma, they seemed very distant, it’s a different life, but when 
I hear what happens to them I feel closer, I want to fight for them, 
they go through the same shit that we live through too…we’re 
surviving together, it makes me proud… 
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Here Melanie relates the idea of collective suffering and survival to a sense of 
pride. Throughout the focus group session, Melanie had been very opposed 
to the notion of a Roma Nation. When framing Romani identity in terms of 
suffering, as opposed to origins, however, she, perhaps unknowingly, began 
to consider the prospect of a national Romani identity: 
 
Melanie: As a Rom, I have never had a really strong Romani pride 
in the same way that people can be proud of being English or 
Scottish or whatever, because we don’t have national identity like 
that. Like, we don’t have a country or anything, but I know that even 
though I was born in England, I am Romani. We have a lot of history 
behind us, like way more than some countries even, but we don’t 
have that same national mentality. Like, you’d never see a Romani 
team allowed in Eurovision or the Olympics.  
 
Ivana (F: 52: Roma): Eurovision makes me very upset actually. 
Only four times in the history, I think four, correct me if I’m wrong, 
has a Rom represent a country and I think only once a song in 
Romani. We are part of Europe, many, many years in Europe and 
we’re invisible, like we don’t exist. I know, I know, only Eurovision, 
but this is important to me. I would be very proud if Romani songs 
could have a place. 
 
Melanie: I actually would love that, to have Romani teams.  
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National identities are often understood in terms of shame and pride, with 
emphasis placed on achievements, visibility, defeats and losses. It is within 
this context we can understand Melanie’s account. Her reference to history is 
an argumentative tool that legitimises nationhood. Competitions, like 
Eurovision, are peaceful arenas for nations to conduct their struggle for 
recognition and also strengthen and reinforce national identity through 
defeating other nations. The absence of the Romani people within these 
events, as Ivana explains, intensifies the international invisibility of the 
Romanies and makes real their alienation and oppression. Given that Melanie 
and Ivana had both previously given little credence to the idea of a Roma 
Nation, it suggests that narratives of collective suffering are effective in 
generating groupness.  
International Romani Day 
International Romani Day was identified as another method through which to 
unite Britain’s Romani population. Observed annually on the 8th of April, 
International Romani Day, sometimes referred to as Roma Nation Day, 
celebrates Romani culture and raises awareness of the racism, discrimination 
and exclusion faced by the Romani people worldwide. Roman described the 
day as: 
 
Roman (M: 31: Czech Roma): …a day to stand together as a united 
people and show the world that they can’t oppress us longer. We 
are a Roma Nation but we are citizens of Europe and so on this 
day we ask for equal rights as Europeans. We protest racism, 
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discrimination, evictions, murder of our culture. It’s an important 
day. Roma brothers and sisters all around Europe, the world, stand 
together. We are united in solidarity.  
 
International Romani Day is often now a political manifestation which 
celebrates Romani identity and culture and promotes the notion of a Roma 
nation. The activities organised on this day, often marches and 
demonstrations, have a strong symbolic meaning for many of the participants 
– specifically Romani nationalists. The banners displayed at the International 
Romani Day event I attended carried phrases such as “Defend Roma Rights”, 
“Celebrate Diversity” and “Roma Welcome Here” and the Roma flag was 
heavily featured. One participants said: 
 
Natalia (F: 29: Slovakian Roma): Actually, International Romani 
Day is much more political these days. It’s not something that’s like 
cultural, it’s not a cultural tradition, it’s more of a political thing, or 
the celebration of Romani culture has been politicised because on 
International Romani Day, maybe you noticed, all these people 
organise marches and have signs that have political messages 
about unity, identity, racism.  
 
In attendance at the International Romani Day event I attended were 
Romanies from Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Britain suggesting that 
such events bring divided communities together. Nevertheless, among the 
majority of the participants, International Romani Day was not viewed as an 
important celebration. The events organised by various Romani organisations 
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were not well known or attended. Those participants who did regularly attend 
International Romani Day events felt the day was an important occasion 
during which Romanies from different countries could interact, build networks 
and organise politically. 
 
 My own impression is that the emotional and political element of International 
Romani day was most intense for new Roma migrants. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given the hostility they have received since moving to Britain and 
the absence, and often prohibiting, of similar celebrations in their home 
countries. As discussed in Chapter 4, after years of denial of their ethnicity in 
their countries of origin, all Romani cultural and political expressions achieved 
a greater importance in the post-migratory context. Romani identity becomes, 
by necessity, a political as opposed to a private issue because of the racism 
and discrimination experienced by the Roma.  
 
For Romany Gypsies, International Romani Day was of less importance and 
was often referred to as a “Roma” event. Tommy (M: 35: Romany Gypsy) 
stated, ‘there’s an event here every year but it’s mainly for them Slovakians’ 
while Rhiannon (F: 27: Romany Gypsy) explained, ‘it’s not something I’ve ever 
celebrated, I think it’s a Roma thing’. Other Romany Gypsy participants 
expressed concerns over the “authenticity” of International Romani Day, 
suggesting it was established and organised by non-Romani activists. Melanie 
was particularly critical of the organisation ‘8 April Movement’ which, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, is a direct action network which organises 
International Romani Day demonstrations :  
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Melanie (F: 34: Romani): This is the problem with the Roma nation 
thing; it’s mostly gorjers who are involved. The April 8th ones are 
the Dale Farm lot, its run by Grattan Puxon and well… 
Jessica (F: 20: Romany Gypsy): He’s imposing… 
Melanie: It certainly puts me off… 
 
Melanie and Jessica hint at the wider problem of community involvement in 
Romani and/or Gypsy and Traveller politics and activism. This is by no means 
a contemporary issue. The Gypsy Council, established in 1966, which has 
been described as pioneering in regards to the organised representation of 
Gypsy and Traveller communities in Britain, was ruptured by the perception 
that it had come to be dominated by non-Gypsy and Traveller activists. 
Indeed, its leading figures, such as Grattan Puxon, who was also involved in 
organising the first World Romani Congress in 1971 through which the IRU 
was established, were largely non-Gypsies and Travellers.  
 
Similar concerns were also raised by Roman who is critical of non-Romani 
involvement in Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller organisations, claiming they 
further oppress the Romani people: 
 
Roman (M: 31: Czech Roma): Gypsy and Traveller organisations 
in the UK are managed by gadze, non-Roma. They decide they do 
not like the Roma nation, they deny the Roma nation. They have 
time for Roma only when Roma live in caravan with Irish Travellers. 
This is all very focussed on Irish Travellers and they say we are the 
same and this not true, this is offensive. They deny the Roma 
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nation but will be very dishonest and say they are allies. Allies do 
not deny your struggles, they do not deny who you are and they do 
not speak for you and belittle you. This is oppression again from 
non-Roma.  
 
Roman touches upon what has been referred to as the “Gypsy Industry”. This 
is the idea that non Gypsies and Travellers, due to their expertise, are able to 
establish careers in supporting Gypsies and Travellers, while presenting the 
communities themselves with limited opportunities to get involved (Ryder, 
2011). More recently Gypsy and Traveller NGOs have experienced a change 
in dynamics, with an increase in the employment and involvement of 
community members (Ryder, 2011; Richardson and Ryder, 2012b).  
Narratives of Deterritorial Diaspora 
Among the participants were several frank critics of Romani Nationalism who 
indict Romani nationalists of relying on essentialised notions of origin. Echoing 
the critiques of cultural theorists, such as Anthias, Soysal and Hall (see 
Chapter 2), they refute nationalist claims that Romani identity can only be 
secured in relation to a territorial homeland in India. These participants do not 
contest the scholarly research that indicates an Indian origin of the Romani 
people. In fact, they demonstrated a great deal of knowledge of their assumed 
origins and journeys across the Middle East and Europe. They recognise, 
however, the dangers inherent in a nationalist ideology that essentialises 
India, as the mythical site of origin, and fetishizes the past. Asserting 
“sameness” by consequence of shared origins was, therefore, deemed greatly 
problematic: 
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James (M: 20: Romany Gypsy): They’re obsessed with India and 
it’s pointless, it literally has zero impact on our lives. You know, I’m 
convinced, yes, I think there’s truth in it [Indian origins] but it’s 
irrelevant to my life now because since then we’ve ended up in 
Europe, we’ve mixed with other groups, our culture has changed, 
it’s changed in my lifetime.  
 
James recognises the transformative nature of identity echoing Hall’s 
conception of identity, as discussed in Chapter 2, which positions it as 
continually in production. For these participants, far from being fixed in an 
essentialised past, Romani identity is subject to the continuous and 
transformative play of history, culture and power (Hall, 1990). They referred 
to the process of cultural transformation which takes place in an ever-
changing context. The relationships between the Romanies and their 
countries of residence, as well as their political and socio-economic status (in 
both home and host countries), refashion Romani culture and identities.  
 
Participants pointed to: a rise in marriage outside of the community and 
intermarriage with other nomadic groups; the adoption of non-Romani 
sociocultural practices whether voluntary, through necessity of modernity, or 
involuntary via assimilationist policy; and the rise of Romani mobility, as 
sources of cultural transformation and cross-cultural exchange. The 
interactions, whether positive or negative, between the Romanies and host or 
dominant cultural groups are a site for transformation. These participants 
understand Romani identities as an amalgam of the many cultural identities 
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that the Romanies have encountered since their dispersal from India. For 
them, therefore, there is no homogenous Romani identity to be recovered.  
 
Some participants were, thus, sceptical of reunification efforts: 
 
Mary (F: 43: Romany Gypsy): I think it’s an unhealthy obsession, 
we’re not the same. I mean, they can argue until they’re blue in the 
face that we’re all from India, I’m not disputing it, I just don’t think 
it’s that important…it’s important that our kids go to school without 
being bullied, for us to have secure places to live, to not be 
discriminated against…it doesn’t really matter what language we 
speak, of course we’re all different, that was thousands of years 
ago, why is it important that we should be the same and speak the 
same language? 
 
Efraim (M: 68: Bulgarian Roma): It is simply impossible to have all 
these thousands of people from all around the EU, around Europe, 
to have the same feelings of identity. I do feel very connected to all 
Romani people, we share many things in common, but the many 
differences is not a problem. We come together, Roma, Gypsies, 
Travellers, because we’re all treated the same, we don’t have to be 
the same to ask to be equal.  
 
For Mary and Efraim, unity should be built upon the Romanies shared 
experiences of racism and discrimination, as opposed to the homogenising 
and universalising rhetoric of shared origins. Cultural and linguistic 
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homogeneity is, thus, unimportant to their understandings of Romani identity. 
That said, while Romani nationalists regard the reunification of the Romanies, 
as a stateless nation of Indian origins, as a worthwhile end in itself, Mary and 
Efraim use Romani solidarity as a means necessary to free the Romanies 
from racism and discrimination. The emphasis is on the language of human 
rights, as opposed to nation building, and the narrative of shared origins is 
eclipsed by a narrative of shared oppression. Akin to Brown’s (1995) call for 
“loosening identities” (see Chapter 1), this understanding of Romani identity 
is less of an assertion of who the Romanies are and more of a statement of 
what the Romanies want. Romani identity is used, therefore, not as an 
ontological claim but as an explicitly political one.  
 
These participants largely maintain a sense of groupness with other nomadic 
peoples. Romani nationalism is considered an obstacle to upholding this 
solidarity, given that it divides nomadic groups along “homeland” boundaries. 
Peggy (F: 47: Romany Gypsy) argues: 
 
I find it really hard to understand that kind of mentality. We’ve 
always been sort of naturally allied with Irish Travellers and I’m not 
trying to say that, you know, we’re the same people, but were facing 
the same problems, the same laws, you know. People don’t 
discriminate between us, the government doesn’t. I don’t 
understand the point in isolating ourselves because we’ve got 
Indian roots and they’ve got Irish.  
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Peggy’s critique of Romani nationalism echoes that of Anthias who argues 
that territorial rooted understandings of diaspora overlook interethnic 
cooperation (see Chapter 2). Anthias warned that the territorial model of 
diaspora was unresponsive to transethnic solidarities, such as antiracist 
movements, given its reliance on the notions of homeland and origin.  
 
Like Peggy, many of the participants expressed solidarity with Irish Travellers 
and other nomadic peoples, as well as other black and minority ethnic groups. 
Experience of racism and discrimination thus acts as a unifying force in which 
shared oppression, as opposed to share origins, is used to invoke transethnic 
groupness. Tara aligned herself with antiracism, explaining ‘…because I have 
been active within the left, I would call myself an anti-racist’. She continued, ‘I 
have [racism] in common with Black people, Asian people… Muslims, Arabs. 
It’s all the same when it comes down to it, so I feel like solidarity with other 
ethnic groups’. Similarly, Miroslav stated: 
 
Miroslav (M: 28: Slovakian Gypsy): I do not like racism. Against me, 
it hurts a lot but it hurts me when I see racism to other people. You 
must treat people how you like to be treat and I don’t like to see 
people in silence when racism against Gypsy people is here. I do 
not stay silent for racism against black people or other people…we 
are the same to racists, they hate us all, we must stand together.  
 
Miroslav views it as his duty to condemn racism against other BME groups, 
suggesting a reciprocal relationship in which BME groups support and defend 
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one another via transethnic solidarity. For Miroslav, Romani identity is to be 
fashioned on the basis of transethnic alliances and cooperation as opposed 
to insularity and cultural homogenisation. Other participants advocated the 
formation of national-level antiracist coalitions made up of individuals and 
organisations representing different ethnic and national groups. In practice, 
however, alliances have not transpired. Shannon spoke of her discouraging 
experience of seeking support from other BME organisations: 
 
Shannon (F: 58: Romany Gypsy):  I’ve approached several other 
community groups asking for support on various things from other 
ethnic groups and been ignored…I approached a black women’s 
group to ask if they could lend us some support, and they didn’t, 
they didn’t reply and when I asked if they got my email they said 
yes we did and that was the end of that…it can be very 
uncomfortable. 
 
In Shannon’s interpretation of this incident, her request was ignored because 
Gypsies and Travellers are not considered by other BME groups as victims of 
racism and discrimination. As discussed in Chapter 1, the tendency to 
overlook anti-Roma racism or “Romaphobia” is greatly apparent in 
understandings of racism and ethnicity. Antiracist discourse has played a 
fundamental role in shaping contemporary understandings of racism, with 
understandings or race and ethnicity constructed around post-war, 
commonwealth migration. This involved the development of a hierarchy of 
racialised identities that juxtaposed black and white by employing colour as 
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the central indicator of difference. Conceptual and theoretical frameworks, as 
well as antiracist activisms, were thus developed around non-white groups, 
such as Afro-Caribbeans and Asians. Under this understanding of racism, the 
experiences of non-white minorities, such as the Irish, Jewish and Gypsy and 
Traveller populations, were marginalised.  
 
As James points out, the Romanies are outwardly white: 
 
James (M: 20: Romany Gypsy): …we’re not really accepted as 
people of colour, so the antiracist movement is, yeah it’s not got a 
place for us. I mean, we look white, we’re Romani, but we’re white 
and unfortunately a lot of black activists, well, they have a very 
narrow minded view about white people. If you’re white, you’re 
privileged…they can’t seem to see that there are white ethnic 
minorities and we do experience racism, in fact worse racism than 
they do. 
 
James highlights the ambiguities of whiteness. The colour dichotomy marks 
Afro-Caribbean and Asians as “racial” or “ethnic”, whilst Gypsy, Traveller, Irish 
and Jewish populations are considered “white” and thus unmarked by race 
and ethnicity. This reinforces the notion of “black victims” and “white 
perpetrators”, which excludes the Romanies from the antiracist movement. As 
argued in Chapter 1, when the inequalities experienced by the Romanies are 
recognised this is usually done so within a “hierarchy of oppression” which 
posits that white minorities cannot experience racism at the same intensity as 
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black minorities. For James, this places limitations on the alliances the 
Romanies can expect to form, stating: ‘we’re not black enough for them; we’re 
not white enough for white people, so in reality the furthest our alliances can 
stretch is to other nomadic groups like Irish Travellers’.  
 
With the Romanies occupying a marginalised position within antiracism, Tara 
fears Romani nationalism will become a credible alternative for disenchanted 
Romani youth, particularly given the increasing centrality of their Indian 
origins. In a similar vein, James notes the normalisation and widespread 
acceptance of nationalistic discourse among Romanies and non-Romanies 
alike: 
 
James (M: 20: Romany Gypsy): It’s become PC these days to refer 
to us as the Roma, not the Gypsies, and every time we are written 
about or spoken about there seems to be this unwritten rule that 
you must say were originally from India…every year we have 
International Romani Day and then one year it was suddenly Roma 
Nation Day….nationalism is subtly slipping into our culture and our 
like knowledge or understanding of ourselves and so you don’t 
actually have to pledge allegiance to some sort of Romani 
nationalist manifesto, it’s more like people just are nationalist these 
days without even realising it, without even putting a label on it.  
 
Whether or not this indicates that the invented traditions, propagated by 
Romani nationalists, have become meaningful sites of identity for the Romani 
population, is, of course, disputable given what this chapter has already 
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revealed. It indicates, however, that the reconceptualization of the Romanies, 
from the “Gypsies” to the “Roma”, has, at the very least, been convincing at a 
scholarly and/or journalistic level. What is more, it implies that Romani 
nationalism need not be actively performed. Rather, it can be described as a 
subconscious nationalism, attributable to an increasing number of Romanies, 
who, despite not formulating or asserting in any coherent way their specific 
nationalistic loyalties and beliefs, are nevertheless influenced by nationalistic 
ideas. 
Summary 
This chapter has explored the extent to which participants experience a sense 
of groupness, focussing specifically on the notion of a united Roma nation. 
Romani nationalists employ a diasporic identity frame which defines the 
Romanies as a dispersed people of Indian origins and which draws 
boundaries along cultural and historical lines. Although they have little desire 
to return to, or re-establish, a Romani homeland, they make efforts to maintain 
a connection to India. In their attempt to construct a united Roma Nation, 
Romani nationalists fall into the trap of identity politics in which they 
homogenise the Romani population and downplay internal differences.  
 
In reality, Britain’s Romanies are greatly diverse. They remain largely divided 
by country of origin, national identity, religion and lifestyle. The Roma, for 
example, felt they had little in common with the traditionally nomadic Romany 
Gypsies, while Romany Gypsies considered their culture and experiences of 
discrimination more similar to that of Irish Travellers. There exists, however, 
shared ethno-cultural markers that unite the Romani community despite their 
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differences, and which construct and maintain a sense of “us” and “them”, or 
“Romani” and “gadze”.  
 
In attempt to unite the Romani population, Romani nationalists have 
advocated the standardisation of Romani language. This has been met with 
scepticism given that different dialects of Romani are largely intelligible.  The 
introduction of “International Romani Day” has also been ineffective in uniting 
Britain’s Romani population, with celebrations remaining relatively unknown 
or poorly attended. Feelings of groupness materialised most strongly through 
the remembrance of collective suffering. Regardless of their differences, the 
participants shared in common a history of racism and discrimination. It acts 
as a motivating force to maintain and defend Romani culture and identity.  
 
Critics of nationalism argue that Romani unity should be rooted in a shared 
experience of racism and discrimination and not in cultural and/or linguistic 
homogeneity. They employ the language of human rights as opposed to the 
language of nation building, focussing on shared oppression rather than 
shared origins. While Roma nationalists are critical of inter-ethnic cooperation, 
their critics express solidarity with other nomadic groups and the wider black 
and minority ethnic population. Solidarity often lacks a reciprocal element, 
however, with Romaphobia being positioned at the bottom of a hierarchy of 
oppression. As such, critics fear Romani nationalism will grow in strength.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Integral to Safran’s definition of diaspora is the lived experience of alienation. 
Indeed, he argues a minority group that has been dispersed from its homeland 
cannot be considered a diaspora if they have few barriers to integration in their 
host country. Are the Romanies socially integrated? Based on the findings of 
this research, arguably no. They remain a marginalised “other”, stigmatised 
and vilified in the media as “backwards”, “animalistic”, “criminals” who profit 
through deceitful opportunism. Romany Gypsies, whose nomadic tradition 
flies in the face of social integration, find themselves at the bottom of a 
hierarchy of abject whiteness. Even “chavs” with their working class vulgarities 
have the common decency to at least inhabit bricks and mortar. Romany 
Gypsies, on the other hand, emphatically fail to meet the white ideals expected 
from performances of white racial identity and, thus, remain stigmatised “white 
others” existing on the margins of society.  
 
The Roma, too, can be considered marginalised. They face a multiple 
otherness in which they are subject to existing prejudices and fears relating to 
“native” Gypsy and Traveller populations, as well as carrying the stigma of 
being “migrant”. Roma migration has, in recent years, attracted a 
disproportionate amount of negative attention. As Britain’s immigration policy 
has been forced to adapt to enable the freedom of movement of all EU 
citizens, EU migration has fuelled public anxieties, aiding a resurgence of the 
populist right. Freedom of movement indisputably contributed to the 
emergence of the Roma as a hot political issue in which leading politicians 
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and the media have employed a “security” and “culture” discourse commonly 
heard in immigration debate.  It is into this environment that the Roma arrive 
in Britain – Gypsies on Benefits and Proud - a “freeloading hoard” of Eastern 
European “Gypo scum” who, as so often presented, are unwilling to integrate 
but more than willing to reap the benefits of British “generosity” in the form of 
the welfare state. Unlike their British Romany Gypsy counterparts, their 
otherness cannot be hidden under the veil of whiteness. The Roma are far 
from inconspicuous – from their physical appearance, to their command of 
English – they are marked with otherness. Nonetheless, the findings of the 
research suggest that they are marked not by their “Romaniness”, but by their 
generic otherness or general “foreignness”. This can work to the Roma’s 
benefit or detriment: at best they are misidentified as Western European, at 
worst they are mistaken as Asian. Their otherness is, thus, imbedded in a 
complex fusion of xenophobia and (mis)directed racism while the otherness 
of Romany Gypsies finds its roots in the ideology of sedentarism, classism 
and cultural Racism. 
 
The Romanies, whether native or migrant, are excluded from society quite 
literally. Through the process of spatial exclusion they are kept away from the 
“respectable” white population – Romany Gypsies into Gypsy and Traveller 
sites and/or social housing in low socio-economic areas and Roma into 
ethnically diverse sink estates. These areas are subsequently transformed 
into classed and ethnically marked spaces. They function to separate the 
undesirables from the desirables and render otherness visible. Their presence 
is unwelcome in white spaces as is demonstrated by the nimbyist opposition 
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to Gypsy and Traveller sites or the regular removal of homeless Roma 
beggars from London’s landmarks.  They remain, therefore, alienated, 
marginalised and stigmatised.  
 
In “multicultural” Britain, there have been superficial attempts at implementing 
policies of social integration - the key word here being superficial, given that 
social integration has too often been conflated with forced assimilation. 
Romany Gypsies have seen a striking decline in their traditional way of life, as 
was reflected in their narratives. Pervasive hegemonic sedentarism targets 
those who lack strong attachments to a fixed locale, pathologising and 
demonising them as abnormal, backwards and dangerous. Romany Gypsies 
have thus witnessed the increasing regulation of Romani culture in which 
nomadism has been curbed. Unsurprisingly this has not occasioned the 
integration and upward social mobility of the Romany Gypsies. Quite the 
opposite, their alienation has become amplified. Romany Gypsy narratives 
were beset with loss, shame and despondency. Enduring displacement from 
repeated evictions and forced settlement into bricks and mortar 
accommodation, has left the Romany Gypsies asking where do we belong? 
They have suffered a loss of tradition and culture which, in their opinion, has 
called into question their ethnic authenticity.  Yet under the sedentarist gaze 
this is “progress”; the decline of nomadism allows Romany Gypsies to break 
free of their otherness, climb the hierarchy of abject whiteness, and join the 
ranks of the less despised white working class.  
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How does this translate to the context of the Roma? Arguably, the Roma have 
fared well under British multiculturalism. Roma participants have largely 
migrated to Britain to improve their social-economic situations. An objective 
they have arguably achieved. In Britain they, or their children, have received 
a better education, improved employment prospects and higher paid jobs, 
habitable accommodation, free health care, greater recognition and a lesser 
risk of discrimination and violence than in comparison to their pre-migratory 
lives. In their narratives they are hopeful of a more prosperous future and they 
speak positively of multicultural Britain.  
 
Roma have a desire to be culturally British. They make efforts to integrate, to 
adopt British cultural norms and values whilst simultaneously discarding 
undesirable elements of Romaniness. This is not to say that they are willing 
to give up their Roma identity completely. Nor does multiculturalism require 
them to do this. There appears, however, to be a strong will to belong that is 
noticeably absent in the narratives of Romany Gypsies who see “not 
belonging” as integral to who they are. Indeed, while Roma encourage 
integration, Romany Gypsies actively discourage it, fearing social integration 
would transform Romani identity into something unrecognisable.  
 
Why do Roma and Romany Gypsies experience Britain so differently? Why 
do Romany Gypsies fear for their future while Roma welcome it 
enthusiastically? Their experiences are, of course, contextually dependent. 
Prior to their migration, the Roma lived in countries notorious for their 
countless human rights abuses where they largely inhabited ghettoised, 
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impoverished areas and were denied education, health care and even 
reproductive rights. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly 
been called upon to defend the rights of the Roma where their home countries 
have failed to do so. Britain, while by no means having a faultless human 
rights record, appears “just” and “equal” in comparison. This is not to say that 
Romany Gypsies have suffered any less than the Roma, or vice versa, but to 
acknowledge that suffering is relative. Far more likely is that: 1) the Roma do 
suffer in Britain, but the improvement to their socioeconomic status 
compensates for any discrimination that they might face; and (2) any 
discrimination the Roma do face is likely to be rooted in their status as 
migrants and, thus, the Roma have less experience of targeted ethnic or anti-
Gypsy discrimination in Britain.  
 
This disparity in experience does not go unnoticed by Romany Gypsies. They 
are frustrated. While they suffer the impact of assimilationist policy, they 
witness an improvement in the social and material circumstances of other 
minorities. The Romany Gypsies in this research are disillusioned with 
multiculturalism. They have experienced the attempted eradication of Gypsy 
culture while simultaneously witnessing the growth in the celebration, and 
tolerance of, other minoritised cultures.  In the narratives of Romany Gypsies, 
these frustrations materialise in the language of inter-ethnic competition. As 
British born citizens they consider themselves as more “deserving” of 
tolerance, as opposed to the “undeserving” migrant other. 
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 Indeed, despite their precarious relationship with society, and irrespective of 
their ethnic and cultural differences, the Romany Gypsies consider 
themselves a truly British people. Born and raised in Britain, and having 
travelled the length and breadth of the country, they perhaps know Britain 
better than their sedentary “foes”. It is with this is mind, that they construct the 
boundaries between a deserving British “us” and an undeserving foreign 
“them”.  
 
The Roma too express similar sentiments. They emphasise their sameness 
with British people in the form of supposed shared European, often Christian, 
liberal democratic values, thus constructing divisive boundaries between 
European and Non-European and/or Muslim others. Both groups employ such 
language in an attempt to whiten themselves and gain greater economic, 
political and social capital. Yet, perhaps ironically, Romany Gypsies also hope 
to draw attention to their difference in order to make claim to the benefits, 
whether real or imagined, that are afforded to other minorities.  
 
Their narratives could be easily misunderstood as similar to, or even identical 
to the views of the populist right. One might be inclined therefore to dismiss 
their frustrations as straightforward xenophobia. Indeed, wider critiques of 
multiculturalism are often written off as racist ramblings, given that the 
alternative to multiculturalism is supposedly fascist nationalism. 
Multiculturalism has arguably become immune from critique and this makes it 
difficult to call attention to the exclusion of white minorities, given that it runs 
the risk of condoning “fascists”. Romany Gypsy narratives reveal, however, a 
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fundamental flaw in the multiculturalist project in which white minorities are 
rendered cultureless. Under multiculturalism, whiteness if conceived as an 
unmarked norm against which other racial and ethnic groups are compared 
(McLaren, 1994). The white British are, thus, homogenised and the cultures 
of white minorities erased by the myth of monolithic whiteness. The invisibility 
of the Romany Gypsies is intensified by: 1) their absence from the post-
Windrush race and ethnicity discourse (see chapter one); and 2) their 
underrepresentation in, or rebuff from, the antiracist movement in which, 
owing to the colour of their skin, they occupy the bottom of hierarchical 
oppression (see chapter six).  
 
“Roots” are central to multiculturalism. The notions of origins, ancestry, history 
and identity are vital to multicultural ideology which ‘tends to eroticise others 
in a nativistic retreat that locates difference in a primeval past of cultural 
authenticity’ (Perry, 2002, 196).  Yet, multiculturalism is widely applauded for 
its apparent progressiveness. It is considered a prerequisite of a 
contemporary society that exemplifies the tolerance, respect for equality and 
anti-racism of the “left”. Critics of multiculturalism are deemed conservative at 
best and unequivocally racist, xenophobic and nationalist at worst. The 
difficulty with framing or voicing criticism/s of multiculturalism, associated as it 
has become with identity politics and leftist elitism, has alienated the now 
invisible abject whites, which in turn has strengthened support for the populist 
right.   
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Fuelled by the fears surrounding the loss of “white working class culture”, the 
populist right exploit anxieties and insecurities among those who were “left 
behind” by multiculturalism. The populist right appeals to the disillusioned and 
socially isolated. Indeed, socially disadvantaged groups are more likely to 
blame migrant populations for their own deteriorating socioeconomic 
conditions (Betz, 2009). We witness, therefore, an anger seething in many 
Romany Gypsy participants who feel they have been denied their piece of the 
multiculturalist pie, which has instead been consumed, in their view, by the 
“undeserving” migrant populations.   
 
The multiculturalist fixation with “white privilege” goes a long way to explain 
why Romany Gypsies are vulnerable to the influences of the populist right. 
Over the past four decades a considerable proportion of the white working 
class has continued to slide further down the socio-economic ladder (Merry et 
al., 2016), with Romany Gypsies occupying the very bottom. Their plight is 
very much shaped by involuntary – namely economic – forces beyond their 
control which limit the opportunities available to them (Merry et al., 2016).  Yet, 
because the hierarchy of oppression is so closely tied to the dichotomy of 
black victims/ white perpetrators, their marginalisation remains eclipsed by 
their “privilege”.  Indeed, discourse has not focussed on the marginalisation of 
the white working class, but on their response to marginalisation (i.e. their 
support for the populist right) which indicates their ‘cultural impoverishment, a 
poverty of identity based on outdated ways of thinking and being’ (Haylett, 
2001, 352). In contemporary multicultural Britain, abject whites have come to 
- 265 - 
represent the unmodern and the bigoted, while the middle class left are 
positioned as champions of equality, antiracism and tolerance. 
 
Of what importance is this to Romani nationalism? It suggests that Romany 
Gypsies feel a sense of injustice in which they are neglected by social 
programs that favour non-white minorities. The nature of their injustice is one 
of frustration and resentment about being left behind in the struggle to acquire 
valuable resources.  Arguably, Romany Gypsies are vulnerable to the populist 
right, thus, leaving Romani nationalism redundant. I argue this is unlikely given 
the centrality of “British values” to such ideologies. As this research has 
revealed, Romany Gypsies feel alienated from cultural Britishness and 
actively opt out, substituting “British values” for “Romany values”.  
 
Romany Gypsies remain, however, a valuable constituency to political 
entrepreneurs constructing a movement rooted in injustice. Romani 
nationalism is uniquely placed to cultivate these frustrations given that it seeks 
to appeal to its constituency via a frame of injustice.  Romani nationalists 
locate the source of injustice as the invisibility of the Romani peoples. They 
express anger at the unequal socio-political arrangements that maintain their 
invisibility and render the Romanies a social problem and invoke claims to 
victimhood. Frames are successful when they arouse and channel the 
emotional frustrations that will raise the likelihood of successful mobilisation 
(Jasper, 2001). Successful frames must resonate emotionally so as to 
motivate and sustain collective action.  
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For Kemper (2001), the dominant emotion in many social movements is 
anger. An effective social movement must expose unequal socio-political 
arrangements that deny one group rights, resources and/or status to the 
benefit of another group. In the case of Romani nationalism, the Romanies 
suffer while the rest of society benefit from their non-Gypsy status. Anger is a 
reliable indicator of the unequal social relations that produce pools of potential 
constituents (Kemper, 2001). The consciousness raising efforts of political 
entrepreneurs seek to enable marginalised and disadvantaged groups to 
make connections between their low socioeconomic status and their 
discontent. They must get their constituents to focus the blame for current 
injustices on a target, from which they will lay the foundations for social 
change.  
 
Romani nationalism does not, as many Romany Gypsies have, lay the blame 
for the inequality suffered by the Romanies, on non-white minorities. Rather, 
they blame it on the lack of international recognition of the Romanies as a 
distinct ethnic group and as a nation without a state. Indeed, the diasporic 
claims of Romani nationalism benefit from the fact that multiculturalism 
continues to: 1) manifest deep racial/ethnic divisions; 2) tie group rights to 
demonstrable ethnic/racial identity and 3) conflate whiteness with privilege. 
Romani Nationalists, in their focus on origins, homeland and suffering: 1) 
cement the Romanies as an ethnic minority; 2) create the foundations from 
which claims to group rights can be made; and 3) unsettle the multiculturalist 
notion that whiteness equals power and, thus, inadvertently appeal to the 
sense of injustice felt by Romany Gypsies.   
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Of course, it is overly simplistic to suggest that for this reason alone Romany 
Gypsies will find a “home” in Romani nationalism. Romani nationalism implies 
the adoption of an entirely new and imagined national identity and, as already 
discussed, Romany Gypsies consider themselves a truly British people. They 
feel excluded, however, from “cultural Britishness” but express little, if any, 
desire to be part of it. Nevertheless, their narratives provide little evidence of 
them requiring an alternative source of national identification to counteract the 
exclusivity of cultural Britishness. It seems unlikely the notion of a “Roma 
Nation” will have any appeal, in this respect.  
 
Roma, too, have strong national identities and attachments to their home 
countries irrespective of how long they have lived in Britain. This is not 
surprising as they were born and spent a considerable amount of their lives in 
their countries of origin. In their home countries remain family and friends and 
Roma maintain strong ties to their countries of origin. They retain memories 
of their pre-migratory lives that were formative to their identities. Nationality 
remains, therefore, central to the Roma’s understandings of who they are. 
This is hardly surprising given that many Roma arrive in Britain from the former 
communist states of the “Eastern Bloc”. State sponsored policies of cultural 
homogenisation, employed to mask national heterogeneity, were effective in 
depriving the Roma of their culture and ethnic identities via forced 
assimilation. Marushiakova and Popov (2010, 43) argue that Roma in Eastern 
and Central Europe are, by consequence, much more socially integrated and 
have a far stronger attachments to the nation state in comparison to other 
Romanies in Western Europe and other parts of the world. 
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This poses a challenge to Romani nationalists who have constructed the idea 
of a diasporic Romani identity and “Roma Nation” on the premise of 
postnationalism. Romani nationalist claims to recognition on the international 
stage are based on the notion that the nation state’s status as the principal 
unit of social organisation has been confronted by the forces of globalisation 
and the transferal of powers from the national to the supranational and 
transnational level. Scholars, such as, Soysal (1994) and Jacobson (1996), 
have argued that the post-war period has seen the growth of new forms of 
“postnational” citizenship that have left national citizenship defunct due to the 
transnationalisation/diasporisation of migrant communities and the increasing 
role of supranational organisations and governance which have bolstered the 
rights of migrants and ethnic minorities.  
 
The Roma Nation is a greatly laboured attempt at creating a “postnational” 
citizenship, identity and solidarity, in which it is assumed that the Romanies, 
by consequence of their alienation, have weak attachments to the nation state. 
Postnationalist scholars argue, however, that there has been a separation of 
identity from rights: ‘Rights increasingly assume universality… and are defined 
at the global level. Identities, in contrast, still express particularity and are 
conceived of as territorially bounded. As an identity, national citizenship… still 
prevails. But in terms of its translation into rights and privileges, it is no longer 
a significant construction” (Soysal, 1998, 208).  
 
Postnationalism is not without its critics, but these critiques are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. There has undeniably been a growth in international 
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conventions relating to human rights, yet the extent to which this lessens the 
power and autonomy of the nation state is a matter of contention. It is, 
perhaps, more fruitful to remain within the realms of multiculturalism. Indeed, 
the increased cultural pluralism of the nation-states has coincided with 
increased mobility in which we have seen the rise of a “multicultural” 
citizenship which affords special rights, recognition and protection to minority 
groups and their cultures (Kymlicka, 1995). Multicultural citizenship has 
greatly enhanced opportunities for migrants and ethnic minorities to make 
claims for recognition, of their cultural and/or ethnic difference, from the nation 
state. Migrant and ethnic communities increasingly take the shape, therefore, 
of transnational diasporas who maintain strong ties to their countries of origin 
(Kymlicka, 1995).  
 
For Roma, British citizenship is merely a legal necessity and is not integral to 
the formation of their identities. By gaining British citizenship they do not 
expect to suddenly inherit British identity. Rather, they expect to inherit rights, 
protections and recognition without having to surrender their national and 
ethnic affiliations. They maintain strong attachments to their home countries 
despite having little desire to return, given that they cannot offer the same 
standard of living. In this fashion, they do not want to be, for example, 
Bulgarian in Bulgaria, but Bulgarian in Britain.  
 
For Romani nationalists, national attachments are testing. Nationalists 
consider the Romanies a diaspora and Romani identity is believed to be 
fashioned in relation to an Indian homeland, not in relation to the nation states 
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of Europe. The Romanies, however, have little, if any, knowledge of their 
Indian origins. For the Roma, an Indian homeland is a remote past and 
irrelevant to the present. Their identities are rooted in their lived memories or 
in the recent past. Their increased mobility and migration has meant their 
countries of birth are considered their homelands.  Notions of homeland thus 
differ according to country of origin and migratory history. Romany Gypsies, 
on the other hand, are more aware, on the whole, of their supposed origins. 
India has become the narrative of choice for Gypsy and Traveller 
organisations and it is firmly embedded into any account of Gypsy history 
intending to raise awareness of “Gypsy, Roma and Traveller” issues. This 
does not necessarily indicate that such organisations are “nationalist”, but that 
they are engaged in the politics of recognition in which groups must indulge 
the multiculturalist fixation with descent and ascribed status.  
 
Romany Gypsies have largely accepted the (re)discovery of an Indian 
homeland. India is not integral to their identities but they increasingly 
recognise themselves as a historically dispersed people of Indian origins. 
India is a mythical homeland; it is a claim to a past long gone. Britain, on the 
other hand, remains a tangible homeland to which Romany Gypsies hold 
indisputable bonds - bonds which cannot be replicated in the Indian context 
just because scholarly research has “proven” a link. What the narrative of 
Indian origins provides for Romany Gypsies is a stronger claim to minority-
hood within a multiculturalist system fixated on difference. Indeed, the ability 
to substantiate their difference from their fellow “white Britons” legitimates 
them as contenders for special group rights. This is of less urgency to the 
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Roma who, by virtue of their immigrant status, already have strong claims to 
minority-hood.  
 
It seems imprudent, therefore, to suggest, as Romani nationalists so readily 
do, that collective Romani identity and solidarity can be fashioned in relation 
to a homeland. The term “Romani” refers to a diversity of people who have 
followed various migratory paths since their dispersal from India and who have 
found home in each of Europe’s nation states and beyond. They maintain 
different lifestyles, hold varying socioeconomic positions, and exhibit different 
relationships with society. Identifying as “Romani”, therefore, tells us very little 
about the extent of their solidarity or collective identity. In common is the belief 
that the world is firmly divided into Romanies and “gadze”, though the 
participants found it difficult to articulate how such boundaries are drawn. 
Outside of the context of their own subgroup, they were unable to define a 
shared “Romaniness” but felt certain it exists. They referred to universally 
shared Romani principles which are governed by a string of traditions and 
values concerning family and kinship, cleanliness and important milestones 
such as, birth, marriage and death.  Boundaries are drawn, therefore, between 
those who do, and those who do not, adhere to this “code of practice”. What 
separates the Romanies from non-Romanies, therefore, is not origins, but 
values and traditions. This is not to say one can become Romani by adhering 
to Romani principles. Indeed, traditions and values interplay with kinship. 
Rather, it highlights that a shared homeland is virtually absent from 
articulations of “Romaniness”.   
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Yet the concept of the Roma Nation is entirely premised on the notion of an 
Indian homeland. The Roma Nation is expected to transcend the internal 
differences that divide the Romanies and inspire a sense of groupness which 
is rooted in shared origins. For Romani nationalists, differences must be set 
aside for the sake of, and in loyalty to, the nation. Their narratives were 
overwhelmed with disapproval, and at times denial, of Romani heterogeneity. 
Romani nationalists wish to reclaim and rediscover a “pure” Romani culture 
that is untouched by European influences. Such narratives are evocative of 
the populist right who seek to reclaim the domestic territory as a space of pure 
British culture and tradition, untouched by migration and cultural pluralism. 
Whether or not there ever was a “pure” Romani culture is debatable and is 
beyond the scope of this research. In the contemporary world, it has become 
ever more difficult to locate any “pure” cultures which are untouched by 
external influences, and the Romanies are no different. Rather, most people 
now reside within the ‘borderlands’ (Anzaldua, 1999), or ‘the third space’ 
(Bhabha, 1994), across and between cultures. This is not only true of ethnic 
minorities like the Romanies, but for national or majority cultures too.  
 
To be “Romani” in contemporary society, therefore, is to be subject to many 
different cultural influences, including the pervasive forces of the nation states 
in which they have settled.  There exists a broad church of “Romaniness”, as 
has always been the way for hundreds of years. In the face of this, Romani 
nationalists intend to redraw the boundaries of “Romaniness” according to 
their own subjective interpretations of cultural “pureness” and ethnic 
authenticity.  
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Is the nationalist fantasy of the recovery of a pure Romani culture just that - a 
fantasy? Or, are Britain’s Romanies just as eager to recover the Romani 
culture of Indian yesteryears? The fact that the Roma are enthusiastically 
welcoming social integration and cultural Britishness renders it unlikely they 
are wistful for 11th century Romani culture. In Chapter 4, Roma narratives 
revealed instances of “internalised racism” and “defensive othering”; this is 
hardly what one would expect from a community supposedly beset with desire 
for cultural purity. The Romany Gypsies, on the other hand, exhibit resistant 
and oppositional identities in which they “overplay” their Romaniness, actively 
preserve Romany culture and maintain the gap between themselves and 
wider society. By rejecting British culture, one cannot automatically draw 
conclusions that the Romany Gypsies are pursuing a pure Romani culture. It 
suggests, however, that Romany Gypsies are somewhat culturally insular in 
comparison to their Roma counterparts. The bounded and insular nature of 
Romani nationalism may, therefore, hold some appeal. The Romani culture 
engineered by Romani nationalists, however, is arguably irreconcilable with 
Romany Gypsy lifestyle. Indeed, the narratives revealed that Roma 
nationalists are often critical of nomadism, considering it an inhibitive influence 
on the social mobility of Romany Gypsies.  
 
The outcome of this is to push Romany Gypsies away from the “Roma Nation” 
towards a Gypsy and Traveller alliance. In their narratives, Romany Gypsies 
repeatedly underlined their close ties to the Irish Traveller community. 
Romany Gypsies and Irish Travellers share a history in Britain in which they 
have been subject to the same government legislation aimed at restricting and 
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policing the nomadic way of life. They have shared, and continue to share, 
cultural spaces – from Gypsy and Traveller sites to annual horse fairs. The 
similarities between their cultures has resulted in a deeply felt sense of 
comradery that is absent between Romany Gypsies and Roma who have had 
little opportunity to interact in comparison. Indeed, Roma consider themselves 
as having more in common with other Roma, in terms of way of life and lived 
experiences of migration and discrimination.  
 
Romani nationalists are not, to say the least, in favour of establishing alliances 
with other traditionally nomadic groups subject to similar discrimination and 
state responses. Ultimately shared origins (identity based claims) are 
considered a greater source of identification than shared experience (interest 
based claims). Irish Travellers do not share an ancestral homeland with the 
Romanies, thus an alliance would disrupt Romani claims to nationhood. 
Indeed, in their attempts to integrate into the normative order of Europe, their 
claims to nationhood must be robust with no room for uncertainty. The Irish 
Travellers must remain, therefore, an unrelated “social problem”. Romany 
Gypsies thus face a choice: do they maintain their alliances with Irish 
Travellers or do they enlist in the Roma Nation? One can assume it will not be 
the latter.  
 
The nationalist aversion to nomadic solidarities, and nomadism itself, 
highlights more than ever the extent to which Romani nationalism is “out of 
touch” with its assumed constituency. The Roma Nation was never about 
establishing a state. It was a response to the exclusivity of “Europeanness” 
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and a resistance to the forced assimilation and attempted eradication of 
Romani culture. In doing so, however, they have created something as equally 
exclusive. In their efforts to construct the Romanies as a nation, they have 
become preoccupied with matters that their constituents neither want nor 
need. For example, the standardisation of Romani language has been 
dismissed as an unachievable whim. Inspired by the notion of one language 
one nation (Smith, 1971), nationalists believe that Romani fragmentation can 
be remedied via the destruction of linguistic pluralism. Such claims are 
redolent of ambitions of cultural purity. If, as Safran (1991) argues, a group 
cannot be considered a diaspora if they cease to speak the language of their 
homeland, linguistic pluralism questions the Romanies legitimacy as an 
ethnically homogenous unit. Romani nationalists have, thus, attempted to 
enforce a standardised Romani language.  This has been unsuccessful given 
that: 1) Romani dialects are largely mutually unintelligible; 2) many Romanies 
do not speak any dialect of Romani at all; and 3) the Romanies suffer from 
high levels of illiteracy (Romani is considered an “unwritten language”). Both 
Roma and Romany Gypsies alike consider language standardisation 
somewhat absurd – there simply does not exist a singular Romani language. 
This is not to discount the idea completely; indeed, the revival of the Hebrew 
language in Israel was successful despite Israel’s multilingual population. The 
growth of multilingual language groups is emblematic of contemporary 
Europe, as seen in the Welsh, Irish and Scots Gaelic, Corsicans and Flemish, 
Catalan and Basques, etc.  
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International Romani Day signals another unsuccessful attempt at inspiring 
groupness. Despite being declared in 1990 by the IRU, it remains unfamiliar, 
unimportant and poorly observed by both Roma and Romany Gypsies alike. 
The over involvement of non-Romani activists in the planning and execution 
of International Romani Day events, has left it ineffective and open to ridicule. 
Where it has been observed, events have been mainly attended by Roma, 
with little involvement from the Romany Gypsy community. It has been utilised 
as a community outreach exercise within neighbourhoods experiencing 
interethnic tensions. It has failed to unite, in any significant way, the Romanies 
at both a national and transnational level.  
 
Yet even critics of Romani nationalism fall into the trap of assuming unity 
where evidence suggests there is none. They too embrace a homogenising 
view of community by identifying particular “communities”, be that Gypsy and 
Traveller, Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller, or Romani, which often overlook 
differences within these communities. They do not refute nationalist claims of 
Indian origins. Rather, they question its centrality to the Romani experience. 
Nevertheless, the narrative of Indian origins is regularly reproduced in 
publications circulated by Gypsy and Traveller organisations, arguably in an 
attempt, as with Romani nationalism, to legitimise the Romanies as an ethnic 
minority comparable to more visible black and minority ethnic groups. Thus, 
while critics of the Roma Nation may decry Romani nationalists for the 
essentialism inherent in nationalist ideology, they too concede to the notion of 
shared descent. The counter-narratives of nationalist critics do move away 
from the “one culture, one language, one nation” rhetoric, however. They 
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recognise that Romani identity and culture is subject to the continuous 
influences of cross-cultural exchange and consider Romani culture as an 
amalgam of the various cultural practices the Romanies have encountered 
since their dispersal from India. For the critics of the Roma Nation, there is no 
homogenous Romani culture to be recovered.  
 
They argue, therefore, that Romani unity should be based on shared 
experience of racism and discrimination as opposed to shared origins and 
cultural and linguistic homogeneity. While the reunification of the Romanies is 
an end in itself for Romani nationalists, its critics see Romani solidarity as a 
necessary means by which to free the Romanies from racism and 
discrimination. The language of human rights, as opposed to nation building, 
is invoked. The focus is on shared oppression, not shared origins. In this way, 
Romani politics becomes less about defining who the Romani are, and more 
about what the Romanies want (i.e. special group rights).  
 
Does such an approach succeed where Romani nationalism has so markedly 
failed? Arguably, yes. Experiences of racism and discrimination were the one 
thing that consistently united the participants, and instigated little 
disagreement, in spite of their strikingly different narratives. The act of 
memorialising collective suffering – from the Porajmos (Romani holocaust) to 
“everyday racism” – is the glue that bonds the Romani people into a single 
socio-political imaginary. In other words, it is where groupness materialises 
most strongly. Yet, the employment of a “collective suffering” frame is not 
unique to nationalist critics. Ultimately, this is where Romani nationalists and 
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their critics come to an agreement. In an age in which victims of identity-based 
injustices are demanding and receiving both symbolic and material redress, 
claims to Romani “victimhood” propose the greatest chance of recognition. 
Thus, whether framed in the language of human rights or in the rhetoric of 
nation building, the Romanies have been defined as historically subjugated 
objects of perpetual suffering who are deserving of recognition and redress.  
 
Although the trend for identity politics dates back to at least the 1960s, it has 
acquired new purchase for the Romanies at a time when Romani 
organisations have grown exponentially throughout Europe; when a Romani 
academic circle is emerging; when far-Right anti-Romani violence is on the 
rise; when freedom of movement and the increase in Roma migration 
aggravate the socioeconomic marginalisation of these communities; and 
when human rights abuses against the Romanies, go largely unnoticed in 
national, and often international, political agendas. In lieu of a politics of 
universal rights, many activists and scholars have turned to the politics of 
group-specific rights which specifically account for the ongoing effects of 
racism and discrimination on the Romanies ability to access supposed 
universal equality. Although varying widely in their assessment of both the 
justification for and desired end of group rights, these efforts comprise an 
identity based movement rooted in claims of victimhood.  
 
A substantial group of scholars, as discussed in chapter two, have questioned 
the value of identity politics, arguing that organising around historically 
marginalised group identities results in a preoccupation with past suffering, 
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and divides minorities into rival factions and the world into victims and 
perpetrators. For Brown (1995), when we organize around identity, or what 
she terms our “wounded attachments”, we are conceding to our subjugation, 
and maintaining a cycle of blame which continues to focus on oppression 
rather than transcending it. Brown’s observations expose the risks inherent in 
the contemporary fixations with victimhood. Indeed, with narrated experiences 
of suffering and oppression increasingly granting minority groups special 
rights and legitimacy, victimhood becomes competitive, with only groups who 
have suffered deemed to have the legitimate right to make claims in the name 
of minority-hood. Because suffering becomes the basis of claim making, 
minority groups must particularise and prove their individual and collective 
suffering so as to authenticate their identities. In short, experiences of 
suffering become the impetus for creating a subject position, running the risk 
that “victims” are defined by, and never escape, their positions of perpetual 
suffering (Brown, 1995).  
 
Accordingly, narratives of victimhood engender a specific form of politics that 
is competitive, focuses only on suffering and weaponises misery. Indeed, 
victimhood has become fetishised to such an extent that a “hierarchy of 
oppression” now regulates the legitimacy of minoritised identity claims. This 
becomes evident in Romani activists’ experiences with the antiracist 
movement. Romany Gypsies, specifically, have been excluded from notions 
of antiracist solidarity given their whiteness leaves them unmarked by race 
and ethnicity. Indeed, the Romanies have found themselves positioned at the 
bottom of the hierarchy of oppression and therein lies the problem with 
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Romani claims to victimhood. For as long as ethno-racial victimhood is 
premised on the notion of black victims/ white perpetrators, it will be assumed 
that white minorities cannot experience racism at the same intensity as black 
minorities. Any claim to victimhood by a white minority will thus be subject to 
scrutiny. Arguably, this has greater impact on the Romany Gypsies, who by 
virtue of their skin colour and country of birth, appear to epitomise “privilege”. 
The Roma, on the other hand, may fare better in the victimhood discourse 
given their greater visibility and status as migrants. Indeed, in the current 
political climate, in which attentions are focussed on the “post-Brexit” 
response to EU migrants, the Roma may find they climb the ladder of the 
oppression hierarchy.  
 
We arrive then at a somewhat fatalist conclusion. The Roma and the Romany 
Gypsies have irreconcilable differences in terms of lifestyle, socio-economic 
status, positionings within, and towards, multiculturalism and antiracism and 
experiences of xenophobia and/or racism. In common they have only the 
suffering of oppression, albeit with some Romanies suffering more than 
others.  One could conclude, therefore, there is no “Roma Nation” in the British 
context. Firstly, Britain’s Romanies appear to have little desire to retrieve 
cultural or linguistic homogeneity. Nor do many consider themselves an Indian 
diaspora. Though many of the participants are aware of their supposed Indian 
origins, they were unable to reconcile their “Indianness” with their present day 
experiences of Europeanness and Romaniness, thus, demystifying this 
idealised and lost homeland. The absence of an emotional connection to India 
can be understood with regards to their strongly felt national identifications 
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with their countries of birth and the certainty of these countries as their 
homelands, despite suffering racism and discrimination and experiencing 
tremendous barriers to belonging in those homelands. It is necessary, 
therefore, that: 1) national identifications and belonging are detached from 
culturalist notions of “Britishness” because this is the main reason why 
participants from Romani backgrounds feel rejected; and 2) we recognise that 
the Romanies often do not identify with one single place, but a variety of 
places which can hold different meanings at different stages of their lives.  
 
Despite this, I remain hesitant to conclude that there is no future for the Roma 
Nation in Britain. Britain’s Romanies, whether native or migrant, recognise and 
acknowledge the “Romaniness” of their fellow Romanies without necessitating 
that they “be Romani together”. It is a passive solidarity in this sense, in which 
they recognise the world is divided into Romanies and gadze, without it 
necessarily requiring strong identifications between different groups of 
Romanies.  There are circumstances under which solidarities and groupness 
intensify. Specifically, it appears collective suffering and injustice fosters a 
greater sense of “we-ness”.  How might Romani nationalists respond to this 
reality? It will entail a shift in ideology, in which they must accept the internal 
diversity of their “nation”. They may want to consider the “Roma Nation” as a 
tool of strategic essentialism (Spivak, 1998), for example. Here they can 
employ markers of Romani identity, (e.g. shared culture, language, origin and 
experiences of discrimination) for the purpose of confronting the systems and 
processes that perpetuate exclusion, while simultaneously bringing to 
attention their internal differences (e.g. socio-economic status, history of 
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migration, lifestyle etc.). This is arguably the approach taken by critics of the 
Roma Nation, who pursue solidarity between Roma, Gypsies and Travellers 
while simultaneously recognising the nuances between these groups.  
 
This approach would require Romani nationalists to rethink the way they frame 
Romani identity, or at least necessitate a revaluation of their aims of 
“reunification”. Indeed, one must question whether Romani nationalists can 
employ strategic essentialism when their aims include cultural and lingual 
homogenisation. Romani nationalists may, therefore, find it constructive to 
clarify the differences between identity based and interest based claims. 
Identity claims will focus on their pursuit of nationhood, shared culture, 
language and origins and their diasporic claims.  On the other hand, when 
making interest based claims (around issues of economic deprivation, 
housing, education and unemployment, for instance) it can be demonstrated 
that group boundaries may alter depending on the issues at question. On 
occasion it will be crucial to employ a discourse that constructs a secure notion 
of Romani identity, while on other occasions it may be more valuable to 
deconstruct such an identity. The assault on nomadism, for example, is 
specific to Romany Gypsies, while issues surrounding migration are pertinent 
to Roma. Claims to recognition alone are unlikely to tackle these more interest 
based issues. Identity claims should be accompanied, therefore, by a claim to 
equal access to opportunities and social and material resources. As Iris 
Marion Young (2005) has argues, the principal aims of identity-based 
mobilisations should be to destabilise the structural processes that maintain 
inequality.  
- 283 - 
Iris Marion Young’s (2005) conception of a ‘politics of positional difference’ 
presents a valuable insight into how Romani nationalists could mobilise 
around experience of difference and disadvantage without falling victim to the 
trap of essentialism. She contends that social groups are, in effect, constituted 
through collective experiences of inequality and oppression which establish 
‘categorical distinctions among people in hierarchies of status and privilege’ 
(Young, 2005). She asks that we move our attentions away from ascribed 
attributes that mark difference and instead evaluate the ways in possession 
of these markers of difference fashion one’s socio-economic positioning and 
social perspective. Instances of groupness do not materialise because the 
Romanies share Indian origins, but because their shared societal positioning 
has instigated socio-economic disadvantage. Social groups are defined less, 
therefore, by a set of shared attributes, and more by the socio-economic 
positionings which determine their relations to others (Young, 2002, 89).  
 
That said, rather that exclusively centring on questions of identity, which 
Young argues is likely to neglect structural societal disadvantage, identity 
movements should pay heed to the injustice and ingrained differences arising 
from structural inequalities and constructions of “normal” and “other”.  For 
Young, we must imagine social groups in ‘relational rather than substantial 
terms’ in order to ‘retain a description of social group differentiation, but 
without fixing or reifying groups’ (Young, 2002, 89). In other words, when 
groups make political claims, they should not be narrowly understood as mere 
claims to recognition of a stigmatised or marginalised identity. Rather, while 
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the recognition of minority identity may make up part of a movement’s aims, 
the overarching claim is always for equality.  
 
By exploring the politics of positional difference, we may obtain a greater 
understanding into the circumstances that produce the need to exercise the 
demand for the recognition of oppressed identities. Additionally, we may 
understand more clearly that not all circumstances produce such a need. Put 
differently, both Young and Spivak reject the claim that all the individuals 
acknowledged as a single identity group always suffer the same hardship in 
every context. This more or less resembles what Nancy Fraser argues in her 
theory of redistribution and recognition. Fraser (2003) argues that inequality 
should be considered both economic, thus requiting material redistribution, 
and cultural, thus requiring the recognition of identities and cultural diversity. 
She contends that some social groups suffer from both types of inequality, 
specifically those from ethnic and racial minorities. Indeed, they are not only 
discriminated against in the labour market, but subject to ‘patterns of cultural 
value’ which privilege certain cultures over others, thus constructing ethnic 
and racial minorities as ‘deficient and inferior others who cannot be full 
members of society’ (Fraser, 2003, 23).   
 
Identity movements, according to Fraser, are often preoccupied with the act 
of disputing stigmatising cultural representations of minority groups, thus, 
isolating misrecognition from economic inequality and encouraging 
ethnic/racial essentialism. She proposes “a non-identitarian” politics that can 
resolve misrecognition without overlooking redistributive struggles and 
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essentialising group identity. She thus rejects the model of identity politics and 
proposes a “status” model. Misrecognition as status inequality requires a 
politics that will overcome subordination ‘by establishing the misrecognised 
party as a full member of society, capable of participating on par with the rest’ 
(Fraser, 2000, 113). This is arguably the aim of Romani nationalists who seek 
the equal participation of the “Roma Nation” in international and national 
government.  
 
If Romani nationalists were to consider these approaches, Romani 
nationalism may be able to concentrate not only on defining Romani identity, 
but on circumstantially and contextually issue and interest based collective 
action. By exploring the latter, one may encourage the increased 
materialisation of groupness and opportunities to form alliances and 
solidarities when group boundaries shift. A Roma Nation that takes such a 
perspective is more likely to steer clear of portrayals of the group as 
possessing internal homogeneity. Such an approach may highlight that the 
Romanies are continually evolving throughout the course of movement action 
and are established in a milieu of social relations. Thus, it may also 
simultaneously avoid demobilising the attempts of Romani nationalist to make 
claims and demands in the name of the Roma Nation.   
 
To conclude, therefore, this research has shown that there is little organised 
or explicit support for a Romani nationalist movement in Britain. Neither Roma, 
nor Romany Gypsies, identify with an Indian homeland and are equally 
unmoved by the idea of a Roma Nation. There is however, strong feelings of 
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exclusion, injustice and victimhood amongst these communities and, if 
carefully cultivated and framed, the Roma Nation may offer a home to this 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1: Roma Participants by nationality and wave of 
migration 
Name Gender Age Nationality Migratory Wave 
Efraim M 68 Bulgarian 1980s 
Ivana F 52 Bulgarian 1980s 
Simeon M 19 Bulgarian 1980s (second generation) 
Monika F 47 Czech 1990s (Refugee) 
Pavel M 25 Slovakian 1990s (Refugee) 
Teodor M 28 Kosovan 1990s (Refugee) 
Anastasija F 19 Slovakian Post-2004 EU 
Deshka F 35 Bulgarian Post-2004 EU 
Frida F 43 Hungarian Post-2004 EU 
Igor M 21 Slovakian Post-2004 EU 
Ina F 26 Romanian Post-2004 EU 
Ioana F 24 Romanian Post-2004 EU 
Janka F 26 Slovakian Post-2004 EU 
Katarina F 21 Slovakian Post-2004 EU 
Lenka F 36 Czech Post-2004 EU 
Madalina F 22 Romanian Post-2004 EU 
Marja F 24 Slovenian Post-2004 EU 
Michal M 20 Czech Post-2004 EU 
Miroslav M 28 Slovakian Post-2004 EU 
Natalia F 29 Slovakian Post-2004 EU 
Petra F 49 Slovakian Post-2004 EU 
Roman M 31 Czech Post-2004 EU 
Rozalina F 38 Bulgarian Post-2004 EU 
Velislava F 19 Bulgarian Post-2004 EU 
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Yuliyan M 45 Bulgarian Post-2004 EU 
Zusana F  48 Czech Post-2004 EU 
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Appendix 2 
Table 2.1: Sessions & Attendance of Intervention Group 1 
(West Yorkshire) 
Date Stage Length Attendance 
27/06/2016 Who we are 1 hrs 30 mins 12 
11/07/2015 Who we are 1 hrs 15 mins 11 
31/07/2015 Interlocutor 2 hrs 8 
08/08/2015 Interlocutor 1 hrs   8 
30/01/2016 Analysis 1 hrs 15 mins 6 
 
Table 2.2: Sessions & Attendance of Intervention Group 2 
(Sheffield) 
Date  Stage Length Attendance 
21/11/2015 Who we are 1 hrs 30 mins 10 
12/12/2015 Interlocutor 2 hrs 6 
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Table 2.3: Focus Groups 
Date Location Length Attendance 
24/09/2015 Midlothian 2 hrs 20 mins 7 
25/09/2015 Glasgow 1 hrs 45 mins 8 
27/11/2015 Derbyshire 1 hrs 45 mins 8 
 
Table 2.4: Interviews 
Date Participant Location 
15/07/2015 Natalia Telephone 
05/08/2015 Igor Telephone  
06/09/2015 Shannon Telephone 
08/09/2015 Annie Telephone 
25/09/2015 Ina Glasgow 
26/09/2015 James Edinburgh 
08/12/2015 Roman Derby 
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Appendix 3 
Focus Group Guide 
• How do the participants define Romaniness? 
o Cultural elements? Set of beliefs and values? Way of life? 
o Do Romany Gypsies and Roma consider themselves as part of 
the same “group”? Do Roma consider other Roma as part of the 
same “group”? 
• Are the participants aware of the theory of Indian origins?  
o Do they identify with an Indian homeland? Is it important to 
them?  
o Are there other places they consider a homeland? Where is 
home? 
o Do they have strong national identifications with their countries 
of origin/residence? 
• What are the participants’ experiences of “Otherness” and 
stigmatisation?  
o How does being Roma and migrant impact experiences of 
“otherness”? 
• Do the participants feel a sense of belonging to Britain?  
o What is their relation to Britishness?  
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Appendix 4 
Participant Consent Form 
Participant Consent Form. 
My name is Emily Webb and I am a PhD Sociology Student at the University 
of Leeds. The purpose of this consent form is to inform you of your rights as 
a participant in this study and of the procedures involved in the collection 
and keeping of data about yourself.  
What you need to know: 
• It is your right not to answer any question that you are asked. 
• You may ask me any questions which you have. 
• You are free to withdraw from the research at any point up to two 
months after your final interview/focus group without giving a reason 
and without consequences. 
• Your name and identity will be changed so no one will be able to 
recognise you in the study and guarantee confidentiality in any 
discussions and publications in agreement with the Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
• No information will be passed on to anyone connected to you. 
• The only information that I may have to tell someone is if you inform 
me that you or someone you know, who is under the age of 18, is 
being physically or mentally harmed or abused in any way. This 
information will be passed on to the appropriate persons.  
• The interview will be recorded digitally and all notes and recordings 
will be kept in a safe and secure place.  
• You have the right to access data about yourself and to ask for it to 
be returned to you at any time. 
• A copy of the completed research will be forwarded to you, should 
you wish to receive it. 
• I have read this consent form in full, I have had the chance to ask 
questions concerning any areas that I did not understand, and I 
consent to being a participant in this study. 
 
Signature of participant: __________________ Print name: -
___________________ 
 
Date of Participation: ________________ 
 
Signature of Researcher: _________________ 
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Participant Information Sheet 
My name is Emily Webb and I am a PhD student at the University of Leeds. I 
am currently working on a project that explores Britain’s Romani 
communities. Specifically I am interested in finding out more about your 
culture and way of life, your experiences of discrimination, your feelings of 
belonging and your understandings of the history of the Romani people. I 
would like to invite you to take part in this project. To help you with your 
decision, this sheet provides you with all the important information about this 
research and what your involvement would entail. Should you have any 
questions about this information please do not hesitate to contact me on: 
 
Email: ss08evw@leeds.ac.uk  or 
        Telephone: 07830683596 
 
 
What is the aim of the research? 
 
The aim of this research is to explore something called Romani nationalism 
and gather your thoughts on the “Roma Nation”. In other words, it aims to: 
 
• Understand experiences of discrimination, home and belonging. 
• Explore collective Romani identity.  
• Gather your opinions on the ways in which Romani activists and 
community leaders have described Romani identity.  
 
This research is part of my PhD studies at the University of Leeds. It is a 
small scale study that aims to make an educational contribution to 
knowledge about Romani communities that can be used by researchers and 
Romani communities alike.  
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
 
The UK is home to Romani communities from across Europe. I want this 
research project to adequately reflect the diversity of Britain’s Romani 
population. You have been invited to participate because you are a Romany 
Gypsy/ a Roma Migrant. 
 
What do I have to do if I take part? 
 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to attend (delete as necessary): 
 
• A face to face interview at a location of your choice. This is expected 
to last approximately one hour.  
• A focus group (group interview) in your community. This will last 
between 1.5 – 2 hours.  
• 4/2 focus groups in your community. These will last between 1.5 – 2 
hours.  
 
If you require a translator, one will be provided in the language of your 
choice.  
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Will the information I provide be kept confidential? 
 
All of the data collected from interviews and focus groups will remain 
confidential and anonymised. Audio recordings will be taken of your 
interviews and focus groups. These recordings will be deleted after they 
have been transcribed and will be anonymised. In other words, your name 
will be changed and any details that may identify you, such as your 
workplace or the names of family and friends, will not be used. Your contact 
details and transcripts of your interviews and focus groups will be stored 
securely at the University of Leeds.  
 
 
What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind? 
 
You are under no obligation to take part in the research – it is entirely your 
choice whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you are free 
to withdraw from the research at any point up to two months after your final 
interview or focus group. If you decide to take part you will be given a copy 
of this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form or give 
verbal consent.  
 
How will taking part in the research benefit me? 
 
Although there will be no immediate benefits for you if you participate in the 
project, it is hoped that this research will enhance knowledge of Romani 
people in the UK and assist future political action, activism and advocacy 
within Romani communities. The results of this research will be available to 
you, your community, and the organisations who act on your behalf.  
 
Thank you, for taking the time to read this information. Please feel free 
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Advisory Panel Consent Form 
Advisory Panel Consent Form. 
My name is Emily Webb and I am a PhD Student at the University of Leeds. The 
purpose of this consent form is to tell you of your rights as a member of the 
advisory panel and of the role that you will play within this research. This research 
aims to explore Romani nationalism, and the extent to which Britain’s Romani 
population support, and identify with, the notion of a “Roma nation”. 
What you need to know: 
• I will ask for your help and advice to develop a set of questions which will 
form the focus of this research. I want to know what issues are important to 
you and how I can produce research that will be beneficial to your 
community.  
• I will keep you updated on the progress of my research and share key 
findings.  
• Your job is to let me know where, how and when I am going wrong! You are 
the expert and it is your job to inform me when I have overlooked or 
overstated issues, or when I pay far too much attention to the issues that 
are not important to your community.  
• When the research process has finished, I would like you to join me in 
writing a research report which will be sent to Gypsy and Traveller 
organisations. This will be co-authored, so your name will appear alongside 
my own.  
• You are free to end your participation in the advisory panel at any time 
without giving a reason and without consequences. 
• The participants of this study are entitled to privacy and confidentiality. 
Should you join the advisory panel, you may have access to information that 
you must keep completely confidential. I will provide you with guidelines and 
information about the Data Protection Act 1988 and the BSA Statement of 
Ethical Practice so that you will understand your responsibilities fully.  
• You are also entitled to privacy and confidentiality and should you wish not 
to be identified as a member of the advisory panel then this is perfectly ok.  
• A copy of the completed research will be forwarded to you, should you wish 
to receive it. 
• I have read this consent form in full, I have had the chance to ask questions 
concerning any areas that I did not understand, and I consent to being a 
member of the advisory panel.  
 





Signature of researcher: _________________ 
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Appendix 5 
Example of Advisory Panel Correspondence  
Chapter 4 concerns 
 
Emily Webb <emvwebb@gmail.com> Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 1:26 PM 
To: Pip McKenzie <pipmckenzie@googlemail.com>; Shantelle Saunders 
<xoshantellesaundersxo@outlook.com>; Marinela Stancheva <maristancheva@gmail.com>; Monroe 
Atanasova <monroesmith@outlook.com>; Matt Lovell <mattlovell87@outlook.com>; Katarina 
Petrovic <katpetrovic995@outlook.com>  
Cc: Emily Webb <ss08evw@leeds.ac.uk.  
 
Hi all, 
I’ve been working on the first of my results chapters and have a few concerns. I’ve attached the 
chapter and a summary to this email. I know it’s long so please don’t feel obliged to read the whole 
thing but can I draw your attention to the section on page 7 called “The Other Others”. I think it’s 
important to include these quotes but wish to do so in a way that avoids making racism 
within/expressed by the Romani community the focus of the chapter. I’m trying to analyse these 
issues sensitively and with balance but I do think there is something really interesting and 
significant here. Any thoughts?  
Many thanks.  
Emily   
 
 
Pip McKenzie <pipmckenzie@googlemail.com> Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 5:18 PM 
To: Emily Webb <emvwebb@gmail.com>; Shantelle Saunders 
<xoshantellesaundersxo@outlook.com>; Marinela Stancheva <maristancheva@gmail.com>; Monroe 
Atanasova <monroesmith@outlook.com>; Matt Lovell <mattlovell87@outlook.com>; Katarina 
Petrovic <katpetrovic995@outlook.com> 
Cc: Emily Webb <ss08evw@leeds.ac.uk> 
Hey Em, 
 
Nah, I don’t think anyone is coming across as racist really just super frustrated with the situation. 
I think the way you’ve summed it up is spot on. There’s this one bit after Shaunas quote where 
you say she’s distinguishing between deserving and undeserving groups. Tbh my take on it is that 
she’s not blaming immigrants she’s blaming the gov for favouring them groups and giving them 
special treatment. I don’t think in her head she’s like fuck immigrants, its more like fuck 





Emily Webb <emvwebb@gmail.com> Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 6:58 PM 
To: Pip McKenzie <pipmckenzie@googlemail.com>; Shantelle Saunders 
<xoshantellesaundersxo@outlook.com>; Marinela Stancheva <maristancheva@gmail.com>; Monroe 
Atanasova <monroesmith@outlook.com>; Matt Lovell <mattlovell87@outlook.com>; Katarina 
Petrovic <katpetrovic995@outlook.com> 
Cc: Emily Webb <ss08evw@leeds.ac.uk> 
Hi Pip, 
 
Agreed. When I refer to “deserving” and “undeserving” others I meant Shauna thinks Gypsies 
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are more deserving of special treatment from the government than newly arrived immigrants. I 
don’t mean for Shauna to come across as believing Gypsies are better or superior to other ethnic 






Marinela Stancheva <maristancheva@gmail.com> 
Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 9:22 
AM 
To: Emily Webb <emvwebb@gmail.com>; Pip McKenzie <pipmckenzie@googlemail.com>; 
Shantelle Saunders <xoshantellesaundersxo@outlook.com>; Monroe Atanasova 
<monroesmith@outlook.com>; Matt Lovell <mattlovell87@outlook.com>; Katarina Petrovic 
<katpetrovic995@outlook.com>  
Hi Emily 
I think it’s very good actually and I don’t think you need worry about this racist thing. It reads 
very good to me and very interesting. A few things I thought as I read. 
1. I notice that some of the stories of refugees are gone now and I think they were very 
nice information for the reader.  
2. The Muslim Roma is very interesting I think for showing this is very different between 
Roma. I wonder if there is opportunity to have more detail about this? 




Monroe Atanasova <monroeatanasova@outlook.com> 
Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 13:28 
PM 
To: Marinela Stancheva <maristancheva@gmail.com>; Emily Webb <emvwebb@gmail.com>; 
Pip McKenzie <pipmckenzie@googlemail.com>; Shantelle Saunders 
<xoshantellesaundersxo@outlook.com>; Matt Lovell <mattlovell87@outlook.com>; Katarina 
Petrovic <katpetrovic995@outlook.com>  
Hi everyone! 
I agree with mari but I’m bias maybe because my family are muslim Turkish roma. But didn’t 
you have the life story of the muslim guy? Like that was good I think keep that in and you don’t 
need to go into proper detail. Only other thing I think is maybe there just isn’t enough on roma 
who were born here but with immigrant parents or mixed parents. I think that’s another kind of 
experience and I dunno if its too late to add something like that? I know there is one or two 
people, the refugee guy and the muslim.  
Mon xxx 
 
Pip McKenzie <pipmckenzie@googlemail.com> 
Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 13:51 
PM 
To: Monroe Atanasova <monroeatanasova@outlook.com>; Marinela Stancheva 
<maristancheva@gmail.com>; Emily Webb <emvwebb@gmail.com>; Shantelle Saunders 
<xoshantellesaundersxo@outlook.com>; Matt Lovell <mattlovell87@outlook.com>; Katarina 
Petrovic <katpetrovic995@outlook.com>  
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Agree with Monroe but think it’s too late now. Might be too late for Muslim thing too. What did 
happen to the bio things? 
 
Emily Webb <emvwebb@gmail.com> Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 19:25 PM 
To: Pip McKenzie <pipmckenzie@googlemail.com>: Monroe Atanasova 
<monroeatanasova@outlook.com>; Marinela Stancheva <maristancheva@gmail.com>; 
Shantelle Saunders <xoshantellesaundersxo@outlook.com>; Matt Lovell 
<mattlovell87@outlook.com>; Katarina Petrovic <katpetrovic995@outlook.com>  
Hi all, 
The participant biographies are separate to this chapter. In all honesty I am concerned about the 
word limit and whether I’ll have room for them. I definitely want to include them with the 
summary report though because I think they are useful for anyone working with Roma.  
Monroe, I really did consider this all the way through the research. I had to draw a line 
somewhere though. We do have Simeon in the study who was born in the UK to immigrant 
Roma parents. He does talk about this, I think in chapter 5. Let me follow up on this. Maybe this 
is something I can bring out in his narrative. 
Regarding Muslim Roma. I touch on this in all three results chapters. It’s something I would 
have liked to explore in a lot more detail but if I’m being realistic – it would need a whole study 
in itself, or at least a chapter which would require more fieldwork. Time wise this isn’t possible. 
It’s something I would consider for a future research project. Maybe it’s something we can work 
on in the future?  
Best wishes, 
Emily  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
